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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
OF LIBERAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 
The roots of feminism as an organized philosophical and 
political movement lie in liberalism. Liberalism's emphasis 
on individual rights, as opposed to obligations, creates an 
environment conducive to the political aspirations of many 
disenfranchised groups. Thus feminism, loosely understood as 
any attempt to "end women's subordination" (Jaggar 1983, 5), 
originated in claims by women to equal political rights within 
liberal society. Recently, however, many feminists have 
rejected liberalism, claiming that although liberalism 
initiated the feminist movement, it no longer adequately 
addresses women's emancipatory concerns. Indeed, some 
feminists claim that liberalism is itself merely a vehicle of 
patriarchy. 
Many feminists use the term "patriarchy" to identify the 
systematic oppression of women in all areas of life. Femi-
nists adopted this term from an older usage which designates 
the father's rule over his children. According to Kate 
Millett (1970, 25), "the principles of patriarchy appear to be 
two-fold: male shall dominate female, elder shall dominate 
younger." In attacking patriarchy, feminism extends 
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liberalism's emancipatory project. As liberalism undermines 
paternalism in politics, feminism challenges the rule of 
female by male. This extension of the liberal ethic revealed, 
according to many feminists, a limitation and contradiction in 
liberalism itself (see Jaggar 1983; Eisenstein 1981; Elshtain 
1981; Hirschmann 1992; Pateman 1988; Young 1990). Because 
liberalism rests on the assumption that the family is a 
private institution, largely outside political control, and 
because "patriarchy's chief institution is the family" 
(Millett 1970, 33), liberalism effectively leaves women 
captive within patriarchal family life. In particular, some 
feminists charge that the liberal understanding of family, and 
its relationship to politics, cannot adequately address the 
demands of women's biological, cultural and historical situa-
tion. Other feminists claim that liberalism's distinction 
between private and public eliminates women's unique moral 
voices from political discourse. Although liberalism's 
promise of individual freedom and equality invigorated women's 
aspirations, many feminists believe that this promise cannot 
be fulfilled within liberalism• s understanding of the distinc-
tion between private and public (see Jaggar 1983; Eisenstein 
1981; Elshtain 1981; Hirschmann 1992; Pateman 1988; Young 
1990). 
Liberalism's distinction between private and public is 
precisely what many feminists find most troubling: one's role 
in the family necessarily has consequences for one's position 
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as a citizen. According to these feminists, family relations 
are not free from coercion and therefore cannot simply be 
relegated to the private sphere as liberalism conceives of it. 
These anti-liberal feminists claim liberalism has been blind 
to and thus legitimized the inequalities in family relations. 
As Pateman (1987, 103) notes, "feminist criticism is primarily 
directed at the separation and opposition between the public 
and private spheres in liberal theory and practice." 
In this way, feminism extends and revolutionizes Marx's 
critique of liberalism. Marxism unmasked the relations of 
coercion inherent to capitalist economy, but failed in its 
emphasis on class structure to address women's subordination 
in the family independently of class. Feminism argues, on the 
other hand, that political equality demands at least some 
standard of both economic and familial equality (Nicholson 
1986, 3-4, 201-203). 
Linda Nicholson traces the historically evolving nature 
of private and public in Gender and History. Nicholson claims 
that "liberalism and marxism are manifestations of the 
changing dynamic between private and public in the seventeenth 
and nineteenth centuries, respectively," and that "feminism is 
a manifestation of the changing dynamic between these spheres 
in the nineteenth and twentieth century" (1986, 4). In her 
view, the decreasing role of kinship in politics resulted in 
liberalism's bifurcation of the private (family) and politi-
cal. Marxism redefined the private and public distinction, 
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identifying the relations of domination in the capitalist 
economy and removing them from the private, non-political 
sphere (1986, 201-203). Feminism also redefines the private 
and public distinction identifying the relations of domination 
in the family (1986, 3-4). 
Feminism exposes the relations of domination endemic to 
the family, although individual feminists have analyzed these 
bases on different terms. Susan Moller Okin (1979), in her 
ground-breaking Women in Western Political Thought, laid the 
foundation for the continuing feminist elaboration on the 
relationship between the private and public and its implica-
tions for woman's position in society. Through an exegesis of 
the works of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Mill, Okin 
discovers that because these thinkers continually define 
"woman" in terms of "family," true feminist reforms within the 
framework of these philosophies is limited, if not impossi-
ble. 1 Even the feminist liberal thought of John Stuart Mill 
fails to effectively address women's demands for equality, 
according to Okin. Although Mill posits that there exists "no 
natural inequality between the sexes," he consistently ties 
women to their roles as wives and mothers (Okin 1979, 227-
228) . Mill refuses to allow women to relinquish their 
domestic duties and fails to recognize the implications of 
1The notable exception to this synthesis of woman with 
family is, of course, Plato's Republic. Plato does, however, 
resurrect this synthesis in The Laws. 
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this burden for the possibility of women sharing equal 
political power with men. 
Other feminists, building on Okin' s original work, extend 
the critique of private and public in liberalism to include a 
critique of distinctions between man/woman, power/morality, 
and politics/family (Pateman 1987, 109). Zillah Eisenstein 
(1981, 223) identifies the private and public with woman and 
man: 
Because of the patriarchal origins of this 
distinction, the state is identified as the male 
and public world, and the family is defined as the 
female and private world. The rule by men is 
formalized by the state because this division of 
public and private life is at one and the same time 
a male/female distinction. On the basis of this 
distinction, ideology identifies the realm of 
female, family, private life, as outside political 
life and the domain of the state. 
Eisenstein argues that the public-private distinction merely 
reiterates, in a sophisticated "mystified" way, patriarchal 
oppression. In her view, the public-private distinction 
covertly maintains female subordination in the face of 
individual--male--liberty. Liberalism perpetuates and 
supports women's oppression by disallowing political means to 
attack women's subordination in the family, in language and in 
the market. By "reify(ing)" the distinction between familial 
and political life, liberalism institutionalizes woman's 
oppression by man (Eisenstein 1981, 44). 
Jean Bethke Elshtain criticizes liberalism on yet another 
ground, the association of public with power and private with 
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moral. 2 She traces the demarcation between public-private in 
liberal tradition to a deeper distinction between reason and 
feeling (Elshtain 1981, 116-117). Liberalism identifies 
politics with the realm of reason, self-interest, calculation; 
it identifies the private--the family--with the realm of 
nurturance, responsibility and love. This aspect of public-
private in liberalism Elshtain finds both dysfunctional and 
sexist. 
In this view, the problem with liberalism is two-fold in 
that liberalism both confines this compassionate nature to the 
non-political and in doing so relegates women to an inferior 
private sphere. The solution argues Elshtain, is not to 
politicize the family but to feminize the political. She 
hopes for a "politics of compassion" (Elshtain 1981, 348-349) 
in which: 
the activation of a female participatory capability 
must begin with her immediate concerns, go on to 
give a robust account of them, and then bring these 
concerns to a transformed vision of the political 
community. 
Arlene Saxonhouse poses yet another challenge for 
liberalism through her examination of premodern political 
thought. The premoderns, ranging from Plato to Machiavelli 
(to the extent that the latter is premodern) taught us that 
the private is political, that politics rests on a foundation 
2 Pateman (1987) suggests power and morality as one 
framework for understanding the feminist critique of public 
and private. 
7 
laid by the family. Woman and family play a central, albeit 
subordinate, part in the political thought of the premoderns. 
Both male and female are necessary for the exis-
tence of the whole. Preliberal thought acknowledg-
es the differences between the sexes and attempts 
to work with that difference, sometimes for better 
and sometimes for worse, to build coherent, stable 
political communities. (Saxonhouse 1985, 9) 
Liberalism, which distinguishes clearly between the 
public and the private, celebrating the individual's exploita-
tion of the private realm (in that endless search for goods) 
poses a paradox for the advancement of women. Saxonhouse 
distinguishes between private and public in a substantially 
different way than Elshtain. According to Saxonhouse, whereas 
in premodern times virtue (public) rested upon partiality 
(private), the elimination of a consideration of virtue in 
modernity transformed the public and private into two compet-
ing channels for the actualization of self-interest. Liberal-
ism pushes men back into the realm of traditionally female 
economic (in ancient terms "household") matters. In identify-
ing both the public and private with self-interest, liberalism 
eliminates differences between people in the public realm but 
also displaces woman from her traditional location, the 
private, without providing and adequate foundation for her 
integration within the public realm. 
As both public and private realms become arenas for 
male activity in the theoretical perspective of 
liberalism, the female, whose previous stature had 
been guardian of the private realm, was denied any 
significant place in the portrait of society. 
(Saxonhouse 1985, 15) 
8 
This dissertation def ends liberalism against those 
feminists who would jettison it as necessarily implicated in 
patriarchy (Eisenstein 1981; Elshtain 1981; Hirschmann 1992; 
Jaggar 1983; Nicholson 1986; Young 1990). In adopting a 
feminist perspective, I seek, in this dissertation, to defend 
liberalism as compatible with feminism. I defend liberalism 
as potentially feminist against those feminists who dismiss it 
as irretrievable patriarchal. Specifically, I argue that the 
patriarchal aspects of liberalism are historically contingent, 
that liberalism can effectively address patriarchy and still 
remain liberalism. 
In opening the family to politics, some feminists 
endanger individual integrity. In families, individuals 
express personal, uniquely chosen, ends; as such, families 
require a degree of autonomy from external coercion. In 
challenging the liberal distinction between private and 
public, some feminists lose the security that distinction 
offers individuals, in and out of families. Liberalism 
provides a model for battling familial inequities and their 
economic and political implications while preserving individu-
al autonomy. Liberalism, I argue, allows for a consideration 
of these concerns without losing sight of individuals and 
their need for autonomy within their own family. 
Although the demarcation of private and public arenas 
varies among different liberals, the aim remains the same: to 
secure individual autonomy. John Locke, writing to def end the 
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individual from an oppressive monarch and an established 
Church, distinguishes the public (politics) from the civil and 
the private 
attempt to 
(marriage, family, economics, religion) 
restrict the boundaries of legitimate 
in an 
state 
authority. John Stuart Mill, writing in a time and place 
where civil liberties had been widely accepted, sought to 
protect the individual from a new danger- - the tyranny of 
majority opinion. Mill seeks to protect the individual from 
the majority by delineating certain domains (e.g., freedom of 
speech) where the individual is sovereign. These freedoms 
must be respected regardless of the "likings and dislikings" 
of the majority. In the twentieth-century, John Rawls faced 
quite a different threat to individual self-actualization--
economic inequality. Rawls' welfare liberalism attempts to 
reconcile individual autonomy with economic disparity by 
redefining some economic concerns as political concerns. 
Regardless of the actual content of private and public in 
different liberal formulations, the private is identified with 
the freedom of individual action necessary to ensure autonomy, 
the public with the concessions of individuals living in 
groups. To limit and control coercion, to protect and 
maximize individual liberty, liberalism relegates political 
authority to certain arenas and labels other arenas as 
private, as beyond political control. Despite the fluctuating 
definitions of private and public (Nicholson 1986, 4), and 
despite the historically ambiguous nature of those definitions 
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(Pateman 1979, 103), liberalism explicitly and implicitly 
categorizes domains of various activities which it treats 
differently. It does this in order to allow for maximum 
liberty within a variety of social contexts. Liberalism 
creates an arena free from coercion (the private), and 
organizes the public so as to minimize its coercive potential. 
Both the private and public aim toward one end: the 
enhancement of individual autonomy. The adaptable nature of 
private and public in different liberal expressions allows it 
to face a variety of threats to individual liberty, whether 
those threats arise from within or without the political 
arena. Liberalism implicitly recognizes that a certain 
balance is required in the relationship between the familial, 
economic and political spheres if individual autonomy is to be 
maintained. In particular, the pull between public and 
private in liberalism reflects a pull between uni versali -
ty/partiality in each person. Just as each person must 
balance the needs of her/his own family with the needs of the 
community at large, liberalism represents a continual struggle 
to balance private and public in the face of changing circum-
stances (Kirp 1986, 18). 
An examination of the dynamics of private and public in 
the evolution of liberal thought can help liberalism meet the 
challenges of feminists who claim that liberalism denies the 
reality that women live each day--the overlap between public 
aspirations and private responsibilities (Pateman 1987, 117). 
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Specifically, liberal political thought provides feminism with 
a paradigm for understanding the meaning of different spheres 
of human acti vi ty3 while still allowing for an attack on 
patriarchy. Some feminists, in stressing "patriarchy," come 
close to defining all spheres of human activity in terms of 
male power, all heterosexual relationships in terms of 
domination (Landes 1982, 125). The liberal paradigm can help 
recapture the differences between power and love in both 
politics and family while admitting that considerable overlap 
exists and that patriarchy touches both. 
Liberalism allows for an understanding of the intersec-
tions between family and politics, private and public, while 
accounting for the differences between them. My relationship 
with my neighbor or an acquaintance differs significantly from 
my relationship with my sister, my spouse or my child. 
Liberalism recognizes the integrally distinctive nature of 
each realm while still allowing for a dialogue between them. 
So as Elshtain argues that we can transform politics through 
compassion, I would argue that the gentle, responsible, giving 
creature Elshtain depicts as original and distinctive to the 
family unit cannot survive translation to the political realm. 
Liberalism reflects a pull between reason (power) and emotion 
3See Walzer's Spheres of Justice for a thoughtful 
discussion of these different spheres and their overlap. 
Particularly note his discussion on "dominance" and "kinship 
and love." Okin in Justice, Gender and the Family also 
suggests that Walzer will be of particular help in the area, 
although she elaborates what she sees as major concerns with 
his feminism. 
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(nurturance) in each individual, and not necessarily between 
the sexes. The tension between reason, power and love is not 
only a tension between the different sexes but also within 
each individual. 
Finally, liberalism offers a picture of the individual as 
a responsible, reasonable actor and a vision for enhancing 
reflexive action. Whereas some feminist histories draw a 
picture of women as unwitting innocent victims of patriarchy 
who suddenly gain control of their destinies through the 
miracles of birth control, 4 liberalism constructs a system in 
which the individual accepts, and politics enhances, responsi-
bility. Liberalism provides a model for encouraging individu-
al responsibility while mitigating oppressive personal and 
social inequalities. 
This project builds, most directly, upon the work of 
Okin. In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin (1989a) 
suggests that certain twentieth century liberals, particularly 
Rawls, can be used, selectively, to meet feminist familial 
concerns. This dissertation builds on Okin' s suggestion while 
tying the liberalism of Rawls to the larger tradition of 
liberalism itself--a tie which Okin neglects. 5 In addition, 
this dissertation adopts a "spheres of justice" approach to 
politics and human life, articulated by Walzer (1983). Unlike 
4See, for example, O'Brien (1981). 
"Note Okin' s stinging criticism of Mill in Women in 
Western Political Philosophy (1979). 
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Walzer, I find this understanding of multiple spheres of 
activities to be compatible with, and informed by, liberalism 
and its understanding of the individual participating in a 
variety of relationships. 
In conclusion, feminist political thought lacks a 
coherent, systematic examination of private and public in the 
liberal tradition. The works of John Locke {classical 
liberalism), John Stuart Mill {modern liberalism) and John 
Rawls {welfare liberalism) serve as the foremost expressions 
of the various liberal traditions and should reveal both the 
universal and relative nature of private and public in 
liberalism. A coherent identification of the similarities 
among and the differences between private and public manifes-
tations in these expressions of liberalism should allow a 
separation of the inherent--from the incidental--character of 
public and private. This study clarifies the political 
implications of the feminist project while revealing the 
latent potential within liberalism for meeting this newly 
identified challenge to individual liberty--gender. 
This task will be accomplished in four steps. Chapter l, 
"Locke and Patriarchy," explores the classical liberalism of 
John Locke as a response to premodern patriarchy. Placing 
Locke's distinction between private and public in historical 
perspective reveals his attempt to protect individual autonomy 
from patriarchy. A look at Locke's foundation for politics in 
consent provides an opportunity for questioning the 
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responsible actor notion in liberalism. An elaboration of 
Locke's different purposes and meanings of authority demon-
strates at least a rudimentary understanding of the variety of 
different relationships (e.g., marital, parental, economic and 
political) in life. Furthermore, Locke's distinction of 
social from political, not merely private, may reveal the 
depth of understanding of the complexity of human relations in 
even this early liberal expression. 
Chapter 2, "Mill and Feminism," analyzes Mill's nine-
teenth century liberalism as both a unique response to 
particular historical threats to individual autonomy and as a 
continuation of the liberal project revealed in Locke. 
Special attention is paid to Mill's demarcation of certain 
areas of autonomy and their implications for feminist concerns 
with the family. Specifically, I ask if Mill's liberalism 
carries consequences for women's emancipatory concerns which 
he may not have carried to their fruition in his own feminist 
writing. 
Chapter 3, "Rawls and Gender Justice," assesses Rawls' 
Theory of Justice in light of the theme, gender justice. Can 
Rawls' "original position" and "veil of ignorance" accommodate 
the liberation of both sexes? Can Rawls' abstract individual-
ism be reconciled with women's actual, historical oppression? 
In particular, this chapter argues that Rawls distinguishes 
between private and public in a way that is both helpful to 
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women's emancipation, and maintains the liberal concern for 
privacy and individual choice. 
Finally, the conclusion, "The Liberal and Feminist 
Paradigm: Are the Two Mutually Exclusive?" illustrates the 
historically evolving nature of liberalism, and the private 
and public distinction as inherent to and as the product of 
that evolution. That chapter delineates the implications of 
this project for both the feminist and liberal paradigm. I 
argue that feminism must acknowledge and return to its liberal 
heritage if it hopes to reconcile sexual equality with 
individual freedom. 
Using a feminist perspective, my approach relies on 
textual exegesis and historical analysis. As Myra Jehlen 
(1982, 189) explains, 
Feminist thinking is really rethinking, an examina-
tion of the way certain assumptions about women and 
female character enter into the fundamental assump-
tions that organize all our thinking. 
Feminism reclaims women's experience in society, politics, 
history and language. Through textual criticism and histori-
cal analysis I investigate both women's inherent and inciden-
tal status in liberalism and the implications of that status. 
My focus differs from other feminist explorations in its 
concentration on the historically evolving nature of liberal-
ism and the dynamics of private and public within liberalism. 
CHAPTER II 
LOCKE AND PATRIARCHY 
As one of the founders of liberalism John Locke's 
political thought offers an opportunity to analyze and 
criticize key liberal assumptions. Individuality, rationali-
ty, family, and most importantly, the distinction between 
private and public life provide a focal point for the feminist 
critique of Locke and liberalism. Indeed, feminists target 
Locke as the first political theorist to explicitly separate 
private family from public politics and use his thought as an 
indication of the repercussions of that separation for women 
given their unique positions within families, the economy, and 
politics. Feminists ask whether Locke's distinction between 
private and public furthers or hinders women's emancipatory 
goals. 1 
Feminists read Locke with two goals in mind. Most 
simply, they hope to expose the assumptions about and implica-
tions for women evident in Locke's liberalism. More profound-
ly, they seek to reveal something integral to Locke's liberal-
ism--and liberalism in general--which becomes apparent when 
1For an interesting discussion of Locke's place in the 
history of the evolution of private and public, see Nicholson 
(1986). 
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one reads Locke with woman's unique personal, familial, 
economic, and political experiences in mind. Decentering man 
and putting woman at the center of Locke's political philoso-
phy discloses, for many feminists, the assumptions and 
subsequent limits of Lockean freedom and equality. On this 
basis, Nancy Hirschmann (1989, 1242) writes that "a feminist 
method profoundly alters the very terms of the discourse" in 
liberalism and concludes that "the context must be changed" in 
order for politics to adequately understand and address 
women's concerns. In fact, many feminists conclude that women 
simply do not, and cannot, fit into Locke's schema of freedom 
and equality; that is, Locke's thought on equality, autonomy 
and individuality fails to address women's actual biological 
and historical circumstances. For many feminists, reading 
Locke from a woman's perspective reveals an internal contra-
diction in Locke's liberalism which neither he nor liberalism 
in general can resolve (see e.g., Elshtain 1981; Eisenstein 
1981; Jaggar 1983; Nicholson 1986; Pateman 1987). 
These feminists find this internal contradiction most 
apparent in Locke's argument against patriarchy. As feminists 
correctly point out, patriarchy supports both paternalism in 
politics and the family. Patriarchy not only demands that 
older rule younger but also that male rule female. Locke's 
own argument against patriarchy addresses only the former 
(older rule of younger) while failing to challenge, and even 
buttressing, the latter (male rule of female). Locke manages 
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to do this by distinguishing between a public sphere (poli-
tics) where men are regarded as adults and a private sphere 
(in particular, the family) where men rule as "the abler and 
the stronger" (II, 82) . 2 This feminist reading of Locke 
concludes that Locke's liberalism can never deliver on its 
promise of equality and autonomy because Locke's argument 
against patriarchy goes neither far nor deep enough. While 
challenging the authority of one patriarch (the King) he 
justifies the authority of many (fathers and husbands). In 
distinguishing private family from politics Locke manages to 
free adult men while leaving women enslaved (see, in particu-
lar, Pateman 1988; see also Clark 1979; Coale 1988). 
The feminist critique of Locke centers on his distinction 
between public and private which, these feminists claim, 
allows him to liberate men while subordinating women. Some 
feminists look closely at Locke's thought on woman as wife, 
mother and laborer, and conclude that Locke's promise of 
public freedom and equality conflicts with his particular 
understanding of the private patriarchal family and woman's 
place in it. More specifically, these feminists claim that 
the individual Locke frees is biologically and socially male; 
that Locke eliminates political patriarchy while salvaging 
2Hereafter Locke's works will be cited as follows: An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding as Essay, Book #, Section 
#, paragraph#; A Letter Concerning Toleration as Letter, page 
#; Two Treatises of Government as 1, paragraph # and II, 
paragraph #; and Some Thoughts Concerning Education as STCE, 
Paragraph #. 
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familial patriarchy; that Locke's assumptions about property 
and rationality and women's economic position effectively 
undermine any possibility of sexual equality; and finally, 
that Locke's distinction between private and public brings all 
these facets of women's oppression together in a systematic, 
albeit "mystified" (Eisenstein 1981, 49) paradigm. In sum, 
these feminists critique Locke from all sides, finding Locke's 
philosophy inadequate to meet women's unique circumstances, 
arguing that putting woman into her appropriate biological, 
familial, economic and political context undermines any 
pretense of freedom and equality in Locke's thought. Locke's 
distinction between private and public cements women's 
oppression in all spheres of human activity. 3 
This chapter argues that Locke's feminist critics misread 
Locke and misinterpret his distinction between public and 
private. These anti-liberal feminists claim that the 
3Thus this chapter as well as the feminist critique of 
Locke goes well beyond his sexually biased language; that is, 
the question is not simply whether he used "man" or "he" in a 
generic or sexually specific way. Interestingly, Locke 
elaborates the meaning of "man" in distinguishing "man" from 
"person" in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. 
According to John Yolton he identifies the former with the 
"sameness of life in a biological organism" and the latter 
with a person aware of "one's actions and thoughts" ( 19 64, 
17). Locke himself refers to the "Species of Man" (Locke's 
emphasis) (Essay, III, 6, 26) . Probably, Locke used the 
pronoun "he" in both specific and non-specific ways. In Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education Locke uses the pronoun "he" 
throughout, with the exception of a few examples solely 
applicable to daughters, but also indicates in correspondence 
to Mrs. Clark that the educational advice given in that work 
applies almost wholly to daughters as well (Eisenstein 1981, 
4 8) • 
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public-private distinction is founded, directly or indirectly, 
in male-female differences, thereby relegating women to the 
private sphere. Particular feminists characterize the public 
and private distinction differently, as one between reason and 
passion (Elshtain 1981), or politics and family/economy 
(Eisenstein 1981), or politics and marriage, "male sex right" 
(Pateman 1988), but behind all these characterizations looms 
what each considers fundamental or socially constructed 
differences between the sexes. The real dichotomy behind 
Locke's public-private distinction, however, is not male-
f emale but adult-child. Locke's anti-paternalism underlies 
his identification of a variety of spheres (e.g., politics, 
religion, the economy and the family) where persons interact 
as adults. Clearly, children cannot and should not be treated 
as adults. Locke's distinction between family and politics 
reflects this child-adult difference. 
Furthermore, what some feminists represent as a dichotomy 
between public and private is actually for Locke a multitude 
of interacting and partially integrated spheres in which 
individuals act. An examination of these various spheres 
reveals a latent potential in Locke's philosophy for address-
ing women's particular circumstances. Locke distinguishes 
private spheres--family, religion, economy--from the public, 
political sphere in an attempt to further the understanding of 
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each unique relationship and to guard against authority in one 
sphere inappropriately seeping into another. 4 
(T)he Power of a Magistrate over a Subject, may be 
distinguished from that of a Father over his Chil-
dren, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his 
Wife, and a Lord over his Slave .... It may help us 
to distinguish these Powers one from another, and 
show the difference betwixt a Ruler of a Common-
wealth, a Father of a Family, and a Captain of a 
Galley. (II, 2) 
Locke explores the dynamics at work in a number of different 
spheres of human relationships and attempts to balance the 
needs of both equality and liberty within and between each 
sphere. He also indicates an understanding of the impact of 
each sphere on another: rather than isolating each sphere 
from the others he demonstrates the necessity of diminishing 
inequalities of one sphere to affect opportunities for 
equality in another. 
In sum, the feminist critique of Locke has neglected the 
more radical strains in Locke's thought. These come into 
focus when one interprets Locke's distinction between private 
and public as an expression of the competing needs and rights 
of a multitude of spheres and when one understands these 
spheres within the context of adult liberty and parental 
4See Walzer (1983) for a recent exploration of the 
distinctions between various private and public spheres. 
Walzer, like Locke, guards against "domination" in one sphere 
inappropriately influencing relationships in another. For 
example, one should not be able to buy political off ice; 
economic dominance should not translate into political 
dominance. 
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nurturance. 5 More specifically, depicting Locke's politics 
as isolated from familial and religious concerns leads some 
feminists to mistakenly conclude that materialistic hedonism 
grounds Locke's politics (see, in particular, Elshtain 1981). 
Representing Locke's distinction between private and public as 
dichotomous leads other feminists to conclude mistakenly that 
Locke's political theory fails to provide an avenue for the 
understanding and amelioration of women's private subordina-
tion (see, among others, Coole 1988; Nicholson 1986; Pateman 
1987). 
Not only do some feminists misread Locke and underesti-
mate the radical potential in his work, their rejection of the 
liberal distinction between private and public leaves the 
feminist project vulnerable to a tyranny as great as male 
tyrannical rule over female. Some feminists undermine the 
distinction between private and public activities without 
suggesting or sketching a suitable alternative conception of 
either family or politics or the differences between each. 
Although the personal carries political implications, the 
personal is not political. To conceive of it as such opens 
the family to tyrannical intrusions from a (compassionate?) 
political system. Families are by their nature private. 
Locke does not arbitrarily label them as such. The family 
5Contemporary 
radical strains in 
ramifications for 
(1987). 
scholarship has focused on these more 
Locke without specifically exploring the 
feminism. See, for example, Ashcraft 
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functions not only as a financial unit, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, as an emotional unit where love can override 
interest and giving can take place without a constant concern 
for reciprocity. 6 To politicize this love beyond family 
dilutes it to such an extent as to destroy it. 7 Love, by its 
nature, is prejudiced, unequal (Walzer, 229) not universal or 
generalized. 
Family arrangements, marital arrangements, demand a 
certain degree of personal choice free from the demands of 
political dictates. Regulation of the give and take in family 
and marital exchanges would destroy the free expression of the 
love that takes place within families. Demands for equality 
limit the choices of individuals in their interpersonal 
behavior. A demand for equality within the family, by its 
nature, denies liberty. In seeking to destroy Locke's 
distinction between private and public, some feminists fail to 
provide a protection for the free, prejudiced and unequal, 
expression of love. 
None of this denies that politics necessarily affects 
families, or that any political philosophy must recognize and 
constructively regulate the impact of each sphere on the 
other. However, I argue that any interference of one sphere 
into another should not only be limited, but also should 
6See Walzer (1983) discussion of the family as an 
emotional/financial unit. 
7See Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic in Poli-
tics, Ernest Barker, ed. (1979, Bk. 2, Chap. 3, 43-45). 
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respect the unique nature of that other sphere. Locke's 
identification of separate, yet interacting, spheres of 
activities is crucially important to the feminist project of 
human emancipation as a necessary protection against tyranny. 
Whereas some feminists argue that Locke's philosophy of 
liberty is ultimately a philosophy of patriarchy, I argue that 
Locke's anti-paternalism, his distinction between private and 
public, can be harnessed by feminists in the struggle for 
freedom and equality, despite the fact that Locke himself 
often failed to delineate the radical potential within his own 
principles. Locke's thought on personhood, marriage and 
family, the economy, and most importantly, private and public 
relationships, all demonstrate Locke's principles of emancipa-
tion and egalitarianism. 
The purpose of this first chapter is not to paint Locke 
as a feminist, or even as a precursor of feminism (indeed the 
term feminist in this context would be an anachronism) but 
rather to fully examine some of his more radical thought on 
gender and family and demonstrate that liberalism itself can 
accommodate both male and female demands for liberty and 
equality. Demonstrating the principles of liberty and 
equality at work in a multitude of spheres highlights this 
radical potential and guides this chapter. By emphasizing the 
more radical aspects of Locke's thought with respect to women, 
this chapter hopes to draw attention to the sexually liberat-
ing potential in classical liberalism. Toward this end the 
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remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section elaborates the feminist critique of Locke. The 
second section expounds those principles in Locke's political 
philosophy most valuable to feminist aspirations. The third 
section details a specific response to the feminist chal-
lenges. 
The Feminist Critique of Locke 
Feminist critics of Locke perceive a conflict between his 
promises of political liberty and equality and women's 
individual and social circumstances. Two broad strains of 
anti-liberal feminist criticism of Locke exist: a communi-
tarian feminist critique and a radical/marxist feminist 
critique. 8 The former stresses women's particular biological 
and familial situations and concludes that the person Locke 
frees is biologically and socially male. The latter concen-
trates on women's unique familial and economic circumstances 
and concludes that the structure of society and politics which 
Locke defends leads inevitably to women's domination by men. 
Both the communitarian feminist and radical/marxist feminist 
analyses conclude that Locke's liberalism oppresses rather 
8Mary Dietz (1987) identifies two feminist challenges to 
the liberal notion of citizenship which she labels maternalist 
feminism and marxist feminism. The two critiques I discuss 
here are substantially the same. I've changed the names for 
two reasons. The former label, "maternalist feminism" 
neglects, I think, the debt of these feminists to more 
traditional communitarian thought. The latter, "marxist 
feminism" collapses, too readily, feminist thought on patriar-
chy with marxist thought on class. 
26 
than liberates women. Both strains of anti-liberal feminists 
agree that Locke's attack on patriarchy fails to undermine 
men's patriarchal rule over women. 
The communitarian feminist reading of Locke argues that 
Locke's philosophy revolves around an exclusively male 
individual, who concerns himself with self-preservation, 
maximizing rights and accumulating wealth. He is the center 
of his world; his own needs drive his actions. According to 
Mary Dietz (1987, 2), liberal individuals, including Locke's 
individuals, "are atomistic, rational agents whose existence 
and interests are ontologically prior to society." Individ-
uals tend "naturally toward egoism" (Jaggar 1983, 31). 
The communitarian feminist interpretation of the char-
acter of Locke's individual derives from an older reading of 
Locke, his notion of human nature and its relationship to 
politics. Leo Strauss• Natural Right and History (1953) 
claimed, among other things, to discover the moral foundation 
grounding Locke's politics and Locke's individual. Contrary 
to the dominant interpretation, Strauss asserted that Locke's 
writings on the state of nature, natural law, and the moral, 
religious individual were actually a prudent subterfuge 
obscuring the primacy of the state of war, self-interested 
natural right and individual hedonism. Locke, in this 
Straussian interpretation, makes the selfish Hobbesian 
individual palatable; Locke rejects the traditional and 
Christian explanation of humanity partaking in an ordered 
27 
universe guided by independent, discernable moral codes 
(natural law) and instead places the individual and his 
limitless search for joy at the center of his political 
system. Strauss (1953, 248) claims that, 
through the shift in emphasis from natural duties 
or obligations to natural rights, the individual, 
the ego, had become the center and origin of the 
moral world, since man--as distinguished from man's 
end--had become the center or origin. 
This hedonism, a "peculiar" hedonism associated with the 
accumulation of wealth rather than the simple immediate 
enjoyment of pleasure, explains both the character of the 
Lockean individual and the nature of politics. The intent of 
Locke's politics, as seen by Strauss, is to guard the individ-
ual' s hedonist pursuits and protect "the joyless quest for 
joy" (1953, 251). Strauss' interpretation of Locke's politics 
empties it of any virtue higher than self-interest, of any 
compassion or morality not immediately founded on the individ-
uals own egoistic desires. 
Communitarian feminists do not greatly dispute the 
accuracy of this description of men; rather, they challenge 
its applicability to women. Communitarian feminists assert 
that women's experience of themselves and the world differs 
significantly from male--and 11 liberal 11 --individuals. Liber-
alism tries to fit women into a mold which they cannot and 
should not accommodate. Some communitarian feminists trace a 
difference in men's and women's moral agendas--that is, their 
empathic capability--to their different reproductive 
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capacities interacting within social contexts. Man's alien-
ation from the product of his body at conception actualizes 
itself in his greater sense of separateness, in abstract moral 
reasoning, and in his historical and institutional attempts to 
mediate his alienation from the means of reproduction (0' Brien 
1981). Women, in contrast, immediately and profoundly 
experience themselves as connected, both in their reproductive 
experience and their historical roles as nurturers. Women, 
who traditionally have centered their lives around the 
activities of the family, realize themselves as members of a 
group, members bound by the needs and desires of others as 
well as the limits of that unique familial context. Women 
cannot and should not become liberal individuals. 
feminists 
eschew the liberal notion of citizen as an indi-
vidual holder of rights .... Such a notion is at 
best morally empty and at worst morally subversive 
since it rests on a distinctly masculine conception 
of the person as an independent, self-interested, 
economic being. (Dietz 1987, 10) 
These 
Women are more likely to think, to act, to reason in terms of 
duty rather than right. 9 
Jean Bethke Elshtain's (1981, 118) analysis of liberalism 
centers on this sexually differentiated understanding of self. 
9Carol Gilligan (1982, 100) documents male and female 
moral development in In A Different Voice. Gilligan: "The 
moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews with 
women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern 
and alleviate 'the real and recognizable trouble' of this 
world. For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an 
injunction to respect the rights to life and self-fulfill-
ment." 
The presumption that human beings are rational, 
metaphysically free, prudential calculators of 
marginal utility ... is used as a contrast model for 
the qualities and activities in a private world 
from which the public sphere is bifurcated theoret-
ically. 
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According to Elshtain, the emphasis on rights and self-
interest in liberal politics eliminates the distinctly 
feminine voice from liberal political discourse. Women's 
moral sense of connectedness and compassion is relegated to 
extra-political institutions such as family. This works to 
the detriment of both women and liberalism by secluding 
women's compassionate natures in the private family and 
robbing politics of the compassion women can bring to polit-
ical endeavors. The male perspective further fails politics, 
as government's purpose is to guide compassionate co- existence 
not hedonistic anarchy. 
In this way, communitarian feminists challenge not only 
liberal individualism but also liberal rights, liberal 
obligation and liberal rationality (Jaggar 1983; Hirschmann 
19 89; Elshtain 19 81) . For women, rights are not primary, 
obligations are not conventional and rationality is not 
completely objective and abstract. Women's superior empathic 
abilities distinguish them from men--and Locke's individual. 
In addition, in separating family from politics, Locke 
isolates women's compassionate, familial nature from the hard 
cold world of politics. For Locke, politics protects property 
which in turn protects self-interest. Family, however, 
nurtures. Within the family another's interest can override 
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one's own. The intimate ties within a family allow its 
members to forcefully and cogently appreciate and consider the 
interests of other members. In contrast to politics, duty 
precedes right in family. Elshtain (1981, 126) decries 
Locke's politics as oblivious to the "silenced" private sphere 
of the family and, historically, women's voices. In separat-
ing politics from family, liberalism, and Locke in particular, 
diminishes politics to self-interest and relegates women's 
voices to the private, non-political realm. 
Saxonhouse (1985, 14) offers a different, communitarian 
analysis: 
Locke, with his theory of property--his contention 
that the acquisition of property could lead to the 
increased wealth and happiness of the entire human 
--gave justification for abandoning public life and 
turning to the private search for wealth. 
Saxonhouse criticizes liberalism and Locke from the standpoint 
of antiquity. Politics for the Ancients entailed the pursuit 
of virtue, personal and social justice, whereas the household 
simply provided an economic, private basis for this public 
pursuit. In reducing politics to the protection of property 
Locke creates two competing realms of self-interest. Whereas 
for Elshtain Locke's politics silences compassion, for 
Saxonhouse Locke's politics silences virtue in its pursuit of 
secure life and goods. This silence is the antithesis of the 
very foundation of politics as first espoused in ancient 
political thought. 
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The conununitarian feminist disagreement with Locke 
focuses on the perceived dichotomy in his thought between 
private and public, family and politics. In depoliticizing 
the family Locke allows room for only the male voice in 
politics, devaluing the significant contribution of the female 
character and perspective. The radical/marxist feminist 
critique similarly emphasizes Locke's understanding of private 
and public, detailing how women's actual marital, familial and 
economic (i.e., private) positions militates against promises 
of political emancipation for women. Radical/marxist femi-
nists point to an incongruence in Locke's thought between 
formal political rights and the subs tan ti ve inequalities women 
experience in a variety of societal relationships. 10 Whereas 
both the conununitarian feminist and radical/marxist feminist 
reading of Locke revolve around his separation of family and 
politics, the latter argue that in depoliticizing the family 
Locke both misinterprets reality and hinders women's emancipa-
tory struggles. These feminists maintain that the elimination 
of male control over female demands an understanding of the 
political character of women's private, familial situations. 
Accordingly Locke's liberal political philosophy obscures, 
10 In terms of liberalism in general, Catherine MacKinnon 
(1987, 16) states "Hear this: the abstract equality of 
liberalism permits most women little more than does the 
substantive inequality of conservatism." 
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indeed disallows such an understanding. 11 
The radical/marxist feminist critique of Locke incorpo-
rates and extends the more general marxian critique of 
liberalism. Whereas Marx revealed the intricate relationship 
between the economy and politics, pointing to the patterns of 
coercion operating in the economy, radical feminists unmask 
the patterns of coercion present in the family which are 
reflected in the economy and politics (Nicholson 1986). More 
directly, radical/marxist feminists extend the marxist 
interpretation of Locke offered by C. B. Macpherson (1962, 
195, 261) which exposes Locke as an apologist for the nascent 
English capitalist class. According to Macpherson, Locke 
postulates the "full individuality for some ... by consuming the 
individuality of others." That is, Locke sacrifices the 
emergent working class to economic enslavement and inequality 
in order to defend the right of the capitalist class to a 
11Carole Pateman (1988, 3) best represents this feminist 
analysis of Locke when she distinguishes paternal patriarchy- -
where older males, fathers, rule younger males and all women- -
from fraternal patriarchy- -where all men rule all women. 
According to Pateman, Locke frees adult males from their 
fathers, thus undermining paternal patriarchy. Yet he 
incorporates "male sex right" (male conjugal rights or powers) 
and substantive inequality by protecting patriarchal familial 
arrangements, instituting fraternal patriarchy. Patriarchal 
families allow men to claim individual rights to freedom and 
equality while maintaining male rule over female, smashing 
feminine aspirations to the same liberty and equality. Locke 
fundamentally transforms political patriarchy but Locke's 
thought remains patriarchal. One man no longer rules all 
other men and women, now all men rule all women. "Patriarchy 
ceased to be paternal long ago. . . . The original contract 
takes place after the political defeat of the father and 
creates modern fraternal patriarchy" (Pateman's emphasis). 
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virtually limitless pursuit of wealth. In this view, "Locke's 
whole theory of limited and conditional government was 
essentially a defense of property." The distinction between 
a private economy and public politics served both the demands 
of the emerging capitalist class for the appearance of 
political equality and supplied the required subs tan ti ve 
inequality necessary for the continuation of their pursuit of 
wealth within a capitalist market. In this way, private and 
public in Locke establishes both theoretical equality and 
actual inequality. 
Radical/marxist feminists apply this reading of Locke's 
distinction between private and public spheres to women's 
actual marital, familial, economic and political situations. 
They outline the inequalities present in all these spheres of 
activities and conclude that these actual inequalities obviate 
any formal equalities Locke may promise. Locke's failure to 
recognize the patterns of coercion in marriage, family and the 
economy obliterates any hope for equal rights for women within 
his political system. In fact, following Macpherson, these 
feminists conclude that private and public in Locke merely 
serves as a tool for the continuation of patriarchy. Formal 
equality for women both masks and legitimates the actual 
inequality in marriage, family and the economy. 
According to the radical/marxist feminist approach, 
Locke's particular version of the marriage contract is 
patriarchal, demanding the subordination of women. Despite 
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Locke's assertion that each person has "Property in his own 
Person" and that the "Labour of his Body and the Work of his 
Hands ... are properly his" (II, 27), Locke overlooks reproduc-
tive labor. Mary O'Brien (1989, 13) notes, "We do not yet ask 
what, if all labor creates value, is the value produced by 
reproductive labor." 12 Moreover, a wife's labor in a marriage 
produces community property (or offspring) which the husband 
controls as the "abler and the stronger" (II, 82). This 
communality of property in the family, and the husband's 
ultimate control over property produced through his wife's 
labor, conflicts with the woman's right to the value of the 
property produced by her own labor (Nicholson 19 86, 156) . 
Women not only bear and raise children, but also traditionally 
reproduce (i.e., maintain) the entire household, including the 
husband. The husband's control over community marital 
property ignores women's reproductive labor. 
More specifically, although women bear the brunt of the 
labor involved in both the reproductive processes and nurtur-
ing, Locke delegates ultimate control of the product of that 
labor, the children, to the husband. Furthermore, Locke's 
claim that marriage provides for a "Right in one anothers' 
Bodies" in effect translates into male control over the female 
body given the inequities of the marriage contract and the 
cultural reality, where women have historically not owned 
12Mary O'Brien's thought bridges what I have called the 
communitarian feminist critique of Locke and the radical 
feminist critique. 
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their bodies but have been subject to both the control of 
their fathers and their husbands. In this way, the marriage 
contract legitimizes "masculine sex-right" (Pateman 1988, 
16 8) . 
Radical/marxist feminists conclude that for Locke the 
institution of monogamous marriage functions primarily as an 
insurance of legitimate heirs for the biologically alienated 
father. Lorenne Clark (1978, 38) asks, in reference to Locke, 
If Adam does not own Eve, how can he be sure who 
his descendants are, and hence, on whom his apples 
ought properly to devolve? And if Eve owns her own 
apples, why should she obey Adam? 
Along similar lines, O'Brien (1981, 159) concludes that 
Locke's liberalism mediates male uncertainty about his 
biological offspring by maintaining patriarchal families. 
The final solution of the problem of patriarchy is 
elaborated by John Locke in his first "Treatise of 
Government," while the legitimacy of property as a 
self-generating "principle of continuity" is cele-
brated in his second. 
That is, Locke's celebration of private property demands a 
system- -patriarchal marriage- -whereby the father can, with 
certainty, identify his rightful (biological) heir. Locke 
captures women in patriarchal marriage contracts in order to 
ensure the continuation and transfer of property to legitimate 
heirs. 
Although Locke contends that the terms of the marriage 
contract are negotiable for both men and women (each partner 
may protect the property with which he or she enters the 
contract), feminists point out that for Locke women must 
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contract marriage. According to Locke, women's sequential 
reproductive potential (where the woman bears a second child 
before the first matures) and the infant's extensive need for 
care provides a "Foundation in Nature," a necessity requiring 
that the woman contract marriage. 13 Thus, women's existing 
economic and social disadvantages, exacerbated by the necessi-
ty to contract, significantly erode the opportunity for women 
to conclude non-patriarchal marriages. Although women may 
have some latitude in negotiating the terms of the contract, 
this formal latitude masks the fact that nature dictates the 
need to contract and history dictates the husband as the head 
of that contract. 14 Diana Coale (1988, 86) summarizes the 
dilemma liberalism poses for women: 
... there is no reason why they should not strive 
for a favorable conjugal contract if, as in the 
case of queens, they are able. Here is the novel 
and revolutionary core of liberalism: every indi-
vidual is at liberty to compete for autonomy and 
success through the exertion of will. Yet it is 
unlikely that many women will succeed because their 
natural and customary disadvantages remain. Thus 
emerges the hiatus which prevents the doctrine from 
fulfilling its radical, universalist promises. 
In a similar vein, Linda Nicholson decries Locke's 
"dehistoricization" of the family. Locke's version of the 
nuclear, patriarchal family is historically contingent, 
130n this basis Lorenne Clark (1979, 20) notes that Locke 
never mentions or discusses single women. 
14 Socialist Anatole France eloquently observes, "The law, 
in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor 
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal to 
eat." 
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according to Nicholson, and not founded in nature as Locke 
argues. The "Foundation in Nature" to which Locke appeals in 
order to justify his own version of the nuclear family is 
actually historically and culturally specific. History 
reveals a variety of familial arrangements. History, not 
nature, constructs Locke's family. Patriarchy, male domina-
tion, is not based in nature as Locke describes, but is rather 
the specific byproduct of a particular historical and cultural 
process. 
In addition to demonstrating the patriarchal aspects of 
Locke's notion of marriage and family, radical/marxist 
feminists point to a number of economic issues which are 
prejudicial to women. Besides criticizing the husband's 
control over community property, feminists turn to Locke's 
teaching on parental honor and inheritance. These feminists 
note that despite Locke's contention that children owe both 
parents honor, the "Power Men generally have to bestow their 
Estates on those, who please them best" which "is no small Tye 
on the Obedience of Children" (II, 7 2 - 7 3) belongs to the 
Father. These feminists echo Leo Strauss in asking: What is 
honor without obedience? What power do women have unless both 
parents control inheritance? According to Diana Coole (1988, 
92) this allows the 
father considerable political leverage thanks to 
the terms of the marriage contract which generally 
make him sole executor of the family property. (See 
also Clark 1979) 
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Radical/marxist feminists off er an even more stinging 
critique of Locke's thought as applied to women's actual 
economic position. 15 In this view, Locke's rationality is 
inextricably tied to property; ownership expresses human 
rationality and individuality. Locke's optimism about the 
abundance of land and raw materials leads him to conclude that 
the rational and industrious can and will acquire private 
property. Furthermore, to the 
degree that the right to private property excludes 
the working classes and women, they are excluded 
from the realm of free and rational activity. 
(Eisenstein 1981, 44; see also, Jaggar 1983; Coole 
1988) 
"He does not understand that it is the nature of private 
property to exclude the laboring masses" and women (Eisenstein 
1981, 46). Locke thereby excludes women and laborers from 
legitimate activity in the political realm. Jaggar (1983, 32) 
quotes Locke: 
opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly 
as narrow as their fortune and their understanding 
are but little instructed, when all their whole 
time and pain is laid out to still the croaking of 
their own bellies, or the cries of their chil-
dren .... 
The distractions of the cries from their children and the 
husband's control of the wife's property indicate women's 
inferior rationality for Locke. 
Picking up one nuance of this radical/marxist feminist 
critique and applying it to women's unique political 
15 See Macpherson (1962) for the origins of the argument. 
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situation, Carole Pateman (1979, 74-76) analyzes the role of 
tacit and express consent as it applies to women. When one 
expressly consents to government--by, for example, inheriting 
property in that system--one acquires a "higher obligation" 
(e.g., one may not emigrate) than that imposed on those who 
tacitly consent (see II, 121; see also, Coole 1988; Nicholson 
19 86) . Women, however, have previously surrendered their 
estates in the marriage contract and so "at best their 
interest" in the social contract is "indirect and mediated by 
the husband" (Coole 1988, 94). Thus, women are in but not of 
the social contract (Nicholson 1986, 157). The standard of 
consent for women and their indirect interest in its political 
protection imposes both differential motives and obligations 
on women. More specifically, in so far as the state protects 
their life, women benefit; as to protecting their estate, 
women possess no interest in consenting. Coole (1988, 94) 
explains that "women will therefore receive limited benefits 
from the state, although these will be sufficient to oblige 
them to obedience." 
On the basis of this examination of Locke's notion of 
family, economy and politics, radical/marxist feminists oppose 
Locke's separation of family from politics, of private from 
public. Women's subordinate position in the family and the 
economy profoundly affects their possibilities for autonomy 
and equality. Even if Locke's liberalism does grant women 
formal, abs tract freedoms in the political realm, in 
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separating family from politics, Locke leaves woman enslaved 
in family, society and the economy. In "reifying" (Nicholson 
1986, 137) the distinction between family and politics, Locke 
"mystifies" women's subordination (Eisenstein 1981, 49). 
Locke's separation of public from private offers the vision of 
freedom and equality with one hand while pulling it back with 
the other. Radical/marxist feminists conclude that if 
politics relies on bargaining and contractual agreement then 
equality is only possible if all negotiators have equal access 
to valuable goods with which to negotiate. By nature of 
familial obligations, historical expectations and economic 
disadvantages, women are not properly equipped to compete in 
the liberal public sector. 
Thus both the communitarian and radical/marxist feminist 
critiques revolve around Locke's attempt to depoliticize the 
family. The separation of private and public life renders 
Locke unacceptably and necessarily patriarchal to feminist 
critics. An elaboration of the Lockean principles of liberty 
and equality, as they operate in the private and public 
spheres, however, demonstrates that Locke's understanding of 
the distinction between private and public is essential to 
attaining the feminist goals of liberty and equality. 
Locke's Liberal Response 
I argue that these anti-liberal feminists not only 
misinterpret Locke's distinction between private and public as 
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dichotomous 16 and "reified" 17 but also that they endanger the 
feminist project (women's emancipation) in abandoning it. The 
feminist claim that the "personal is political" may collapse 
human relationships into a single dimension. Patriarchy 
touches all human relationships, but not all human relation-
ships are defined by patriarchy. Some feminists resurrect 
exactly that notion of politics which Locke finds most 
repugnant and dangerous in his protagonist, Sir Robert Filmer: 
the failure to recognize the difference between private and 
public pursuits (Elshtain 19 81, 212 -214) . Locke distinguishes 
private from public concerns as a protection against tyranny. 
16 Pateman (1987, 106, 119) describes the liberal distinc-
tion between private and public as a dichotomy and argues that 
"Locke's theory ... shows how the private and public spheres are 
grounded in opposing principles of association which are 
exemplified in the conflicting status of women and men; 
natural subordination stands opposed to free individualism." 
Eisenstein ( 19 81, 16) also identifies this dichotomy. In 
discussing the woman as mother she argues that "derived from 
this are the more subtle forms of patriarchal organization: 
... the division between public and private life, and the 
divorce of political and family life. The separation of male 
from female constructs a dichotomous world view that limits 
insight into the structure of patriarchal organization itself" 
(my emphasis). 
17 Feminists use the term "reified" to describe what they 
perceive as the liberal abstraction of public from private 
life, an abstraction founded on an inappropriate understanding 
of reality. Pateman (1989, 91-92) states that in Locke, "a 
reified conception of the political is built upon what I shall 
call the fiction of citizenship." She continues "Liberal-
democratic theory today ... continues to present the political 
as something abstracted from, as autonomous or separate from, 
the social relationships of everyday life." Nicholson (1986, 
2, 4, 137) also describes the Lockean distinction between 
private and public as "reified" and argues that modern 
feminism, in contrast, recognizes the "complex interconnec-
tions" between the family and other spheres of society. 
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Tyrants, according to Locke, extend their "Power beyond, what 
of Right belonged to the lawful Princes, or Governours of the 
commonweal th" (II, 19 7) . 18 In protesting Locke's separation 
of family from politics some feminists threaten individual 
freedom and choice. These feminists fail to balance the 
demands of liberty and equality in terms of the variety of 
specific social contexts. 
Indeed many feminists do assert the need to distinguish 
private from public. 19 The crucial problem becomes one of 
identifying a model which articulates the differences between 
private and public while providing an avenue for the elimina-
tion of patriarchy. Properly understood, Locke provides the 
beginning of such a model. An examination of the dynamics at 
work in the variety of spheres Locke identifies reveals the 
radical potential founding his private-public paradigm. 
18Walzer ( 19 83, 19) explains the relationship between 
private and public spheres and the protection against tyranny 
more explicitly. "The regime of complex equality is the 
opposite of tyranny. It establishes a set of relationships 
such that domination is impossible. In formal terms, complex 
equality means that no citizen's standing in one sphere ... can 
be undercut by his standing in some other sphere." 
19 For example, O'Brien (1989, 79) distinguishes between 
"intimate" space and "public" space. Elshtain (1981) also 
criticizes radical feminists for forgetting about this 
important distinction. Pateman (1987, 119, 122) summarizes 
that the feminist critique of the liberal distinction between 
private and public does not "necessarily suggest that no 
distinction can or should be drawn between the personal and 
political aspects of social life." Rather "Feminism looks 
toward a differentiated social order within which the various 
dimensions are distinct but not separate or opposed." For 
provocative explorations of a feminist distinction between 
private and public see Young (1990); Hirschmann (1992). 
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Locke distinguishes a variety of social spheres in terms 
of both their foundation and their ends (II, 71). Families, 
for example, originate in "Inclinations of Tenderness and 
Concern" (II, 63) of parents for their children. The marital 
relationship also expresses this natural inclination to 
intimacy (Ashcraft 1987, 109-112). Marriage brings with it: 
Mutual Support and Assistance, and a Communion of 
Interests too, as necessary not only to unite their 
Care, and Affection, but also necessary to their 
common Off-spring. (II, 78) 
The end of marriage and family is the duty of parents "to take 
care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of 
Childhood" (II, 58). Politics begins with the person's desire 
to be free of arbitrary and non-consensual political authority 
(i.e., the avoidance of a state of war) (II, 21) and has as 
its goal the preservation of property (II, 3). Feminists 
misread Locke when they describe his separation of private 
(family) and public (politics) as dichotomous and reified. 
Rather Locke explores the dynamics at work in a number of 
different spheres of human relationships and attempts to 
balance the demands of both individual liberty and equality in 
each sphere. Locke's reciprocal principles of liberty and 
equality both inform his treatment of various spheres (famil-
ial, religious, economic, and political) as well as determine 
the extent that one sphere can actively intervene another. 
For Locke, adults are rational, free and equal. Upon 
reaching the age of reason, persons are assumed to have the 
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consciousness of self and consequences which allows reasonable 
action (Ashcraft 1987, 47-48, 168). 
Thus we are born Free, as we are born Rational; not 
that we have actually the Exercise of either: Age 
that brings one, brings with it the other too. (II, 
61) 
Individual freedom consists not only in the ability of 
individuals to choose their actions in accordance with their 
preferences but also in their capacities to organize their 
desires rationally, so as not to always succumb to immediate, 
ephemeral passions. This rationality allows individuals to 
discern an ordered reality which reveals certain laws of 
justice to humanity (natural law). Liberty allows reasonable 
individuals to discern this order and respond appropriately 
(Polin 1969, 3-6). Natural law constrains both the state of 
nature and civil government. As Locke explains, 
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern 
it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is 
that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult 
it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty 
or Possessions. (II, 6) 
In moving from the pre-political state of nature to civil 
government, individuals consent to a common judge to interpret 
and enforce natural law through civil law. Thus, natural law 
operates within civil arrangements as well as the state of 
nature. For this reason, the individual cannot sell him or 
herself into slavery in or out of the social contract. 
Natural law forbids the arbitrary destruction of one's own or 
another's life (Grant 1987, 67-71). 
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Liberty is not license. Laws of nature and of government 
both circumscribe and enlarge human liberty by harmonizing 
individual freedom with that of other free individuals. 
Liberty assumes equality. Individuals are equal before 
natural law; nature neither assigns rulers nor subjects 
(Pangle 1988, 234). Among adults: 
Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another: there being nothing more evi-
dent, than that Creatures of the same species and 
rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages 
of Nature, and use of the same faculties, should 
also be equal one amongst another without Subordi-
nation or Subjection. (II, 4) 20 
Nature lends equal authority to each individual, although 
individuals vary in terms of strength, beauty or intelligence. 
Locke illustrates these principles of freedom and 
equality at work in a variety of human relationships, specifi-
cally in his thoughts on family, politics and the relationship 
between them. Locke explicitly and systematically distin-
guishes political from familial relationships. He does so in 
response to Sir Robert Filmer, who confounds the two. 
Filmer's Patriarcha, the leading exposition and defense of 
patriarchy in Locke's time, grounded political authority in 
paternal right which, according to Filmer, reflected divine 
will. That is, Adam's dominion over Eve, their children and 
the world has been passed, father to son, to present day 
20 Locke makes this same point many times. "The Equality, 
which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion 
one over another, ... being the equal Right that every Man hath, 
to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or 
Authority of any other Man" (II, 54). 
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rulers. Indeed, occasionally God intervenes to ensure his 
will but the justification of political power remains the 
same: Adam's fatherhood passed to his heirs legitimizes 
political authority. For Filmer, politics is not like family; 
politics is family (Nicholson 1986, 141). The king exerts 
both paternal and political power over his subjects, because 
the king is literally both patriarch of this extended politi-
cal family and head of the political institutions. 
In response, Locke's First Treatise directs itself to 
demonstrating the differences between family and politics, 
between natural and conventional authority. Locke separates 
familial from political ends in an attempt to protect individ-
ual liberty, to free adults from patriarchal political rule. 
Locke's distinction between family and politics safeguards 
both adults and children. Children benefit because politics 
can never adequately replace a loving parent. Adults benefit 
because politics recognizes their status as mature, rational 
beings. 
According to Locke, the family's purpose is procreation 
and the education of children. Sexual and emotional affinity 
and the sharing of common goals guide its movement. 
God hath made it their business to employ this Care 
of their Offspring, and hath placed in them suit-
able Inclinations of Tenderness and Concern to 
temper this power, to apply it as his Wisdom de-
signed it, to the Children's good, as long as they 
should need be under it. (II, 63) 
Parenting requires tenderness and a personal understanding of 
each unique child. Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
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(STCE) demonstrates the need for flexible, loving parents. 
The ill - tempered child's discipline and upbringing should 
differ from that of a timid child. Each child enters a family 
with particular dispositions. A parent can appropriately and 
lovingly gear a child's education to his or her particular 
strengths and weaknesses (Yolton 1989, 14-15). 
He, therefore, that is about Children, should well 
study their Nature and Aptitudes, and see, by often 
trials, what turn they easily take, and what be-
comes them, observe what their Native Stock is, how 
it may be improved .... He should consider, what 
they want; whether they be capable of having it 
wrought into them ... and whether it be worth while 
to endeavor it. (STCE, 122) 
Locke understands the implicit dimensions underlying family 
life. 
In contrast, protection of property directs political 
action; politics operates in terms of individual rights, each 
person's interest in securing body, liberty and estate from 
injury. 
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making 
Laws ... for the Regulating and Preserving of Proper-
ty, and of employing the force of the Community, in 
the Execution of such Laws.... (II, 3) 
Locke's distinction between politics and family is 
founded in the difference between adults and children. Adults 
are free; children require guidance until they reach an age of 
reason where they are presumed to perceive natural law for 
themselves. "And thus we see how natural Freedom and Subjec-
tion to Parents may consist together, and are both founded on 
the same principle" (II, 61). Adulthood brings with it both 
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reason and freedom. Feminists who misinterpret this distinc-
tion as resting ultimately on differences between man and 
woman not only misread Locke but also fail to grasp the 
liberating potential in Locke. Locke distinguishes adults 
from children, politics from family, so that adults will be 
treated as adults, not children. 21 Women can utilize Locke's 
distinction between family and politics to safeguard both 
adults and children. Locke's private-public distinction 
allows women to claim their adult status in politics and 
family without detracting from the unique parental relation-
ship. Children remain under the authority of their parents. 
In principle, wives need not, should not, remain under the 
authority of their husbands. 
Locke's distinction between family and politics is also 
founded in the difference between intimacy and citizenship. 
The former relies on personal, emotional ties; the latter 
relies on mutual respect for each person as a rational, free 
and equal individual. Actually two types of emotional 
21 II, 2, clearly distinguishes parental from political 
authority. II, 54-55, identifies "that equal Right every Man 
hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the 
Will or Authority of any other Man." Children differ from 
adults in that they have not yet reached a state of full 
equality. "Children, I confess are not born in this full 
state of Equality, though they are born to it. Their Parents 
have a sort of Rule and Jurisdiction over them when they come 
into the World, and for sometime after, but 'tis but a 
temporary one. The Bonds of this Subjection are like the 
Swadling Cloths they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the 
weakness of their Infancy. Age and Reason as they grow up, 
loosen them till at length they drop quite off, and leave a 
Man at his free Disposal." 
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relationships compose modern nuclear families: parent/child 
and wife/husband. Locke's distinction between family and 
politics captures both features of modern families: the 
mutual, intimate, sexual support present in the spousal 
relationship and the nurturing, loving support present in the 
parental relationship. Neither spousal nor parental relation-
ships can survive translation to the political sphere. One 
cannot love a stranger as one loves a spouse or a child. 22 
Thus, anti-liberal feminists misunderstand family when 
they reduce it to its public dimensions, to the political. 
Not only does this fail to account for the dynamics at work in 
the different relationships, but it also forgets that individ-
ual liberty requires a refuge from politics which is lost if 
one dissolves the distinction between family and politics. 
Family provides a shelter from the over-arching, arbitrary 
intrusions possible when politics steps into family. In 
addition, although families provide love, it is politics which 
provides the sufficient scope necessary for the full develop-
ment of the personality. Persons need both families and 
politics as distinct relationships to actualize their poten-
tial. Neither can be reduced to the other. 
Locke's understanding of adult freedom and equality 
profoundly influences his understanding of marriage. While 
feminists correctly point out some disturbingly patriarchal 
22 See Ashcraft ( 1987, 109 -112) for a discussion of the 
role of intimacy in Locke's family. 
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features of Locke's thought, some also neglect its deeper 
potential for a radical transformation of patriarchal mar-
riage. For example, although Locke does grant control of 
community property to the husband as the "abler and stronger," 
he does so only after having already undermined the notion 
that strength gives authority (Schochet 1975, 249-250). Locke 
himself denies "that Men live together by no other Rules but 
that of Beasts" (II, 1). Furthermore, not only is Locke 
tentative in granting marital authority to the husband--it 
"should be placed somewhere" (II, 82) --he immediately opens 
the possibility of marriage without male domination and female 
submission. "But the ends of matrimony requiring no such 
Power in the Husband," that power, 
might be varied and regulated by that Contract, 
which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far 
as may consist with Procreation and the bringing up 
of Children till they could shift for themselves; 
nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not 
necessary to the ends for which it is already made. 
(II, 83) 
Indeed, here Locke merely reiterates a point he made in his 
First Treatise: 
There is here no more Law to oblige a Woman to such 
a Subjection, if the Circumstances either of her 
Condition or Contract with her Husband should 
exempt her from it, then there is, that she should 
bring forth her children in Sorrow and Pain. (1, 
4 7) 
Melissa Butler (1978) has shown that Locke often con-
sciously departs from traditional views about women in the 
interest of individualism. Locke understood that his individ-
ualism required a consideration of women as well as men as 
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individuals. Similarly, Mary Lyndon Shanley's (1979, 91) 
study of seventeenth century marriage contract theory leads 
her to conclude that Locke revolutionized marriage, not in 
basing it in a voluntary contract, but in making the terms of 
the contract negotiable: 
Locke's notion that contract might regulate proper-
ty rights and maintenance obligations in marriage 
was an astonishing notion, and not for the seven-
teenth century alone. 
For Locke, a woman could control not only who her partner was 
to be, but also the terms of her relationship to that chosen 
partner. Despite patriarchal aspects of Locke's thought, the 
basis of a radical transformation in the institution of 
marriage lay in his work. Locke takes his own principles of 
individual liberty and equality seriously and in doing so 
revolutionizes marriage and family. Although Locke betrays 
his own principles in some specific instances, this does not 
invalidate the principles themselves. 
This radical Locke also surfaces in an examination of his 
thought on family, as well as marriage. Locke denies the 
husband's ultimate control over the children, as God, not the 
children's father, is the "Author and Giver of Life" (1, 52) 
and "the Mother cannot be denied an equal share in begetting 
the Child, and so the Absolute Authority of the Father will 
not arise from hence" (1, 55) . 23 Mere paternity does not lend 
authority, at least no more than the mother herself shares by 
23 See Nicholson's (1986, 142) discussion on this point; 
also Ashcraft (1987, 72). 
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virtue of her maternity. In addition, although Locke tenuous-
ly grants control of joint property and children to the 
husband, he explicitly excludes property belonging to the wife 
before the union (II, 82). This is significant because every 
woman enters the contract with a fundamental property right in 
her own body, and therefore retains control of that property. 24 
This carries radical repercussions for the traditional 
institutions of marriage and family. On this basis, women can 
protect their bodies, and the product of their bodies from 
masculine domination. Neither nature nor God demands that the 
woman relinquish control of her body, or her labor, to her 
husband. Furthermore, the wife's and child's independent 
claim on familial property suggests that paternal authority 
over property is one of trust rather than absolute control. 25 
A violation of political trust allows revolution. Conceiving 
of paternal authority as a trust not only indicates a move 
away from a patriarchal conception of the family but also 
implicitly recognizes the redress available in the case of a 
breach of that private trust-revolution. Locke not only 
undermines his own apparent support for an authoritarian 
patriarchal family structure, he also recognizes the histori-
cally and culturally fluctuating nature of this social unit. 
24Coole (1988, 88) overlooks the significance of this 
exclusion for all but a few lucky heiresses. 
25 Locke (II, 83) identifies the "Community of Goods, and 
the Power over them, mutual Assistance and Maintenance, and 
other things" as "belonging to Conjugal Society." 
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Although Locke describes an historically specific family, he 
leaves open the possibility of cultural and historical 
adaptations. As long as the family fulfills its purpose- -
educating young--Locke can accommodate it. Locke cites 
various circumstances where "the Children are all left to the 
Mother" and even where "one Woman hath more than one Husband 
at a time" (I I, 6 5) . 
include polyandry 
For Locke, the marriage contract could 
(Tarcov 1984, 209). Although Locke's 
familial illustrations reveal a bias toward a traditional 
nuclear family, the implications of his contractual thought do 
not lend to the closure feminists such as Linda Nicholson 
suggest. The application of Locke's principles are not 
limited by any one historical or cultural manifestation. 
Locke's understanding of individuals as free and equal 
persons interacting in a variety of relationships informs his 
picture of marriage, family and politics and the possibilities 
inherent to those institutions. In addition, although 
politics and family are distinct spheres, Locke argues that 
the boundary between them is not impermeable. He paves an 
avenue through which politics can actively encourage the 
actualization of liberty and equality in the family. Politics 
can, on some bases, interfere in the family (as with the 
economy and religion, as indicated below) . Family and 
politics are not separate, dichotomous and reified for Locke 
as some feminists claim. He not only discusses the reciprocal 
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relationships of family and politics but also, more implicit-
ly, the extent of political intrusion in the family. 
A comparison of marriage and political contracts yields 
evidence to suggest that politics can interfere with family 
(Butler 1978, 145). Consent grounds both types of contracts 
according to Locke. Just as Locke argues that the social 
contract can legitimately support a number of political 
institutional arrangements, monarchy, aristocracy and democra-
cy (although Locke does have preferences), so the marriage 
contract can support a number of familial arrangements. But, 
according to Locke, in politics we cannot consent to an 
absolute monarchy; 26 this would deny the freedom and equality 
which justifies consent in the first place and which is a 
necessary feature of societies bringing together rational 
individuals. Similarly, although Locke does not expressly 
make this argument, authoritarian, patriarchal marital 
contracts would violate the inalienable rights to life, 
liberty and property of those contracting (in this case, the 
wife) and be illegitimate. 27 Politics, in its legitimate role 
as a caretaker of these inalienable rights, can and should 
26More exactly, absolute monarchy is in principle 
illegitimate. As Ashcraft (1987, 118-120, 155-157) points 
out, absolute monarchs exist and historically people have 
consented to them; but, in principle this consent, and those 
absolute monarchies, are illegitimate. People living under an 
absolute monarch remain, in fact, in a state of nature. 
27 Locke (II, 202) limits authority in various contexts. 
"For the exceeding the Bounds of Authority is no more a Right 
in a great, than a petty Officer; no more justified in a King, 
than a Constable." 
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step into the family to support these rights and to subvert 
illegitimate marriage contracts. Politics protects the life, 
liberty and property of women as well as men and can step into 
the family to do so. Locke's principles of freedom and 
equality can be used to attack patriarchal families as well as 
patriarchal politics and allows politics to conduct such an 
attack on patriarchy in the family. Just as politics can 
interfere in the economy in the interest of life, liberty and 
property, so it can interfere in the family "the end of 
Government being the preservation of all" (IL 159) . 28 
Both the marriage contract and the political contract are 
bound by natural law. 29 These boundaries are most evident in 
the limits to the consent which forms each society. In 
neither case may one sell one's self into or consent to 
slavery (Lemos 1978). As noted earlier, consent to slavery 
violates the natural law to preserve one's own, and another's 
life (Grant 1987, 71). This indicates that mere efficiency is 
neither the standard of a good political or familial order. 
Locke denies the justice of an efficient, absolute monarchy 
28 Later in the work I provide a detailed discussion of the 
relationship between the economy and politics, and specific 
examples of the ability of the latter to interfere in the 
former. 
29 Locke (II, 135) explains, "Thus the Law of Nature stands 
as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. 
The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well 
as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law 
of Nature, i.e., to the Will of God, of which that is a 
Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the 
preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or 
valid against it." 
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(Grant 1987, 92) and, implicitly of the efficient absolute 
authority of the father. This demonstrates that both politi-
cal and familial relationships appeal to a principle of 
justice which transcends each. In this way, Locke implicitly 
recognizes the steps civil government can take to discourage, 
even outlaw, authoritarian, patriarchal marriages. Liberal 
politics can actively attack patriarchal marriages which 
violate this principle of liberty, which violate natural law 
(the principle of justice in families). For example, femi-
nists could use Locke's notion of liberty and consent to 
attack, and outlaw, all types of rape, including marital 
rape. 30 Regardless of the marital contract a woman's body 
remains her own. Penetrating that woman's body without her 
consent violates natural law. Politics legitimately steps in 
to protect that woman and punish that perpetrator. In sum, 
although Locke distinguishes politics from family, both appeal 
to natural law as the standard of a just familial, or politi-
cal order. 
The interactive relationship between family and politics 
becomes apparent when put in the context of natural law. The 
family's role is to educate children to assume roles as free 
and responsible adults. Appropriate familial education 
becomes almost a patriotic duty for Locke. In his introduc-
tion to Some Thoughts on Education, Locke declares: 
3
°For a discussion of the relationship between rape and 
patriarchy, of the patriarchal use of rape to keep women 
subordinate, see Brownmiller (1975). 
The well Educating of their Children is so much the 
Duty and Concern of Parents, and the Welfare and 
Prosperity of the Nation so much depends on it, 
that I would have everyone lay it seriously to 
Heart. ( STCE, 80) 
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The family educates for liberty while liberal politics allows 
the exercise of that liberty (Tarcov 1984, 76). Specifically, 
Locke designs his education so as to subdue the child's desire 
for mastery over others and directs this desire to mastery 
over one's self and one's desires (Tarcov 1984, 89-90). 
Children must not be allowed to master their parents, their 
maids, their rewards or their environments; rather, they 
should be taught to master their desires through reason (STCE, 
33-36). Locke also tells us that example is the best teacher; 
surely a patriarchal master of the household would undermine 
any attempt to subdue the desire in children to master others. 
The political sphere provides an environment within which 
the marital union occurs and familial activities take place. 
For all the ends of Marriage being to be obtained 
under Politick Government, as well as in the state 
of Nature, the Civil Magistrate doth not abridge 
the Right, or Power of either naturally necessary 
to those ends, viz., Procreation and mutual Support 
and Assistance whilst they are together; but only 
decides any Controversie that may arise between Man 
and Wife.... (II, 83) 
Just as family relations can influence politics, liberal 
politics can influence family and marital relationships. 
Politics can support and encourage non-patriarchal marriage 
contracts. Feminists who oversimplify Locke's distinction 
between private and public, describing it as reified, fail to 
account for the potential in Locke's description of private 
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and public for understanding, even shaping the influence each 
sphere has on the other. 
Not only does Locke's description of the relationship 
between private and public allow politics to address patriar-
chy in the family but his defense of individual freedom and 
rationality encourages individual action in order to establish 
and protect liberty. Illegitimate rule allows, indeed 
demands, revolution. The principles of justice constraining 
family and politics, and Locke's explicit assertion that 
individuals can ascertain those principles of justice for 
themselves, 31 logically supports a right to revolution where 
the individual can demand justice in either the familial or 
political community. Oppressors do not give up power, the 
oppressed seize it. 32 
31Locke (II, 6, 225) throughout the Second Treatise, 
asserts this individual capability to discern natural law: 
"The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern 
it ... which ... teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, 
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." The 
people, the oppressed, serve as judge of the oppression: "If 
a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all 
tending the same way, make the design visible to the People, 
and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, 
whither they are going, it is not to be wonder'd, that they 
should then rouze themselves, and endeavor to put the rule 
into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which 
Government was first erected." 
32 It should be noted that Locke (II, 168, 176, 225) is not 
inciting citizens to immediate or imprudent revolution. "And 
he that appeals to Heaven, must be sure he has Right on his 
side; and a Right too, that is worth the Trouble and the Cost 
of the Appeal, as he will answer at a Tribunal, that cannot be 
deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according 
to the Mischiefs he has created to his Fellow- Subjects." Only 
a "long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifaces, all 
What is my Remedy against a Robber, that so broke 
into my House? Appeal to the Law for Justice. But 
perhaps Justice is denied, or I am crippled and 
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do 
it. If God has taken away all means of seeking 
remedy, there is nothing left but patience ... then 
they may appeal ... to Heaven, and repeat their 
Appeal till they have recovered the native 
Right.... (II, 176) 
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Mary O'Brien (1989) argues that the feminist revolution, 
unlike any revolution in the past, occurs in the private 
realm. Locke's liberal principles open the door to such a 
private revolution. As Shanley (1979, 70) says, "Women, like 
men, were free beings able to define their relationship to 
others by their own wills and consent." Locke's theory of 
revolution derives from Locke's conception of both men and 
women as free, rational beings. 
A revolution in the private realm, in the family, is far 
from easy or certain, given the pervasiveness of patriarchy. 
Since those who benefit from patriarchy do not simply relin-
quish control, women must demand freedom and equality across 
the spectrum of familial, economic and political life. In 
addition, as we have seen, liberal politics encourages the 
enhancement of freedom and equality in the family. Freedom 
and equality in any realm reverberates into others. Locke 
provides for both an individual and political at tack on 
patriarchal families. 
tending the same way" will incite a majority which is typical-
ly rather complacent. Locke is, however, emphatically 
defending a people's right to protect their own liberty when 
circumstances demand it. 
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Marriage, family and politics are only three spheres of 
human relationships which Locke explores in terms of liberty 
and equality. Throughout his writing Locke locates a number 
of different spheres of human activity which operate according 
to different principles, different centers of gravity. 
Locke's treatment of these other spheres echoes his treatment 
of the relationship between family and politics. Politics can 
interfere in religion, or in the economy, to protect each 
person's right to life, liberty and property. 
In religion charity grounds action. Love, as in love thy 
neighbor, defines religious relationships. Religion concerns 
itself with the "Interest of Mens Souls" (Letter, 26) whereas 
politics concerns itself with property, body and estate. 
Locke, in rebuttal to those who confound these two spheres, 
distinguishes faith from coercion. Once again, the interests 
of liberty and equality demand that politics not preach and 
preachers not coerce. While exploring the different laws of 
conduct guiding religion and politics, however, he implicitly 
and explicitly recognizes the interactive nature of these 
spheres of action. In a Letter Concerning Toleration Locke: 
undertake[s] to represent how happy and how great 
would be the Fruit, both in Church and State, if 
the Pulpits everywhere founded with the Doctrine of 
Peace and Toleration. (Letter, 34) 
Furthermore, Locke demonstrates the necessity for mitigating, 
and eliminating, the prejudicial impact of religion on other 
spheres: 
All ... care is to be taken that the sentence of 
Excommunication, and the Execution thereof, carry 
with it no rough usage, of Word or Action, whereby 
the ejected Person may any wise be damified in Body 
or Estate. (Letter, 30) 
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Politics protects property and religion cares for souls. 
Politics cannot interfere in religion for the sake of souls 
(i.e., faith) but it may for the sake of property. When 
religious rites threaten life, liberty or property, government 
legitimately intervenes. 
But those things that are prejudicial to the Com-
monweal of a People in their ordinary use, and are 
therefore forbidden by Laws, those things ought 
not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred 
Rites. Onely the Magistrate ought always be very 
careful that he do not misuse his Authority .... 
(Letter, 42) 
On this basis, politics need not, should not, tolerate the 
sacrifice of infants, "promiscuous uncleanness, or practise of 
other such heinous Enormities" (Letter, 42), or the sacrifice 
of any calf other than the member's own. 
In the economic sphere utility guides action. Property 
originates in each person's drive for self-preservation and 
has as its end the comfortable life of the laborer, and by 
extension, those who benefit through his/her labor. Rational 
individuals best serve their own interests as well as those of 
the community. Free individuals exercise their liberty 
through labor and the procurement of property (Polin 19 69, 6) . 
In this way, property manifests liberty, rather than sheer 
materialism (Myers 1991). For Locke, an individual's right to 
property encompasses actually two rights: 1) the right to 
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private property, to keep what one labors for or inherits, and 
2) the right to acquire property in the first place (Lemos 
1978, 140-141) . 33 The former generates inequalities while 
manifesting liberty; the latter demands a modicum of equality 
in order to ensure liberal expression through property. This 
becomes most apparent when one reads Locke's use of the word 
"property" in its broadest sense: "property" connotes one's 
liberty as well as one's estate (Myers 1991, 327-329). 
So, once again, Locke attempts to balance freedom and 
equality, this time by structuring the dialogue between 
politics and the economy. Class divisions can be neither so 
great that one class of people is permanently crippled in its 
at tempts to acquire property, 34 nor so small that they 
inadequately reflect individual effort. In this way, politics 
protects property while setting the terms of economic rela-
tionships, establishing the limits of procurement, and 
enforcing taxation: 
... in some parts of the World (where the Increase 
of People and Stock, with the Use of Money) had 
made Land scarce, and so of some Value, the several 
33 Putting the individual's right to property within the 
context of each person's duty to preserve God's workmanship 
also supports this conclusion. In this interpretation, a 
right to property is based upon appropriate use, upon its 
promotion of human happiness. See Tully (1980); Ashcraft 
(1987). 
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"Man can no more make use of another's necessity, to 
force him to become his Vassal, by withholding that Relief, 
God requires him to afford to the want of his Brother, than he 
that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to 
his obedience, and with a Daggar to his throat offer him Death 
or Slavery" (1, 42; quoted in Tully 1980, 137). 
Corrununities settled the Bounds of their distinct 
Territories, and by Laws within themselves, regu-
lated the Properties of the Private Men of their 
Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement settled 
the Property which Labour and Industry began. (II, 
45) 
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over and above this, because "all the Members of the Society 
are to be preserved" (II, 159), 
he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of 
his full Satisfaction, and give way to the pressing 
and preferable Title of those, who are in danger to 
perish without it. (II, 183) 
One may be coerced, presumably through political means, to 
provide for the needy. Furthermore, Locke's injunction to 
leave "enough and as good" (II, 33) for others when procuring 
property, al though considerably weakened with the introduction 
of money,"' demands that neither disparity of wealth be so 
great, nor monopolies of goods be so extensive, as to bar the 
opportunities of others to an equal exercise of labor and 
enjoyment of goods. Locke protects each person's right to 
acquire, as well as own, property. Often, as has been 
demonstrated, these two subsidiary rights need to be bal-
anced. 36 
35The introduction of money provides that "he who 
appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but 
increase the corrunon stock of mankind" (II, 3 7) . With or 
without the presence of money, however, when procurement 
lessens the corrunon stock of mankind, obstructs the rights of 
others to acquire property through labor, Locke would, in this 
interpretation, curtail appropriation. 
36 Furthermore, Locke (I, 86) limits the right to property. 
"And thus Man's Property in the Creatures, was founded upon 
the right he had, to make use of those things, that were 
necessary or useful to his Being." 
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Following this same line of argument, as politics can 
interfere in the economic realm it can intervene in the family 
for the sake of protecting each individual's right to proper-
ty. In the case of the family, it may not, however, usurp the 
family's educational authority. It may not wholly equalize, 
or regulate the intimate marital relationship. It steps into 
these roles only to the extent that is necessary to ensure 
each person's right to protect and acquire property. Impor-
tantly, Locke understands property broadly as life, liberty 
and estate. 
Communitarian and Radical/Marxist Feminists: A Reply 
Understanding the underlying dimensions of liberty and 
equality at work in the interaction among the multitude of 
private and public spheres Locke identifies sheds light on the 
potential within his paradigm for addressing his communitarian 
and radical feminist critics. Putting Locke's individual 
within the context of these multiple spheres reveals an 
individual who is not the egoistical, self-preserving maximiz -
er of rights and accumulator of goods that some communitarian 
feminists depict. A closer look at Locke reveals an emphasis 
on "person" as well as, and above, the individual. This 
person realizes himself or herself in a variety of social 
contexts. My religious obligation to my fellow person--love 
(charity) --which differs from my political obligation--
protecting his property--differs again from my familial 
obligation. Even self-preservation, the motivation behind 
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politics, manifests God's Will ("Workmanship") rather than 
desire (although the two do not conflict in this instance) . 
Self-preservation is an obligation before it is a right. 
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and 
not to quit his station willfully; so by the like 
reason when his own Preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to pre-
serve the rest of mankind. (II, 6) 
As Ashcraft (1987, 133) points out, there exists a connection 
in Locke's thought between natural law which obliges one and 
natural right to property--life and estate. 
The communitarian feminists' stress on Locke's individu-
alism neglects the constellation of relationships which 
surround each person, relationships which, each in varying 
degrees, reflect both man's and woman's connectedness. 
Communitarian feminists' stress on natural rights fails to put 
those rights within the context of natural law and various 
human relationships. On this same basis, communitarian 
feminists who take Locke to task for removing "compassion" or 
"virtue" from politics have misread Locke's own intention. 
Locke removed considerations of virtue--for Locke, religion--
from politics in the hope of promoting both peace and virtue. 
As Locke argues in a Letter Concerning Toleration, faith 
cannot be induced by force, but encouraged through love. For 
Locke, virtue is self-generating (or at least more likely to 
surface) given the appropriate tolerant political environment. 
The care of Souls cannot belong to the Civil Magis-
trate, because his Power consists only in outward 
force; but true and saving Religion consists in the 
inward persuasion of the Mind. (Letter, 27) 
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The recognition of this distinction works to the "true 
interest of the Publick" (Letter, 21). Indeed, Locke believes 
that virtue in one sphere benefits another: religious 
individuals make good citizens; compassionate, reasonable 
familial education creates liberal citizens; removing direct 
and explicit concern for virtue from politics promotes 
virtuous politics. 37 
Locke illustrates what Nancy Rosenblum (1987, 55) might 
call a "divine egotism." Locke's identification of political 
interests with "Life, Liberty, Health and Indolency of Body; 
and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands" 
(Letter, 26) serves not only to protect each individual from 
political tyranny but also to provide a space for "inwardness" 
(Rosenblum 1987, 55) or in Locke's words "inward sincerity." 
Removing virtue as a political concern allows virtue to 
surface in an atmosphere of individuality and plurality 
because virtue is not the product of force but of persuasion. 
Coercion promotes blind acceptance rather than the thoughtful, 
ingrained understanding of rational virtue. Locke remarks on 
those who: 
are resolved to stick to a Party, that Education or 
Interest has engaged them in; and there, like the 
37The communitarian feminist reading of Locke overlooks 
many persuasive, more recent interpretations of his philoso-
phy. Refuting Strauss' vision of hedonistic nihilism in 
Locke, Grant (1987) argues that although humanity is not 
capable of absolute certainty, we can rationally and morally 
guide our conduct. In addition, Macedo (1990) points to the 
virtuous underpinnings grounding liberalism and Tarcov (1984) 
elaborates on the moral nature of Lockean education. 
common Soldiers of an Army, show their Courage and 
Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever 
examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they 
contend for. (Essay, IV, 18, 11) 38 
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In regards to Christian virtue, "If the Gospel and the 
Apostles may be credited, no Man can be a Christian without 
Charity, and without that Faith which works, not by force, but 
by Love" (Letter, 23). The virtuous politics some communi-
tarian feminists espouse confounds two dimensions of life, 
inappropriately using force to generate something it cannot 
create and imperiling necessary space for inward sincerity. 
The radical/marxist feminist error in reading Locke also 
results from an oversimplification of Locke's distinction 
between private and public. As the preceding discussion of 
the spheres at work in Locke's thought indicates, Locke does 
depoliticize the family, but he does not isolate it. He 
demonstrates an understanding of both the adverse effect one 
sphere can have on another (e.g., note the adverse effect 
politics can have on religion) and the welcome influence one 
sphere can have on another (e.g., note the positive impact 
family can have on politics) . Because Locke allows for a 
dialogue between spheres, he can accommodate the dialogue 
between substantive and formal rights without degrading either 
the family or politics. Politics can encourage free, equal 
families while respecting the unique nature of that familial 
community. In this interpretation, Locke's political 
38Quoted in Myers (1991, 400-401). 
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philosophy would allow for government subsidized day care as 
a necessary, although clearly not sufficient, prerequisite to 
female equality. Politics enforces each individual's right to 
protect and acquire property. This demands some interference 
in the economic and familial sphere. This also allows 
politics to outlaw marital rape. Politics can step into the 
family, but it does so carefully, ever mindful of the liberty 
expressed in that marital, familial contract. 
A correct understanding of the underlying dimensions of 
liberty and equality at work in the dialogue between two 
particular spheres, economics and politics, contradicts the 
argument by some feminists that for Locke women were not 
considered rational by virtue of their unique historical 
relationship to property. Not only does circumstantial 
evidence indicate that Locke thought women to be rational, but 
understanding Locke's rationality in terms of the richness of 
human contexts and the principles of liberty and equality 
clearly reveals that Locke considered, in fact, assumed women 
to be rational beings. 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke refers 
to "rational parents" (Essay, IV, 4, 16) suggesting that both 
parents are rational, despite the mother's tending to her 
child's call. Furthermore, in discussing political conquest 
Locke refers to both the wife's title in property and the 
wife's labor in producing goods (thereby confirming women's 
rationality even by Macpherson's standard): The Conqueror 
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"cannot take the Goods of his Wife and Children; they too had 
a Title to the Goods he enjoy'd, and their shares in the 
Estate he possessed." In addition, "whether her own Labour or 
Compact gave her a Title to it, •tis plain, Her Husband could 
not forfeit what was hers" (II, 183). 
Over and above this circumstantial evidence, Ashcraft 
(1987) unveils a more radical interpretation of Locke which 
directly confronts both Macpherson's and, by extension, the 
radical/marxist feminist reading of Locke. Ashcraft argues 
against Macpherson's narrow equation of Locke's rationality 
with property on three bases: First, Locke refers to all men 
as free in the state of nature, 
socio-economic conditions which 
without any reference to 
underlie that freedom. 
Second, even if Locke did correlate property with reason, 
every man (and woman) has property in his (or her) own body 
and Macpherson (and some feminists) mistakenly equate property 
solely with estate. Finally, and most importantly, Locke's 
indication that reason is presumed with maturity, where one 
"might be supposed capable of knowing the Law, and so living 
within the Rules of it" (II, 60), demonstrates the more 
universal character of reason. Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education buttresses this meaning of Lockean rationality. 
Locke describes education as making the mind of the child 
"pliant to Reason" (STCE, 34) and providing habits so one may 
submit to his own Reason, when he is of an Age to make use of 
it" (STCE, 36). Not estate, but "reason and property in one's 
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person" (Ashcraft 1987, 175) is the criterion for legitimate 
political involvement and consent. Macpherson, and less 
directly, some feminists, are misled by reading passages out 
of context; in a political context reason is not socially, 
economically or sexually differentiated for Locke (Ashcraft 
1987, 167-173). Not property (as understood as goods) but 
self-guidance, the ability to render legitimate contracts and 
the perception of natural law all indicate rationality for 
Locke. 
Clearly, the principles of freedom and equality inform 
the relationships (marital, familial, economic, religious and 
political) of all individuals, men and women. Locke's liberal 
political philosophy begins to illustrate the transformation 
which all human relationships undergo when individuals are 
considered rational, free and equal. In this way, the 
misinterpretation of Locke's distinction between private and 
public domains as reif ied yields mistaken conclusions about 
the possibilities of emancipation for women within Locke's 
liberal system. The oversimplification, by some feminists, of 
Locke's understanding of private and public leads them to err 
in concluding that Locke's liberal individual is artificially 
divorced from social particularities, that Locke's liberal 
family is necessarily patriarchal, that women are not rational 
and that politics does not and cannot influence family. More 
specifically, because some feminists misread Locke's distinc-
tion between politics and family as one between male and 
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female and not between adult and child, they discount his 
paradigm. 
Instead of rejecting Locke's distinction, feminists can 
use it as both a protection of (male and female) adult liberty 
and as a principle with which they can press for equality and 
liberty in different social contexts. Locke's liberal 
political philosophy allows women, like men, to be treated as 
rational adults in family and politics. 
neither men nor women as children. 
Politics should treat 
Feminists should be 
activating Locke's principles of personhood and anti -paternal -
ism, of rationality, freedom and equality while criticizing 
specific instances of patriarchy in Locke's thought. 
Locke supplies the beginning of a model, with all its 
rough edges, which captures the differences and overlap 
between private and public concerns. In doing this, Locke 
creates a paradigm which discourages tyranny and maximizes 
individual liberty. In establishing and protecting the family 
as private, Locke disarms political, tyrannical intrusions in 
that sphere. Locke's thought, in contrast to some feminist 
thought, provides a shelter for families from political 
tyranny. This paradigm also distinguishes essential differ-
ences between different spheres while providing a basis for 
understanding the overlap among spheres. The organizing 
principle in one sphere differs from another, but actions in 
each reverberate in others. Locke's liberalism begins to 
reconcile the demands of freedom and equality within a variety 
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of contexts. Although Locke never explicitly explores the 
impact of familial gender disadvantages as they influence 
political aspirations of freedom and autonomy, he plants the 
seeds for a deeper understanding of these influences, and even 
leaves open the possibility of tempering the impact among 
private and public positions. In so doing, he points to the 
possibility of enhancing freedom and autonomy in each sphere 
of activity. Liberalism needs to systematically and self-
consciously work out the interactive relationship between 
spheres of human activities, to specifically address gender 
differences and formally incorporate those differences into 
its paradigm. 39 This does not undercut as much as continue 
the liberal, or Lockean, project. 
39Walzer (1983) details a provocative and persuasive 
attempt to do exactly this. 
CHAPTER III 
MILL AND FEMINISM 
Feminist critics of liberalism turn with particular 
interest to the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill. 
Mill actively championed the rights of women in his writings 
and his political career. He consciously extended liberal-
ism's fundamental principles of individualism, equality and 
liberty to women. On this basis, feminists ask whether Mill 
can consistently and systematically maintain a distinction 
between private and public spheres while providing for women's 
equality and liberty in both domestic and political circles. 
Feminists ask whether Mill's liberty is a real possibility for 
women as well as men. 
While some feminist critics of Mill defend his basic 
principles, 1 others conclude that his distinction between 
public and private limits Mill's liberal paradigm, negating 
any substantive liberty or equality for women. Mill's promise 
of female autonomy remains an abstraction, divorced from 
women's actual familial, economic and social positions. The 
1See, for example, Rossi (1970); Shanley (1981); Spitz 
(1981); Tulloch (1989); Urbinati (1991). 
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elimination of women's "domestic slavery" 2 requires a rethink-
ing of Mill's separation of private from public, of family 
activities from political intervention. 
Mill (OL, 105) contends that the repeal of the "despotic 
power of husbands over wives" requires "nothing more ... than 
that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the 
protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons." 3 
From the anti- liberal feminist standpoint, this undermines any 
hope for the concrete realization of genuine female autonomy. 
Women's daily lives demand a reconceptualization of private 
and public which fully recognizes and incorporates the 
constraints of private lives on public opportunities. These 
feminists argue that in protecting a private arena of human 
activities, Mill's liberalism remains blind to private sources 
of power. They point out that women's private slavery 
obstructs women's public freedom; Mill's separation between 
private and public obscures and masks these private obstacles. 
2Mill himself uses this description of women's familial 
position in Sub., 150. 
3Hereafter, references to Mill's On Liberty, The Subjec-
tion of Women and Chapters on Socialism will be to J. s. Mill, 
On Liberty and other writings, Stefan Collini, ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and noted as OL, page #; 
Sub., page#; Soc., page#. References to John Stuart Mill, 
Autobiography, Jack Stillinger, ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin 
Company, 1989) are noted as Auto., page#. References to John 
Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 
Currin Shields, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1958) are noted as Rep., page #. Finally, references to 
Mill's Utilitarianism are to Utilitarianism and Other Writ-
ings, Mary Warnock, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1962) 
and cited as Util., page#. 
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Equal "protection of law" and "the same rights" (OL, 105) lays 
a superficial veil of freedom, disguising and protecting 
actual historical slavery. 
Feminist critics argue that in carving out a private 
arena free from political intervention, Mill, like other 
liberal thinkers, masks and protects private sources of power. 
These critics point to Mill's separation between private and 
public and to his perceived failure to develop a cogent 
framework relating formal and substantive equality. They deny 
any possibility for a resolution to this problem within Mill's 
liberal paradigm. Hughes (1979), for example, argues that 
Mill's distinction between public and private covers over the 
conflict between an abstract promise of public freedom and a 
concrete disparity in private property, a barrier to real 
economic success for women. Cameron (1980) identifies the 
conflict as one between the ideal of freedom and the customary 
sexual division of labor in the family. Eisenstein (1981) 
targets the tension between what she calls "individuality" and 
the "ideology of liberal individualism" in Mill's thought. 
Finally, Elshtain (1981) depicts the distinction between 
public and private in Mill as one between abstract reason and 
emotion. All these feminists agree, however, that "a conflict 
exists in Mill between the ideal and the reality" (Cameron 
1980, 782). The illusion of freedom and equality evaporates 
when women's actual historical and customary situations are 
taken into account. Mill's cornrni tment to a liberal conception 
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of a private sphere free from political intervention leads to 
the "ultimate renunciation of his egalitarian principle" 
(Hughes 1979, 540). 
Feminists who discount Mill's liberalism misread his 
feminism and misinterpret his distinction between private and 
public life. In this chapter, I argue that this results from 
a failure to differentiate two levels of theoretical analyses 
operating in Mill's work4 --a distinction Mill himself would 
recognize. Mill's philosophy synthesizes fundamental princi-
ples, like equality or social welfare, with experiential and 
historical opinions on how these principles can be achieved. 
For example, Mill recognized both psychology and economics 5 
as evolving fields of study, and would certainly adapt his 
prescriptions in these fields to meet his goals. This failure 
leads some of his feminist critics to oversimplify and 
exaggerate Mill's separation of private and public in a way he 
himself would not accept. As a result, these feminists 
overlook the richness and variety that distinction encompass-
es. Reading Mill in light of the richness of spheres of 
activities he seeks to encourage reveals a capacity in Mill's 
4Gutmann (1980, 58), for example, refers to Mill's 
defense of laissez-faire economics as a "second-order princi-
ple." Shanley ( 19 81, 241) asserts, "Mill's commitment to 
equality in marriage was of a different theoretical order than 
his acceptance of a continued sexual division of labor." 
Tulloch (1989, 14) also discerns two levels of theoretical 
commitment in Mill. 
5For a discussion of the status of Mill's economic theory 
see Ryan (1984). 
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liberalism for addressing and attacking patriarchy in public 
and private life, while maintaining and protecting the 
integrity of different spheres of human activity. 
This chapter shows that a feminist rereading and reclaim-
ing of Mill's liberal principles is important for two reasons. 
First, Mill's philosophy offers a strategy for distinguishing 
between private and public along rationally defensible lines - -
harm to others. That is, legitimate political intervention 
confronts only those actions which harm or threaten to harm 
another individual. This criterion protects individual 
autonomy and self-actualization without arbitrarily identify-
ing either the family or the economy as always and absolutely 
beyond political intervention. Indeed, Mill recognizes the 
patterns of coercion present in both the family and economy. 
Mill wages a fight against political, social, economic and 
domestic tyranny, while preserving space for individual 
initiative and choice. Mill seeks to protect a private sphere 
and to combat private power. He offers a principle--harm--
which does just that. Mill's distinction between private and 
public erects a sanctuary for individual expression and 
growth, 6 while providing for appropriate political interven-
tion7 in the interest of freedom and equality. 
6Rosenblum (1987) identifies this romantic aspect in 
liberalism and in Mill. 
7Tulloch (1989, 160-161) discusses the opening in Mill's 
thought for a positive case for political intervention, for 
the sake of individual development. 
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In rightly attacking private and corrupt sources of 
power, feminism requires a cogent conceptual framework which 
recognizes the private arena as a legitimate and necessary 
realm of human self-expression. Mill's liberalism offers such 
a framework while at the same time addressing, in principle, 
feminist concerns. Mill articulates a paradigm which attacks 
private sources of power while preserving social and cultural 
complexity. Feminism requires such a paradigm if it hopes to 
balance its attack on socially pervasive patriarchy with a 
consideration of individual free choice and autonomy. 
Just as important, Mill's depiction of the family 
captures the vast possibilities built into intimate, familial 
relationships. The family unit, particularly the marital 
union, expresses a number of complex relationships: emotional, 
erotic, nurturing, intellectual and power relationships. 
Mill's family, and its position within his distinction between 
private and public, recognizes all these dynamics and allows 
for the richness of family life. For Mill (Sub., 150), 
families are vehicles of patriarchy, 8 characterized by 
"domestic slavery" but emotional, sympathetic ties also bind 
80f course, Mill did not use this term himself. Its 
appropriateness becomes apparent however upon reading The 
Subjection of Women where Mill locates women's subordination 
within all social spheres. In particular, he identifies women 
subordination in familial, social (e.g., custom enslaves 
women), economic and political spheres. 
79 
the family. 9 At present, families are about both power and 
love, and Mill refuses to collapse the two. Mill addresses 
the asymmetrical power relationships corrupting marital 
relationships without forgetting the love integral to that 
relationship. Mill (Sub., 161) hopes for "a marriage of 
sympathy in equality, of living together in love, without 
power on one side or obedience on the other." Feminists need 
a model which both expresses their abhorrence of familial 
patriarchy and recognizes the love possible in family rela-
tionships. Mill offers such a model. Mill's paradigm of 
private and public offers a principle by which patterns of 
coercion operating in a variety of social arrangements 
(including the family) can be tackled without shattering the 
independence and integrity of that sphere. 
In sum, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate 
Mill's reconciliation of the principles of liberty and 
equality at work in a multitude of spheres and to argue that 
Mill's liberalism is potentially feminist. His distinction 
between private and public enriches, rather than corrodes, his 
feminism. Toward this end, the remainder of this chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section elaborates the 
feminist critique of Mill. The second identifies and develops 
those principles in Mill's political philosophy most valuable 
9A number of feminists point to this Mill's two-sided 
analysis of the family. see, in particular, Okin (1979); 
Shanley (1981); Urbinati (1991). 
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to the feminist project. The third specifically responds to 
feminist critics. 
The Feminist Critique of Mill 
Feminist critics of Mill argue that behind Mill's 
abstract promise of liberty and equality dwells an elitism 
which subordinates women familially, economically and politi-
cally. They point to an incongruence between the f orrnal 
promise of equality and substantive inequalities. This 
incongruence becomes apparent through an analysis of Mill's 
distinction between private and public spheres of activity. 
Two main strains of anti-liberal feminist criticism exist, 
echoing the critiques of Locke: a communitarian feminist 
critique and a marxist/radical feminist critique. 10 The 
former analyzes Mill's epistemological assumptions and 
concludes that his identification and definition of rationali-
ty and its role in the distinction between public and private 
effectively excludes genuine gender equality and liberty. The 
latter stresses women's actual individual and social circum-
stances, and concludes that Mill's separation of private 
interests from public concerns inevitably protects socially 
pervasive patriarchy. Both anti-liberal feminist critiques 
agree that, intentionally or not, Mill's liberal feminism not 
only fails to liberate women; in fact, it oppresses them. 
10 see Chapter 2 of this work, "Locke and Patriarchy" for 
a defense of these labels which are adapted from the work of 
Dietz (1987) . 
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The communitarian feminist critique revolves around 
Mill's emphasis on reason--a reason which they identify as 
constructively and historically male. According to this 
reading, Mill (Sub., 121) praises an "apotheosis of Reason" 
and he denigrates "Instinct" and feeling. Mill's "reason" 
requires an abstraction from feeling and emotion which is 
alien to women's cultivation of empathy--an emotion necessary 
to the well-being of the family. Mill actualizes this split 
between reason and emotion in his distinction between public 
and private. "Hard, external institutions of enormous power" 
(Elshtain 1981, 143) characterize politics whereas women and 
families "beautify" and "soften, 1111 offering solace from the 
cold reality of politics. Mill's distinction between private 
and public reflects his bifurcation of emotion and reason 
effectively subordinating the feminine character. 
Jean Elshtain reads Mill's work in light of a growing 
body of feminist literature which suggests that the male and 
female character are psychoanalytically constituted. 12 As 
11Elshtain (1981, 144-145) quotes an early essay by Mill 
on women in which he describes women's role as "to beautify 
life." Elshtain herself refers to the "traditional softening 
effect" of women. 
12Hirschmann (1992, 164-165) argues, "In the rationalist 
and empiricist epistemologies of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Mill, 
and Kant, which dominate liberal theory and western thinking, 
ontology and epistemology are separate and distinct .... [W]e 
can see that the dichotomy between epistemology and ontology, 
which characterizes both rationalist and empiricist epistemol-
ogies, is specifically masculinist, for it follows from, or at 
least echoes, the mind-body duality: if the body is separate 
and distinct from the mind, then theories of knowledge and the 
ways we conceptualize knowing must be distinct from theories 
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such, women learn early to empathize, to nurture and to 
personalize. Men more readily impersonalize moral dilemmas, 
abstracting personal considerations in order to attain an 
impersonal perspective. Carol Gilligan (1987, 79), for 
example, identifies a "different voice" in which "the conven-
tional feminine voice emerges with great clarity, defining the 
self and proclaiming its worth on the basis of the ability to 
care for and protect others." 
This feminine personality falls victim to a political 
structure--Mill's liberalism--which neglects and isolates 
women by defining politics in terms of power, in terms of a 
male rather than female voice. Men speak politically, women 
speak privately. Elshtain (1981, 142, 216) suggests that this 
occurs as a result of "internalization" and "projection" in 
the male psyche. That is, male fear of female reproductive 
power, which they can neither ignore nor coopt, causes them to 
separate themselves from that which they fear (that is, 
reproductive power) and create a world- -the political sphere- -
in which male power supersedes reproductive power, thereby 
"embedding the need to defend themselves against women in 
institutions and activities." 
As such, Mill's distinction between private and public 
results from the male denial of their own femininity and the 
attempt to remove this affront to their masculinity from 
politics. In doing this, men, and in this case Mill, relegate 
of existence and the ways we conceptualize being." 
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both feelings and women to the private familial sphere. 
Elshtain (1981, 143) elaborates: 
To fend off both the unconsciously imbedded images 
of female power and the recognition of the "weak-
ness of women" as that which one cannot accept in 
oneself, men have, over the years, created hard, 
external institutions of enormous power both as a 
match for the vision of the powerful Mother within 
and as a protection, a hedge against their own 
"weak, female" self. 
Thus, Mill's distinction between private and public results 
from psychoanalytic processes which effectively discriminate 
against women and reduce politics to power. 13 
The communitarian feminists reject the liberal, and 
Millian, version of rationality as "instrumentalist" and 
"egoistic" - -a model of rationality to which women should 
neither aspire, nor through which they can be emancipated. 14 
Other feminists, with a less psychoanalytical approach, also 
target Mill's notion of "reason" as the ultimately limiting 
aspect of his liberalism. Julia Annas (1977, 191), for 
example, contends that Mill's emphasis on reason neglects the 
130'Brien (1989, 37) offers a similar analysis of modern 
politics, although she does not apply her conclusions as 
directly to Mill. "The state itself is a concept, an abstract 
principle of continuity rendered as vital entity. This 
abstract state provides a continuity that is abstracted from 
the actuality of biological reproduction in which men are 
marginal and uncertain actors and reconstituted as men's 
greatest achievement in rational social organization, in 
making history." 
14Jaggar (1983, 45) argues "The egoistic conception of 
rationality is inadequate ... for political theory. . . . The 
egoistic model of human nature is unable to acknowledge the 
values intrinsic to participating in an affective, a produc-
tive or a rational community because these values involve, by 
definition, a concern for individuals other than oneself." 
84 
role that sentiment and feeling play in the subjection of 
women, sentiments and feelings which support women's subordi-
nation by appealing to women's traditional or "natural" 
domestic roles. Consequently, she argues Mill, 
is not aware of the massive changes required in 
people's desires and outlooks before sexual equali-
ty becomes a reality .... He does not pay enough 
attention to the extensive interference in people's 
lives necessary to ensure that the liberation of 
women becomes a real change and not just the same 
attitudes under another name. 
Mill's stress on reason leads him to overlook the radical 
nature of his own theory and to settle for public (political) 
reforms when the liberation of women requires a radical 
private revolution. Political reforms cannot alter patriar-
chal custom and sentiment. In short, she insists that Mill's 
distinction between private and public subverts his potential-
ly revolutionary principles of equality and liberty by 
allowing "rational" political reforms while ignoring private 
sentiment and feeling. 
In a similar vein, Jennifer Ring blames Mill's empiricism 
for the limits of his liberalism. 15 Mill's empiricism forces 
him to understand women's nature through observable historical 
data. In doing so, Mill incorporates many stereotypical 
traits into his characterization of women and their role in 
15Ring' s thought bridges the communitarian and 
radical/marxist feminist critiques of Mill. She shares in the 
radical/marxist feminist conclusions while dwelling on Mill's 
notion of rationality as a point of contention. 
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the family. Mill's (Sub., 165) empiricism prompts such 
assertions as: 
Like a man when he chooses a profession, so when a 
woman marries, it may in general be understood that 
she makes a choice of the management of a house-
hold, and the bringing up of her family ... and she 
renounces, not all other objects and occupations, 
but all which are not consistent with the require-
ments of this. 
Again, Mill's methodological assumptions necessarily limit his 
liberal vision. In Ring's (1985, 28) words, "Mill depended so 
heavily on an empiricist methodology that his political 
solutions lay embedded in existing custom, unable to embrace 
the future." 
The radical/marxist feminist analysis of Mill shifts 
attention from Mill's conception of individual rationality to 
an evaluation of the societal institutions which inhibit 
women's equality and liberty. It focuses on the familial, 
economic and political inequalities which inevitably undermine 
any formal promise of equality. These feminists argue that 
Mill's separation of private from public disguises the 
inegalitarian consequences built into the liberal political 
structure. Mill's liberalism necessarily assumes male 
citizens. 16 It masks this assumption by welcoming both sexes 
16 In terms of liberalism in general, Zillah Eisenstein 
(1988, 77) asserts, "The fact that liberalism has always 
privileged the phallus and the social relations of patriarchal 
society explains why the tension between women's similarity 
(to) and difference (from men) is embodied within liberal law. 
As a gendered discourse, liberal law ends up exposing the 
phallus, because in its view men and women are supposedly 
homogenous individuals and not sex classes." 
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in the political sphere but nevertheless refusing to address 
patterns of coercion in private spheres. By claiming that 
women's emancipation requires nothing but "that the present 
bounties and protective duties in favor of men should be 
recalled," which does not necessitate "protective duties and 
bounties in favor of women," (Sub., 144) Mill provides for the 
mere appearance of equality and for the maintenance of 
inequality. As Diana Coole (1988, 148) writes, 
He does not appear to have recognized that there 
might be structural reasons for women's continued 
and reinforced subjugation, predicated on contempo-
rary interests which might be fully rational and 
useful to their practitioners. 
Although Mill feared unrestrained political power and sought 
to limit its reach by delineating a private arena beyond 
political intervention, radical/marxist feminists conclude 
that he remained blind to private patterns of coercion which 
enslave and subordinate women. 17 
Zillah Eisenstein also attacks Mill's separation of 
private and public and claims that it embodies a tension 
between "individuality" and "liberal individualism" in Mill's 
thought. On the one hand, Mill's philosophy includes a 
rudimentary conceptualization of "individuality," in which the 
17Even "liberal" feminists note and criticize the 
repercussions of Mill's separation of private and public. 
Susan Okin (1979, 280) declares that with Mill "the strict 
separation of the private from the public realm, of the family 
from economic life, and the assumption that the day-to-day 
care of the family is women's unpaid work, would all be 
undermined by the inclusion of women in his theory as the 
complete equals of men." 
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individual is understood as actualizing her or himself within 
complex social structures. On the other hand, his commitment 
to "liberal individualism" conceives of the individual as 
disassociated, from and independent of, social realities. 
This disallows any true actualization of individuality as well 
as a penetrating analysis of the impediments to the actualiza-
tion of individuality. This tension between individuality and 
liberal individualism obscures Mill's diagnosis of the 
structural nature of patriarchy, necessarily limiting Mill's 
(and any) liberal paradigm. Eisenstein (1981, 127) concludes 
that insofar as Mill accepts "the structural base of society- -
the separation of public and family life--out of which the 
ideology of liberal individualism is defined, a true individu-
ality is not open to most women." Mill's attempt at a 
reconciliation between women's social oppression (that is, his 
recognition of sex and class as oppressive in themselves) and 
abstract, atomized individualism fails. 
The limits of liberalism, of "liberal individualism" in 
Eisenstein's words, manifest themselves most profoundly for 
women in the family. Mill's sanguine acceptance of a sexual 
division of labor within the home indicates the essentially 
oppressive dimension of his private-public distinction. Mill 
(Sub., 164) observes that, 
when the support of the family depends, not on 
property, but on earnings, the common arrangement, 
by which the man earns the income and the wife 
superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me 
in general the most suitable division of labour 
between two persons. 
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According to the radical/marxist feminist critique, assertions 
such as these, rather than illustrating departures from Mill's 
fundamental principles, demonstrate the necessarily patriar-
chal conclusions of Mill's liberalism and his private-public 
distinction (see, for example, Annas 1977; Cameron 1980; Coole 
1988; Eisenstein 1979; Hughes 1979; Pateman 1989). According 
to this critique, Mill's "failure to question the apparently 
natural division of labour within the home means that his 
arguments for democratic citizenship apply only to men" 
(Pateman 1989, 217). 
In this view, women's familial subordination resonates in 
the economic sphere where it is solidified by Mill's commit-
ment to private property. Despite Mill's call for reforms of 
the private property system, he failed to recognize that 
capitalism inherently privileges some while oppressing others. 
In adhering to the principle of free accumulation and exchange 
of property, Mill sacrifices freedom and equality for women 
(see Hughes 1979). Mill's scheme for encouraging coopera-
tives, where workers band together to produce and procure 
goods, fails to address the real cause of inequality: private 
property. 
Capitalist private property necessarily reproduces 
unequal distribution of goods and disparities in the opportu-
nities of different people to procure goods. Ownership is a 
form of power over people in which the owner controls the 
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lives and destinations of other individuals. 18 This problem 
is especially poignant for women, who have historically been 
excluded from and disadvantaged in the market place. More-
over, Mill's assumption that women will continue to supply the 
bulk of domestic labor irretrievably handicaps women in this 
market system. Mill's disregard for the coercive dimension of 
private property is evidenced when he declares that "The power 
of earning is essential to the dignity of a woman, if she has 
not independent property" but "it would not be necessary for 
her protection, that during marriage she should make this 
particular use of her faculties" (Sub., 164). As such, Mill 
is blind to the coercive consequences of a wife's dependence 
on her husband for economic subsistence. Marriage can never 
be a partnership of equals while one partner holds the purse 
strings. 19 In the end, radical/marxist feminists conclude 
that "the pull toward private property was stronger than the 
one towards equality in Mill" (Hughes 1979, 537). 
Male domination in the family and in the economy effec-
tively subverts Mill's attempt to secure political equality 
for women. Al though Mill called for women's suffrage, he also 
18Like the radical/marxist feminist interpretation of 
Locke, the radical/marxist feminist reading of Mill extrapo-
lates Macpherson' s more general interpretation and critique to 
women's particular circumstances. According to Macpherson 
(1977, 55), Mill failed to see "that capitalist market 
relation enhances and replaces any original inequitable 
distribution ... steadily increasing mass of capital." 
19 For a feminist reading of the coercive nature of private 
property in Mill see, among others, Cameron (1980}; Coole 
(1988); Eisenstein (1981); Hughes (1979). 
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suggested a strategy of plural voting in order to guard 
against class faction. Mill suggests that all people require 
representation but that the quality of each person's vote 
varies. One way to balance the quality of various votes would 
be to weigh them in terms of a standard such as education. 
Everyone, male and female, would have at least one vote; more 
qualified individuals, more likely according to Mill to be 
concerned with and knowledgeable of the overall social good, 
would be awarded plural votes. 
The only thing which can justify reckoning one 
person's opinion as equivalent to more than one is 
individual mental superiority; what is wanted is 
some approximate means of ascertaining that. 
(Rep. , 13 7 -13 8) 
Mill (Rep., 138) recommends educational or occupational 
standards as possible criteria for plural votes: 
If there existed such a thing as a really national 
education or a trustworthy system of general exami-
nation, education might be tested directly. In the 
absence of these, the nature of a person's occupa-
tion is some test. 
In effect, this system of plural voting prejudices 
against all women and those men of the laboring classes whose 
educational and occupational possibilities is significantly 
diminished. A woman's position as homemaker, a position Mill 
endorses, works against possible educational and occupational 
achievement. As a result, men's votes would inevitably and 
significantly outweigh women's votes. In the political 
sphere, as in the familial and economic sphere, a formal 
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promise of equality, in this case an equal right to vote, 
masks an actual inequality, in this case plural voting. 
In conclusion, both the communitarian feminist and 
radical/marxist feminist critique of Mill revolve around a 
tension in Mill's thought between formal and substantive 
equality, a tension apparent in his private-public distinc-
tion. Both groups of anti-liberal feminists conclude that an 
analysis of Mill's thought on rationality, family, economics 
and politics exposes the empty nature of his abstract promise 
of equality and the oppressive nature of his political and 
social system. 
Mill's Liberal Response 
A response to feminist criticism of Mill demands an 
elaboration of liberty and equality at work in a variety of 
social contexts as well as an analysis of the role that Mill's 
standard of harm plays in distinguishing between private and 
public. 
The demand for individual liberty echoes throughout John 
Stuart Mill's work. While continuing Locke's liberal defense 
of the individual Mill radically alters its moral foundation. 
In doing so he transforms the complexion of liberalism. Mill 
grounds his defense of the individual, and his distinction 
between private and public, in utilitarian concerns. 20 It is 
20 specif ically, John s. Mill defines utilitarianism as 
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, 
or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
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best for the society as a wh.Ole, as well as for each individu-
al, that each member is fret? to pursue his/her own ends to the 
fullest extent possible. The greatest happiness of the 
greatest number demands, according to Mill, a robust consider-
ation of individual self-development and variance. In this 
way, Mill defends individual liberty without appealing to 
natural rights. 21 
Mill adopts and revolutionizes the utilitarianism he 
learned from his father Ja:ines Mill and from Jeremy Bentham. 
Mill rejects the narrow notion of pleasure and the individual 
offered by earlier utilitarians. To be human is to be capable 
of experiencing a pleasure beyond that described by Bentham. 
Mill's utilitarianism attempts to account for the moral and 
intellectual pleasures wn_ich separate human beings from 
animals. 
It would be absurd th.at while, in estimating all 
other things, quali tY is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be 
supposed to depend on quantity alone. (Util., 258-
259) 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happi-
ness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, the pain, and the privation of pleasure" (Util., 
257) . 
21Mil1 states, "I forego any advantage which could be de-
rived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a 
thing independent of utili t::.Y" (OL, 14) . 
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He concludes that "It is better to be a human being dissatis-
f ied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied" (Util., 260) . 22 
Mill's notion of individuality reflects this complex 
understanding of pleasure. For Mill, full individual actual-
ization requires latitude for choice and variance. The 
ability to choose who and what we become inextricably binds 
Mill's notion of human choice with both his defense of 
individual liberty and his faith in human progress. 23 For 
Mill (OL, 60) I 
human nature is not a machine to be built after a 
model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed 
for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the 
tendency of the inward forces which make it a 
living thing. 24 
Mill's notion of individuality and choice informs his utili-
tarianism; his appeal is to "utility in the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
22The question whether Mill does or does not commit a 
"naturalistic fallacy" in qualifying as well as quantifying 
pleasure is beyond the scope of this paper. 
23Berlin (1984, 192-193) remarks on Mill's "passionate 
belief that men are made human by their capacity for choice--
choice of evil and good equally. Fallibility, the right to 
err, as a corollary of the capacity for self-improve-
ment ... these are the principles which Mill never abandons." 
Berlin elaborates: "He saw that men differed and evolved, not 
merely as a result of natural causes, but also because of what 
they themselves did to alter their own character, at times in 
unintended ways." 
24Mill underscores the variety and complexity of human 
nature. "Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are 
not indistinguishably alike" (OL, 67) . 
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being" (OL, 14). Human development requires choice, which 
results in human beings who are a "noble and beautiful object 
of contemplation" (OL, 63). 
Mill is confident that a full range of choices and 
experiences combined with the appropriate education allows 
persons to come to know the fullness of their individual 
potential. In addition, each individual will become aware of 
his or her social, empathic nature. Mill (Util., 286) 
predicts that, 
the influences are constantly on the increase, 
which tend to generate in each individual a feeling 
of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, 
would make him never think of, or desire, any 
beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits 
of which they are not included. 
Mill's stress on human choice and progress combine to 
produce an understanding of liberty and equality which is 
exercised in a variety of social spheres. Human beings come 
to know themselves within an assortment of social relation-
ships. Moreover, Mill discerned that liberty- -choice- -demands 
a modicum of equality throughout the different spheres of 
human activity. Liberty not only requires an environment free 
of social and political coercion, but also an environment free 
of coercive inequalities. These principles of liberty and 
equality instruct Mill's vision of the possibilities for human 
familial, economic and political associations. 
As utilitarianism provides the moral foundation for 
Mill's liberalism, feminism becomes a moral imperative of that 
liberalism. James Mill and Jeremy Bentham influenced Mill's 
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utilitarianism; Harriet Taylor influenced his feminism. 
Mill's interest in women's political and domestic equality 
predates his relationship with Taylor. However, it was her 
influence which clarified for Mill the practical consequences 
of the extension of liberal principles to women. 25 
(Auto., 149) describes her contribution: 
What was abstract and purely scientific was gener-
ally mine; the properly human element came from 
her: in all that concerned the application of 
philosophy to the exigencies of human society and 
progress, I was her pupil. 
Mill 
Taylor made Mill aware of the pervasive nature of women's 
subjection to men. 26 
In his relationship with Taylor, Mill personally discov-
ered the patriarchal dangers as well as the emotional riches 
of married life. When Mill met Taylor she was already 
married. Despite a growing emotional and intellectual 
25 See Auto., 143-150, for Mill's account of Taylor's vast 
influence on his thought. "When two persons have their 
thoughts and speculations completely in common; when all 
subjects of intellectual or moral interest are discussed 
between them in daily life ... it is of little consequence in 
respect to the question of originality which of them holds the 
pen ... the writings which result are the joint product of both, 
and it must often be impossible to disentangle their respec-
tive parts and affirm that this belongs to one and that to the 
other." 
26It is beyond the scope of this paper to discern exactly 
which of Mill's works Taylor co-authored. For a persuasive 
discussion on this topic see Rossi (1970). Abiding by the 
conclusions of Rossi's arguments, I will forsake any advantage 
an appeal to The Enfranchisement of Women would have for my 
purposes, as Rossi attributes this work primarily to Taylor 
(Rossi 1970, 41-43). In many specific instances, Taylor's 
essay delineates more radical conclusions than Mill's, see, 
e.g., Krause (1982); Rossi (1970). 
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affinity between Mill and Taylor, Harriet Taylor's marriage to 
John Taylor endured until his death almost twenty years later. 
Mill and Taylor both recount, in personal correspondence and 
formal writings, the distaste they felt for the constraints of 
marriage and for the gossip which surrounded their private 
relationship. Custom as well as legalities imprison brilliant 
women in stunting marriages (Rossi 1970). Within two years of 
John Taylor's death, the two married. In this marriage Mill 
experienced the "blessing" of a "partnership of thought and 
feeling," "a partnership of our entire existence" (Auto., 
14 3) . Mill's union with Taylor became his prototype for 
healthy marriages, marriages built on equality and friendship. 
From this relationship Mill learned that marriages need not 
rely on dependence or independence, but on an inter-depen-
dence, "when each of the two persons instead of being nothing, 
is something" (Sub., 209). 
Mill's adaptation of utilitarianism and his relationship 
with Harriet Taylor culminate in Mill's attempt to balance 
liberty and equality in various social relationships. Mill 
deliberately presents a case for individuality and diversity 
in a variety of private and public spheres. Mill values 
liberty not only for its service to human progress, to 
utilitarian considerations, but also for itself as a necessary 
component of a full human life (see, in particular, Archard 
1990; Cohen 1986; Halliday 1976; Rosenblum 1987; Ten 1980; 
Thornton 1987). Freedom not only serves the "interests of man 
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as a progressive being" (OL, 14) but the desire for freedom is 
also firmly rooted in our human nature. "After the primary 
necessities of foods and raiment, freedom is the first and 
strongest want of human nature" (Sub., 212). Mill's concep-
tion of freedom as both an instrumental and intrinsic good27 
grounds his identification of private activities where the 
individual is sheltered from oppressive social and political 
coercion, where the individual is free to discover his or her 
own nature. 28 
On one level, liberty connotes negative liberty--freedom 
from external coercion. But Mill also defends a positive 
liberty, 29 where we are not only free from arbitrary external 
coercion but also for individual self-actualization. Freedom 
allows the individual to flourish. One metaphor Mill employs, 
and which describes the interplay between positive and 
negative liberty, is his allusion to the Chinese "lady's" 
foot. 3° Freedom, as this example demonstrates, means freedom 
27 See Archard (1990) for a fuller elaboration of these two 
dimensions of freedom in Mill's thought. 
28Mill alludes to both ends of individuality, "Where, not 
the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of 
other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of 
the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the 
chief ingredient of individual and social progress" (OL, 57). 
29 For an exploration of the two sides of Mill's liberty 
see, in particular, Archard (1990); Ten (1980); Thornton 
(1987); Tulloch (1989). 
3
°Cummings ( 1973) uses Mill's reference to the Chinese 
lady's foot to demonstrate the positive aspect of Mill's 
liberty. 
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from restraints as well as freedom to become healthy and whole 
(see OL, 69). Another metaphor expresses the repercussions of 
the denial of negative and positive liberty to women. "What 
is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial 
thing--the result of forced repression in some directions, 
unnatural stimulation in others" (Sub., 138). "In the case of 
women, a hot-house and stove cultivation has always been 
carried on ... for the benefit and pleasure of their masters" 
(Sub., 139). For Mill, women's subordination, the denial of 
liberty to women, means that women suffer arbitrary coercion, 
and also that women are denied the opportunity to discover and 
articulate the fullness and variety of their humanity. Mill 
(Sub., 184-185) expresses this succinctly: 
For the artificial state superinduced by society 
disguises the natural tendencies of the thing which 
is the subject of observation, in two different 
ways: by extinguishing the nature, or by trans-
forming it. In one case there is but a starved 
residuum of nature remaining to be studied; in the 
other case there is much, but it may have expended 
in any direction rather than in which it would 
spontaneously grow. 
This understanding of liberty entails the necessity for 
psychological and legal freedom (Lonoff 1986). The explora-
tion of options essential to individual development requires 
freedom from the oppressive dictates of custom, institutions 
and autocratic law. "Individuals, instead of being deterred, 
should be encouraged in acting differentially from the mass" 
(OL, 67). In this way, Mill's Subjection of Women not only 
forcefully states a liberal case for women's emancipation, but 
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also acts as a rhetorical treatise31 in which Mill appeals to 
both men and women for the end of a system which enslaves 
women, for an end to their customary and legal oppression. 
For this reason, Mill illustrates the detrimental effect of 
female subordination on both men and women. 32 
Mill's definition of liberty assumes equality. If 
liberty means freedom for self-cultivation, then persons 
equally deserve the opportunity for fulfillment. If the goal 
of liberty is the enhancement of each individual's growth, 
then each individual merits liberty. According to Mi 11 
(Util., 319), equality, 
is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a 
mere form of words without rational significance, 
unless one person's happiness ... is counted for 
exactly as much as anothers. 33 
More exactly, Mill understood that liberty requires a certain 
equality in the opportunity to avail oneself of that liberty. 
As Alan Ryan points out, Mill perceived that freedom "without 
resources is illusory" (Ryan 1984, 158; see also, Mendus 1989; 
Robson 19 68; Rossi 1970; Thornton 19 87) . Mill identified 
31For an exploration of the rhetorical side of The Subj ec-
tion of Women see Lonoff (1986, 79). Lonoff notes "Mill took 
pains with the literary aspects of his arguments; his pleas 
for liberation, equality, and justice are sustained by a 
skillful subtle rhetoric." 
32Mill states that "Women can not be expected to devote 
themselves to the emancipation of women, until men in consid-
erable number are prepared to join with them in the undertak-
ing" (Sub., 194). 
33 See Hughes (1979) for a discussion of Mill's definition 
of equality. 
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familial and economic constraints on liberty as well as 
political constraints. In doing so he addresses feminist 
concerns about private patterns of coercion. Liberty mandates 
a certain standard of equality in all spheres of human 
activity. 
Individuals come to know and express themselves through 
a variety of intimate and casual contacts. Mill seeks to 
protect and enhance indi victual liberty by maintaining the 
individual choice and spontaneous development integral to 
these different social expressions of individuality. Mill 
also understands that patterns of coercion (e.g., oppressive 
inequalities) detrimental to individual liberty exist within 
intimate and social relationships. "Citizenship fills only a 
small place in modern life" (Sub., 160), and Mill calls for 
emancipation of human life itself. Prejudice invades all 
social spheres. Inequality in one sphere of activity carries 
damaging repercussions for success in other spheres. Mill 
foresaw that the end of women's domination by men entails 
dramatic reforms throughout social life (see Shanley 1981). 
In this sense, there exists no clear line of demarcation 
between private and public activities for Mill (see Robson 
1968, 204-205). 
Mill wishes to protect a private sphere while at the same 
time addressing private power. As such, Mill offers a 
standard, harm to others, which can combat coercive inequities 
in private spheres, such as the family, while maintaining the 
101 
independence and integrity of that sphere. Mill's liberalism 
can address private challenges to liberty and equality. Mill 
directly answers feminist concerns that liberalism, in 
protecting a private sphere, is blind to existing private 
power. 
Throughout On Liberty Mill grapples with the problem of 
distinguishing individual interests from societal concerns. 
Mill (OL, 16) draws a circle around the individual within 
which he or she is sovereign. 
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that 
of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as 
we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the 
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, 
or mental and spiritual. 
Society and government should leave individuals alone to 
determine their own "mental and spiritual" ends, but intervene 
when individual actions infringe on the liberty of others. 
The sole reason justifying "physical force in the form of 
legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion ... is 
self-protection" (OL, 13; see also Ten 1980, 52-67). 
The problem becomes the identification of the focus and 
scope of harm. 34 On this basis, Mill (OL, 80) distinguishes 
34 Feminist Anne Phillips (1991, 26) finds Mill's distinc-
tion between private and public ultimately incoherent. "In 
the complex and interrelated world we inhabit, there is 
virtually no action performed by an individual which is 
without some impact on other people's lives. Does this mean 
governments can interfere in them all?" Many Mill scholars 
dispute this sort of conclusion. Rees (1991), for example, 
claims that the distinction is "between just •affecting 
others' and 'affecting the interests of others'." Ryan (1991) 
discerns three branches of conduct in Mill (prudence, 
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"the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and 
that which concerns others." Just as obvious, however, "no 
person is an entirely isolated being." Once again the 
question becomes one of an interpretation of harm. Where is 
the line between harm to oneself and harm to another? In the 
service of this elusive distinction Mill points to legitimate 
reasons for intervention (harm to others) and explicitly 
identifies illegitimate reasons. 35 Illegitimate reasons of 
intervention include any purpose other than the protection of 
others. The fact that an action harms the agent, that society 
finds the act distasteful or morally repugnant, cannot justify 
intervention (see Ten 19 80) . The health, well-being and 
growth of the individual concerns the individual alone. 
aesthetics and morality) and concludes that government can 
only legitimately intervene in the latter. Ten (1980, 5-6) 
offers the most persuasive interpretation. He argues that 
"[Mill's] case depends on distinguishing between different 
reasons for interfering with the individual's conduct in any 
area. Certain reasons are always ruled out as irrelevant, but 
there is one reason, the prevention of harm to others, which 
is always relevant." 
35Mill explains "the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be 
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating 
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him or entreat-
ing him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any 
evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct 
from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to 
produce evil in some one else" (OL, 13). 
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When Mill extends to women equal protection of the law, 
he promises more than political equality; he offers a strategy 
by which harm to women can be addressed regardless of the 
social sphere in which it surfaces. The "same rights" Mill 
promises to women encompass the equal protection from harm by 
others. Furthermore, in extending liberal rights to women, 
Mill begins to understand that women suffer as groups. Harm 
is not merely an individual phenomena, acted out by one 
individual on another. 36 Women suffer as a sexual class and 
as individuals (see Eisenstein 1981). Mill (Sub., 196) 
asserts that "Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our 
law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of 
every house. " Mill's liberalism can confront obstacles to 
individual liberty regardless of their private nature. For 
example, Mill's standard of harm allows an attack on marital 
rape. Indeed, Mill's positive notion of liberty permits far 
greater interference in individual lives than even Mill 
anticipated (Tulloch 1989). Harm can take the form of 
encroachments on people's opportunities for self-actualiza-
tion. In this way, Mill's principles can be interpreted to 
support aff irma ti ve action. 37 
36Fox-Genovese 
women's relation 
thought." 
(1991, 178) points to the "ways in which 
to individualism transformed (Mill's) 
37Recently, David Dyzenhaus (1992) has argued that Mill's 
harm standard could be logically extended, in keeping with 
Mill's own principles, to allow censorship of pornography on 
feminist grounds. Reading On Liberty in light of The Subjec-
tion of Women reveals not only the breadth of Mill's 
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In sum, Mill's distinction of private from public 
revolves around the standard of harm. This standard allows 
Mill to preserve a private sphere while attacking private 
power. Mill explicitly explores liberty and equality at work 
in the familial, the economic, and the political sphere. An 
analysis of Mill's understanding of each of these spheres 
should reveal the ability of Mill's liberalism for attacking 
patriarchy while protecting free individual expression and 
association. Mill does not forget substantive equality in his 
promise of formal equality. 
Two relationships actually comprise the family: the 
marital relationship and the parental relationship. Both 
relationships affect and reflect other social and political 
relationships. Both are open to political intervention. 38 
At present the marital relationship encompasses two 
dynamics; both love and power define this relationship. The 
healthy, or corrupt, actualization of the marital relationship 
dramatically influences the children. On the one hand, Mill 
understanding of the unique social harm incurred by women, but 
also reveals an opening for a less narrow identification of 
the presence of harm. Just as one may be prohibited from 
shouting fire in a crowded theater, or in Mill's example, 
prohibited from inciting an angry mob by calling corn dealers 
"starvers of the poor" (OL, 56) one may be prohibited from 
distributing incendiary pornography in a society already 
inflamed with patriarchy. According to Dyzenhaus, Mill 
understood the potential harm of expression, as well as, 
conduct. In contrast, Robert Skipper (1993) argues that 
Mill's theory allows no such revision of its harm principle. 
38 See Coole (1988) for a more skeptical analysis of Mill's 
intervention in the family. 
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identifies marriage with power. Within marriage Mill finds 
the roots of patriarchy (see, in particular, Millet 1970; 
Shanley 1981; Tulloch 1989). The domination of women by men 
begins in the family and reverberates outward. 39 The subjec-
tion of women begins at home. A husband's despotic rule over 
his wife is akin to the rule of slaves by masters. Mill 
(Sub., 148) argues that "no slave is a slave to the same 
length, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is," for 
a husband can claim "from her and enforce the lowest degrada-
tion of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an 
animal function contrary to her own inclination." 
The despotic power exercised within the family presents 
a major obstacle to progress. It denies humanity the full 
benefit of women's potential contributions. Moreover, a 
husband's despotic power over his wife produces children who 
value power as opposed to liberty. 40 Boys learn that man-
hood, rather than virtue or merit, yields power and recogni-
tion. Mill (Sub., 196) observes that, 
39Mill explains, "And here, I believe, is the clue to the 
feelings of those men, who have a real antipathy to the equal 
freedom of women. I believe they are afraid, not lest women 
should be unwilling to marry, for I do not think that any one 
in reality has that apprehension; but lest they should insist 
that marriage should be on equal conditions; lest all women of 
spirit and capacity should prefer doing almost anything else, 
not in their own eyes degrading, rather than marry, when 
marrying is giving themselves a master, and a master too of 
all their earthly possessions" (Sub., 145). 
40Rossi (1970) explores these two benefits of sexual 
equality: 1) the doubling of human talents, 2) the advantages 
for socialization. 
All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the 
unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, 
have their source and root in, and derive their 
principal nourishment from, the present constitu-
tion of the relation between men and women. 
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Mill hopes for a time when women's human capacities double the 
talents available for human progress. 
Love, as well as power, defines the marital union. The 
marriage relationship embraces the possibility of the richest 
of friendships, where each partner's happiness and fulfillment 
intensifies the other's. In this healthy union, each spouse 
understands her or his private interests in light of the union 
as a whole, and in light of the benefit for one's spouse. 41 
The possibility of emotional, intellectual and erotic affinity 
animates marriage. 42 The family, and in particular the 
41Note the interesting symmetry between this description 
of the possibilities latent in marriage and Mill's prediction, 
which we analyzed earlier in this chapter, that eventually 
each of us would understand our social natures, that each 
would discern the private benefit of the public good. In sum, 
Mill hopes for an end to the clash between private and public 
interests. Healthy, giving marriages provide the building 
blocks for such an understanding by the individual of her/his 
social nature. 
42 Shanley (1981) disapproves of Mill's reticence on the 
sexual component of marriage. In fact, Mill refers to sex as 
an "animal function" and an "animal instinct." Mill also 
maintains in his Autobiography that his twenty year pre-
marital relationship with Taylor "was one of strong affection 
and confidential intimacy only" (Auto., 136). Mill went so 
far in an early draft of his AutobIQCi'raphy to describe how he 
and Taylor "disdained, as every person not a slave of his 
animal appetites must do, the abject notion that the strongest 
and tenderest friendship cannot exist between a man and a 
woman without a sensual relation, or that any impulses of that 
lower character cannot be put aside when regard for the 
feelings of others, or even when only prudence and person 
dignity require it" (see FN 1, Auto., 137). Despite Mill's 
depreciation of the importance of sexual expression in marital 
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marital relationship "in its best form is, as it is often said 
to be, a school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving forgetful-
ness of self" (Sub., 153). 
Mill details the political benefits of a marriage based 
in friendship. Democratic liberal government requires members 
who value liberty, equality and self-cultivation. Mill's 
description of a healthy, even ideal, marriage produces such 
citizens. The observation of the loving and voluntary 
commitment between one's parents vividly demonstrates for the 
children the advantages of liberal equality throughout 
society. Children grow confident of their own worth, cogni-
zant of the worth of others. Children mature to liberty and 
equality, perceiving the shallow security of power without 
merit. In contrast, a corrupt marriage, based in power and 
slavery, results in children who become little tyrants, 
capriciously exercising whatever arbitrary power they can 
grasp. Mill (Sub., 153) describes this corrupt family as "a 
school of wilfulness, overbearingness, unbounded self-indul-
gence, and a double-dyed and idealized selfishness." Absence 
of liberty corrupts the family, impeding the care, nurturance, 
socialization and love manifest in that relationship. In this 
way, Mill graphically illustrates the dialogue between family 
and politics. Family life carries significant social and 
political implications (see Shanley 1981; Urbinati 1991). 
friendships, he certainly allows room for this expression. 
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Mill understands that the "personal is political" to the 
extent that the domestic and political spheres carry profound 
implications for each other. Furthermore, Mill's (Auto., 111) 
vision of friendship comprises one aspect of his attack on 
patriarchy. The possibility of a "most valuable friendship" 
in marriage, combined with the political intervention neces-
sary to prohibit the harm of one marital partner by another, 
can together attack patriarchy. 43 As patriarchy has roots in 
family, a resolution of patriarchy begins with the family. 
Mill addresses the parental relationship more briefly. 
Parents owe their children an appropriate upbringing conducive 
to the child's fruition as a mature, free and equal adult. 
This imposes an obligation on parents which can be enforced by 
political means. Government can interfere in the family for 
the sake of the child's education. "One of the most sacred 
duties of parents" is to provide for their child an "education 
fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others 
and towards himself" (OL, 105). The import of this duty 
demands state enforcement. However, Mill attempts to balance 
state interference for the sake of equality with individual 
liberty. For this reason, he suggests a number of methods, 
such as compulsory exams or defraying costs, which can assure 
educational achievement without promoting educational unifor-
mity. Mill hopes to provide parents with the widest latitude 
43Urbinati (1991) points to the role of friendship in mar-
riage as a principle for the transformation of socially 
pervasive patriarchy. 
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possible in choosing educational strategies while assuring a 
minimum of education for all children. Mill (OL, 108) ties 
his interference in the parental relationship to his standard 
of harm: 
The fact itself, of causing the existence of a 
human being, is one of the most responsible actions 
in the range of human life. To undertake this 
responsibility--to bestow a life which may be 
either a curse or a blessing--unless the being on 
whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the 
ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a 
crime against that being. 
In the end, Mill distinguishes the family from politics 
on the basis of their legitimate ends. Families should 
operate in terms of love--personal, partial, discriminating 
love. Persons experience the interests of one's spouse, or 
one's child, poignantly and profoundly. A full account of 
family life demands an exploration of this intimate connec-
tion. In contrast, politics and government should act 
impartially. 44 The liberty and equality of each individual 
demands the impartial application of the power of government 
in the prevention of harm. Equally dangerous would be any 
attempt to found a politics of love and any attempt to remove 
the partial, personal component in the family. 
The task is to employ government to prevent harm to 
others without interfering in the personal expression of love. 
This can be achieved through a close attention to the reasons 
for intervention. Intervention to prevent the harm of one 
44Mill discusses the definition of impartially, and its 
connection to various activities (Util., 300-301). 
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partner by another constitutes legitimate intervention. 
Intervention for the sake of the agent himself or herself 
constitutes illegitimate intervention. The free choice by a 
couple of a particular (homosexual or heterosexual) marital 
arrangement, whether we find that arrangement unfair in its 
repercussions or distasteful in its expression, deserves 
protection as long as each partner legitimately chooses that 
arrangement for herself or himself. Mill supports interven-
tion when one partner cannot protect himself or herself, when 
the patterns of coercion are so great as to render free choice 
impossible. Mill warns, however, that this intervention 
should neither add unnecessarily to political power and 
bureaucracy nor contribute needlessly to uniformity of action. 
Mill's depiction of the wife as a slave, and his descrip-
tion of the presently constituted marriage relationship as a 
master-slave relationship, refers back to his prohibition of 
slave contracts in On Liberty. 45 According to Mill, one 
cannot exercise his or her liberty by abdicating that liberty 
in favor of slavery. Persons cannot deny their status as 
persons, as agents capable of choice and self-actualization. 
One's choice cannot legitimately forsake all future choices. 
"The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be 
free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to 
alienate his freedom" (OL, 103) . Mill's prohibition of 
45 Pateman (1988) points out the repercussions of Mill's 
prohibition of slavery for women's present enslavement in mar-
riage. 
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slavery lays the foundation for a political and social attack 
on familial patriarchy, on marital slavery. The parallel 
between patriarchal marriages and slavery opens an avenue for 
positive political intervention to encourage female libera-
tion, to end women's enslavement. The elimination of domestic 
slavery requires an expansion of familial, economic and 
political opportunities through positive political interven-
tion. 
As always, Mill attempts to reconcile the dictates of 
liberty and equality in the family. Government can interfere 
for the sake of individual protection, but not in order to 
mandate a pre-established division of labor. Free marital 
expression consists of the opportunity to determine as a 
couple the give and take in that relationship. This liberty 
of determination cannot take place in an atmosphere of 
coercive inequality or customary prejudice. The sexual 
division of labor "neither can nor should be pre-established 
by the law, since it must depend on individual capacities and 
suitabilities" (Sub., 156). 
Mill's paradigm of private and public attempts to 
reconcile the attack on social patterns of coercion which 
require government intervention with a concern for the 
sovereignty of the individual. Mill's standard of harm to 
others does exactly this. Family arrangements which express 
free choice remain immune from government intervention. 
Government should not violate free choice by establishing 
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certain marital arrangements (e.g. , uniform guidelines for the 
sexual division of labor). Moral repugnancy or distaste does 
not warrant government intervention. In contrast, marital 
arrangements in which one person harms the other, in which one 
partner victimizes the other, or in which one partner's free 
choice is eliminated, demand political attention. The harm of 
one partner by another legitimizes intervention. In this way, 
Mill allows for the love possible and power present in marital 
relationships. Mill allows politics to intervene in the 
family while preserving the difference between the two. 
The actualization of free choice in the family depends 
upon freedom and equality in other spheres of activities. 
Familial freedom for women demands freedom in the economic and 
political spheres. Mill's evaluation of economic and politi-
cal activities demonstrates the principles of freedom and 
equality operating throughout Mill's philosophy. 
In his autobiography, Mill (Auto., 138) explicitly 
identifies the goal guiding his economic theory: 
The social problem of the future we considered to 
be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of 
action, with the common ownership in the raw mate-
rials of the globe, and an equal participation of 
all in the benefits of combined labour. 46 
Mill struggles with the problem of reconciling liberty, 
equality and social welfare in his Chapters on Socialism. In 
this work, Mill evaluates different economic systems, commu-
nism and capitalism, in terms of their promotion of 
46The "we" Mill refers to is Taylor and himself. 
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independence, social welfare and equality. Whereas commu-
nis~ 7 generates an oppressive centralization of authority, 
capitalism engenders troublesome, and equally oppressive, 
class inequalities. Mill notes that capitalism fails to 
correlate labor with reward or merit with success. Communism, 
however, stifles healthy competition while empowering a large 
managerial cadre. 
The question of which system to support becomes an 
empirical one. Mill supports whichever system works best, 
judged in light of the over-arching principles of liberty and 
equality. In the end, he supports a modified capitalism, but 
his support is provisional. Mill (Soc., 275) concludes that 
"individual property has presumably a long term before it, if 
only a provisional existence." This does not entail, however, 
that it must exist during the whole term unmodi-
fied, or that all rights now regarded as appertain-
ing to property belong to it inherently, and must 
endure while it endures. 
Mill provisionally rejects communism as "not available as a 
present resource" (Soc., 275). Communism assumes a human 
nature, a "social fabric" not yet available. 
In addition to his provisional support of capitalism, 
Mill looks to government to encourage cooperative production. 
With a taste of independence and freedom in the family, 
47Mill uses the term "socialism" where I use the term 
"communism." The socialism Mill criticizes equals communism 
as we now understand it. This is important because, as will 
be demonstrated, Mill recommends what some call a liberal 
"socialism." 
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economic market and politics, workers can extend that freedom 
by forming industrial cooperatives where joint production 
overcomes individual inequalities (Ryan 1984). Mill states: 
Eventually, and in perhaps a less remote future 
than may be supposed, we may, through the coopera-
tive principle, see our way to a change in society, 
which would combine the freedom and independence of 
the individual, with the moral intellectual, and 
economic advantages of aggregate production. 48 
The principles of liberty and equality shine through Mill's 
historical conclusions. Mill's particular economic sugges-
tions rank second to his fundamental principles of liberty and 
equality (Gutmann 1980; Ryan 1984). 
In the political sphere, as in the economic sphere, 
Mill's struggle with the political prerequisites of liberty 
and equality is compounded by his concern for social welfare- -
progress. Mill actively championed women's suffrage. He 
declared that women deserve, and require, equal protection of 
law. Female political participation advances both women and 
politics. Mill (Rep., 143) takes, 
no account of difference of sex. I consider it to 
be entirely irrelevant to political rights as 
difference in height or in the color of the hair. 
All human beings have the same interest in good 
government; the welfare of all is alike affected by 
it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to 
secure their share of its benefits. 
It should be recalled that equal "political rights" for Mill 
entails impartial protection from harm by others. This does 
48Mill, Principles of Poli ti cal Economy. Quoted in 
Gutmann (1980). 
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not necessarily exclude a consideration of the unique harm 
done to women. 
Mill (Rep., 127) argues for a representative democracy 
"representative of all, and not solely of the majority." Mill 
fears a tyranny of a capricious majority as much as that of a 
political despot. For this reason Mill recommends a number of 
strategies for blending majority with minority rights, liberty 
and equality with progress. "Universal but graduated" (Rep., 
143) suffrage represents one such attempt. By merging a 
consideration of the quality of a vote with the quantity of 
votes Mill hopes to protect against class faction (i.e., an 
angry and short-sighted laboring class) as well as provide for 
social progress and welfare. 49 Mill seeks to reward more 
qualified voters with a weighted vote. Qualities deserving 
recognition are those that demonstrate a far-sighted concern 
for the public interest as opposed to selfish individual or 
class interest. Mental superiority justifies plural votes. 
Mill (Rep., 137) immediately recognizes, however, the problems 
with discerning the quality of a vote. He rejects property as 
a measure of quality: "accident has so much more to do than 
merit with enabling men to rise in the world" that such a 
measure "will continue to be supremely odious." Mill (Rep., 
138) tentatively suggests that education or occupation "might" 
serve as "some" test. Mill limits plural voting so that no 
49 Robson (1967) discusses the connection between plural 
voting and progress in Mill's thought. 
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single class could dominate the majority. He also elaborates 
a number of other strategies designed to insure minority 
representation. 50 
This strategy, plural voting, represents a specific 
suggestion founded on deeper principles. Once Mill discerned 
that any of his particular strategies violated their justify-
ing principle, he would abandon it promptly. He recognizes 
the evolving nature of knowledge, particularly knowledge of 
social phenomena (note his discussion of economics). It is 
therefore mistaken to dismiss Mill's paradigm on the basis of 
some misguided (tentative and contingent) specific recommenda-
tions. Upon recognizing the corrosive effects of plural 
voting, Mill would, I believe, revise his strategy in order to 
adequately service his principles of liberty and equality. 
Communitarian and Radical/Marxist Feminists: A Reply 
This elaboration of the variety of social spheres in 
Mill's thought reveals the radical potential in Mill's private 
and public paradigm for addressing socially pervasive patriar-
chy while maintaining the integrity of different spheres. 
Mill's philosophy attacks coercive inequalities without 
500ne such method Mill favors to insure minority repre-
sentation is proportional representation. Interestingly, some 
feminists also look to proportional representation as one way 
in which women's voices are not utterly silenced. Unlike the 
"winner take all" strategy of determining representation, 
proportional representation guards against one dominant class 
or faction monopolizing discussion or policy formation. For 
a discussion on the feminist advantages of proportional 
representation see Phillips 1991, 80-89. 
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collapsing private pursuits with public duties. He backs his 
formal promise of equality with an understanding of substan-
tive inequality. He perceives, and addresses patterns of 
domination in all social spheres, but refuses to diminish 
private to public, love to power, or families to domination. 
Mill's private and public paradigm conveys the richness and 
complexity of human nature, a multi-dimensional human nature 
in which individuals realize themselves in a variety of social 
contexts (see Rosenblum 1987). He explores in detail three 
social spheres: the domestic, economic and political spheres. 
All these spheres are necessary, but none sufficient in and of 
themselves, as expressions of human liberty and equality. As 
such, Mill balances liberty and equality within, and among, 
spheres of activity. 
The underlying principles of liberty and equality 
operating in Mill's analysis of private and public spheres of 
activity allow a specific response to the communitarian and 
radical/marxist feminist critiques of Mill. As explained 
earlier, the communitarian feminist critique centers upon a 
perceived separation in Mill's thought between emotion and 
reason. This allegedly reflects a difference between men and 
women. Communitarian feminists argue that Mill depreciates 
and subordinates women and the emotional private family to the 
rational (male) public realm. Mill's distinction of private 
from public is not founded on a difference between men and 
women, however, but in two different aspects of every 
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individual's life: the partial personal expressions of love 
and the impartial interest in public welfare. 
Mill tries to reconcile these two dimensions of human 
nature in his private and public paradigm and in his depiction 
of the individual. Each individual expresses him/herself in 
a variety of personal and impersonal contexts. Mill (OL, 60) 
explains that "desires and impulses are as much a part of the 
perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong 
impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced." Mill 
(OL, 61) defends emotions as necessary to healthy societies: 
whoever thinks that individuality of desires and 
impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, 
must maintain that society has no need of strong 
natures - -is not the better for containing many 
persons who have much character--and that a high 
general average of energy is not desirable. 
Mill accounts for and balances the pull of both reason and 
emotion in society and in the individual. He does not 
subordinate emotion to reason or family to politics. All 
express humanity. In his Autobiography, Mill's speaks of a 
mental crisis he suffered, through which he came to believe 
that "The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, 
now seemed to me of primary importance. The cultivation of 
the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical 
and philosophical creed" (Auto., 86). 
Communitarian feminists mistakenly interpret Mill's 
denigration of instinct and prejudice as a depreciation of 
emotion and feeling (Urbinati 1991; also see Robson 1967; 
Thornton 1987) . Rather than "abstracting" reason from 
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emotion, Mill coordinates the two into a portrayal of a 
healthy individual, male or female. Furthermore, Mill employs 
the Subjection of Woman as both a rhetorical and a rational 
tool. Mill discerned that the elimination of women's subordi-
nation requires a re-education of sentiment as well as a 
rational philosophic argument (Shanley 1981; Urbinati 1991). 
Whereas the communitarian feminist misreading of Mill 
results from a mistaken association of men and women with 
reason and emotion in Mill's thought, the radical/marxist 
feminist misinterpretation ensues from an exaggeration of the 
"separateness" of private and public activities. Furthermore, 
it fails to distinguish principles of fundamental import in 
Mill's philosophy from practical, provisional suggestions. 51 
The preceding analysis exposes the complexity in Mill's 
paradigm of private and public which allows- -indeed demands- -a 
concern for coercive inequality. Mill's private and public 
paradigm incorporates a dialogue between formal equality and 
substantive inequality. 
Radical/marxist feminists read Mill's support of laissez -
faire capitalism, plural voting, and a sexual di vision of 
labor in the home as indications of the conflict in Mill's 
thought between formal equality and substantive inequality. 
Mill, however, recognized the tenuous, evolving character of 
51Gutmann (1980); Shanley (1981); Ten (1980); Tulloch 
(1989) all discern two levels of theoretical commitment in 
Mill's philosophy. 
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the study of economics and of human social behavior. 52 we 
examined the tentative and provisional nature of Mill's 
economic and political theory. Likewise, his psychological 
assumptions about the sexes and their appropriate roles in the 
family can, and for a true understanding must, be distin-
guished from his deeper commitment to freedom and equality. 
Although Mill (Sub., 164) says that "It is not. .. I think, a 
desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labor 
to the income of the family" (my emphasis), he reiterates 
several times throughout the same text that no one can know 
the true nature and roles of women. "I consider it presump-
tion in anyone to pretend to decide what women are or are not, 
can or cannot be, by natural constitution" (Sub., 173). 53 
His particular recommendations of procedures and strategies 
depend entirely on their service to liberty and equality in 
the sphere of activity in which they operate. 
In conclusion, Mill's private/public paradigm provides 
for liberty and equality while protecting the private aspect 
of the family. Mill coherently extends liberal principles to 
women. Rather than exposing the limits of Mill's liberalism, 
this endeavor reveals the breadth and potential of his 
52 See, especially, Mill's Auguste Comte and Positivism 
(1961). 
53Earlier in the same text Mill asserts, "It is only a man 
here or there who has any tolerable knowledge of the character 
of the women in his own family. I do not mean, of their 
capabilities; these nobody knows, not even themselves" (Sub., 
141) . 
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paradigm for articulating the complexity of humanity and 
society. Mill advances Locke's liberal paradigm by explicitly 
identifying a standard of intervention which regulates 
interaction between the political sphere and the economic and 
familial spheres. Whereas Locke's political philosophy 
contains a la tent potential for political intervention in 
various spheres, Mill systematically demarcates private and 
public activities in terms of a standard of intervention. 
Whereas Locke's liberal philosophy begins to illustrate the 
transformation all human relationships undergo when individ-
uals are considered free and equal, Mill consciously promotes 
that transformation. The political dictate to protect the 
individual from harm by others transcends familial boundaries. 
Mill picks up the liberal project where Locke left off, self-
consciously working out the interactive relationship between 
spheres of activities. 
Mill's standard of intervention- -harm to others- -provides 
the beginning of a model for government intervention for the 
sake of gender equality. It is this standard that requires 
elaboration. Can this liberal standard be extended so as to 
fully recognize how women suffer as women? Can such an 
extension maintain the liberal distinction between private and 
public? These questions guide my next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
RAWLS AND GENDER JUSTICE 
As Mill rejects Locke's foundation for liberalism in 
natural rights, John Rawls rejects utilitarianism as an 
adequate basis of liberal freedom. Yet all three promise 
individual liberty and, consequently, distinguish between 
private and public activities. Rawls reinvigorated the 
continuing debate over liberal ideas and practices with his 
widely acclaimed--and just as widely criticized--reworking of 
liberal political thought, A Theory of Justice. Rawls' 
philosophy thus offers feminists an opportunity to test their 
criticism of liberalism against a twentieth century formula-
tion of the tradition. 
Many feminists interpret Rawls' thought as another 
indication of liberalism's inability to articulate and to 
address women's differences, differences in reproductive, 
familial and economic roles which root women's oppression 
(see, for example, Benhabib 1987; Hirschmann 1992; Pateman 
1989; Young 1990). For these feminists, Rawls' abstract 
method effectively erases women's differences, silences their 
voices and ignores their lives. In their view, Rawls' overt 
attempts to include women in his principles of justice merely 
serves to obscure still further the limits of liberal 
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principles for women's emancipation. Nancy Hirschmann (1992, 
76) claims that: 
The structural sexism of contemporary obligation 
theory is ... masked by ostensible improvements in 
contingent sexism, but, in a continuum of histori-
cal devolution, it is systematically implicated and 
intertwined in the concepts these theories inherit 
from the Enlightenment. 
This chapter argues that Rawls' feminist critics miscon-
strue the intent and emancipatory potential behind his 
principles of justice. Rawls' method integrates both univer-
sal and particular concerns, both "male" and "female" voices 
(Okin 1989b). Indeed, Rawls' theory fails only when he 
overlooks the revolutionary nature of his own liberal princi-
ples (see Kymlicka 1989, 95). Rawls offers a strategy with 
which we can discern both what we have in common, as members 
of liberal societies, and how we differ. Rather than erase or 
ignore those differences, Rawls' political philosophy incorpo-
rates human individual differences into its very foundation 
(see Kukathas and Pettit 1990, 135-136). The central question 
concerns the fair terms of cooperation between individuals 
with different experiences and different goods; these fair 
terms of cooperation mediate between persons understood as 
"self-authenticating sources of valid claims" (PL, 33). 
This chapter critically extends the sympathetic reading 
of Rawls' philosophy offered by Susan Okin in two ways. 
First, reading Rawls' work in light of previous liberal 
thinkers reveals how the contemporary liberal project began 
and progressed with the work of Locke and Mill. By 
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elaborating the emancipatory implications in Rawls' own 
thought, the feminist potential implicit in earlier liberal 
accounts is exposed. 
Second, and more importantly, whereas Okin locates a 
fundamental ambiguity in Rawls' work apparent in his reluc-
tance to apply the principles of justice to the family (Okin 
1991, 181), I argue that this reluctance on Rawls' part is as 
much a product of his choice of focus as a sentimental, 
patriarchal desire to protect the family from the demands of 
justice. 1 This becomes apparent when one examines Rawls' 
distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. By focusing 
directly on the relationship between family life and politics 
in Rawls' thought, by explicitly identifying both the private 
and public dimensions of the family, I demonstrate that what 
Okin labels an "internal paradox" (1989a, 249) actually 
reveals Rawls' deep concern for both the integrity of the 
family unit and the emancipation of women through an extension 
of the principles of justice. Rawls' ambivalence about the 
relationship between justice and the family does not reflect 
a patriarchal blind spot to coercive family structures, but a 
deep understanding of the role of family life in expressing 
diversity, individual goods and liberty. 
1Rawls remarks in Poli ti cal Liberalism: "Other major 
matters are omitted, for example, the justice of and in the 
family, though I do assume that in some form the family is 
just. The underlying assumption is that a conception of 
justice worked up by focusing on a few long-standing classical 
problems should be correct, or at least provide guidelines for 
addressing further questions" (PL, xxix) . 
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In sum, like Okin, I discover in Rawls' principles a 
profound emancipatory potential for the alleviation of gender 
inequities. Unlike Okin, I find his private-public distinc-
tion both emancipatory and logically consistent. To make this 
case, I first elaborate the continuing feminist critique of 
Rawls, then suggest a possible liberal response apparent in 
Rawls' political philosophy. This allows a specific response 
to the feminist critics of Rawls' identified here. In all 
three steps, I concentrate on Rawls view of the relationship 
between private and public: in the first, on the feminist 
critique as it challenges this distinction in his work; in the 
second, on the consequences of this distinction for gender 
equity; in the third, on the potential for Rawls' distinction 
between private and public to meet the continuing feminist 
challenge to its efficacy. I argue that this private-public 
distinction protects both women and men, while providing a 
potent weapon against patriarchy, wherever it surfaces. 
The Feminist Critique of Rawls 
Rawls himself recognizes two broad lines of criticism 
prompted by A Theory of Justice. These critiques either 
represent Rawls' liberalism as: 
intrinsically faulty because it relies on an ab-
stract conception of the person and uses an indi-
vidualist, nonsocial, idea of human nature; or else 
that it employs an unworkable distinction between 
public and private that renders it unable to deal 
with the problems of gender and the family. (PL, 
xxix) 
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Feminists adopt both these lines of argument. The first, 
which I call the revisionist liberal feminist critique, 
charges Rawls with failing to apply his principles of justice 
to the gender-structured family, failing to address the 
injustice in reproductive relationships (see, for example, 
Green 1986; Kearns 1983; English 1977; Okin 1989b). Ultimate-
ly, however, many of these feminists find Rawls' principles 
viable and desirable, given a complete application of their 
strictures. My own interpretation belongs in this camp. 
Contrary to this view, however, I argue that Rawls' principles 
of justice necessarily impact on the family, to the extent 
that families belong in the basic structure; at the same time, 
however, Rawls locates a fundamentally private aspect of 
family life which places families beyond political control. 
In the end, I demonstrate that Rawls does this consistently 
and persuasively. The second strain of feminist criticism, 
which I call the communitarian feminist criticism, 2 challenges 
the adequacy of the principles of justice themselves, denying 
their cogency for articulating feminine experiences. These 
feminists reject the universalizing, impartial character of 
Rawls' principles of justice as inevitably blind to women's 
particular circumstances and to the coercive relationships 
which enforce women's subordination (see, for example, 
2The characterization of this strain of feminist critique 
as "communitarian" is adopted from Chapters 2 and 3, where 
similar critiques of Locke and Mill were identified. See 
Chapter 2 for a defense of this label. 
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Benhabib 1987; Matsuda 1986; Pateman 1989; Young 1990). Some 
communitarian feminists counterpoise Rawls' ethic of justice 
with an ethic of care, an ethic, they assert, more in tune 
with women's reality (see, for example, Held 1993; Ruddick 
1989) . 3 I elaborate each of these two feminist readings, 
liberal and communitarian, in turn. 
The liberal feminist critique applauds Rawls for his 
effort to create the necessary material and economic bases of 
liberty; it denies, however, the feminist potential of such a 
liberalism until the distinction between private and public is 
reworked, or even jettisoned. 4 Only a liberalism which "cuts 
3The feminist critique lacks a sustained attack of Rawls 
from the left. This can be attributed to two factors. First, 
feminists often adopt and deepen the prevailing interpreta-
tions of particular thinkers and the general marxist criticism 
of Rawls is itself less prevalent in the literature responding 
to Rawls, for two prominent, early marxist critiques, see 
Macpherson (1973); Nielsen (1978); cited in Kymlicka (1990a, 
160). Second, to a large extent, Rawls coopts a socialist 
critique of his work by both identifying and addressing 
economic patterns of coercion. Rawls notes that in "a 
democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though 
not presumably equally held ... and distributive shares satisfy 
the principles of justice, many socialist criticisms are met" 
(TJ, 280). It should be noted that in some respects Young 
(1990, 32) criticizes Rawls from the left when she accuses him 
of focusing on distributive justice and forgetting structural 
processes which reenforce and recreate domination. Young 
asserts that "a distributive understanding misses the way in 
which the powerful enact and reproduce their power." I have 
treated Young in this chapter as an expression of communi-
tarian feminist criticism, because she traces this failure to 
appreciate the contexts of power to Rawls' abstract method 
which, in her view, renders power relationships unintelligi-
ble. 
4Green (1986, 36) presents an example of the more 
extreme, later case. "Liberalism, shorn of the public/private 
distinction which has heretofore hindered the application of 
liberal principles to the question of justice within the 
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through the public/private dichotomy remains a secure founda-
tion for feminist thought and action," and in fact, there 
exists "much in Rawls' work to encourage the suspicion that 
the public/private distinction is intrinsic to liberalism" 
(Green 1986, 27). At the very least, Rawls' theory "is flawed 
by the ramifications of the public-private split" (Kearns 
1983, 41) which relegates family life, and gender relations to 
the sacrosanct arena of private activity, beyond the reaches 
of justice. 
The private nature of the family is evident in the way 
Rawls identifies the participants in the original position, 5 
those agreeing to the principles of justice to guide society, 
as "heads of families." As such, they represent the interests 
of families, rather than individuals; they look forward to the 
interests of their progeny as well as themselves. This 
characteristic of parties to the agreement, however, "makes 
the family opaque to claims of justice" (English 1977, 95; see 
family, remains a sturdy foundation for thorough-going 
feminist action." It is hard to imagine what a liberalism 
"shorn" of its private-public distinction would look like. I 
have argued throughout this dissertation that this distinction 
defines liberalism, that it characterizes liberalism at its 
essence. To the extent that some feminists seek to jettison 
the private-public distinction, rather than rework it, they 
have moved away from anything which would reasonably be 
considered liberal. 
5The original position is a device of representation 
Rawls employs to expose the fair terms of cooperation. I will 
examine this concept, in detail, later in this chapter. 
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also, Okin 1987, 48-50), 6 alerting some feminists to a far 
deeper problem in Rawls' work. In their view, Rawls' silence 
regarding gender structured families implies a reluctance, or 
even an inability, to speak to women's claims for emancipa-
tion, to effectively combat that aspect of families which 
constitute a barrier to equal opportunity for women. 
Despite his assertion that persons behind the veil of 
ignorance will be ignorant of their sex, 7 Rawls never incorpo-
rates the ramifications of this inclusion into his theory. He 
overlooks the radical transformation of gender-structured 
society and family this would require (Kearns 1983). After 
all, if parties to the contract are truly ignorant of their 
sex, they could never risk allowing the maintenance of a 
patriarchal society. Although Rawls recognizes the family as 
a significant barrier to equal opportunity (TJ, 301), he never 
comprehends the significance of that obstacle to liberty for 
6It should be noted that Rawls appropriates this critique 
in Political Liberalism. In this later work, Rawls stipulates 
that the "parties can be required to agree to a savings 
principle subject to the further condition that they must want 
all previous generations to have followed it" (PL, 274) and 
drops the head of families constraint. This way, parties 
necessarily consider the interests of subsequent generations 
without being characterized as heads of families. 
7Actually, in A Theory of Justice Rawls never mentions 
sex specifically in terms of his "thick" veil of ignorance. 
"Among the essential features of this situation is that no one 
knows his place in society, his class or social status, nor 
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the 
like" (TJ, 12). Rawls corrects this oversight and his sexist 
language in later work. Rawls rules out as "not relevant from 
a moral standpoint. .. a knowledge of our sex and class" (Rawls 
1975, 537; see Okin 1987, 46). 
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women. Rawls asks, "Is the family to be abolished then?" (TJ, 
511). He replies that "there is much less urgency to take 
this course" (TJ, 511), for "when the principles of fraternity 
and redress are allowed their appropriate weight, the natural 
distribution of assets and the contingencies of social 
circumstances can more easily be accepted" (TJ, 512). This 
suggests that, for Rawls, women can accept patriarchal 
families as "natural" and search for redress outside the 
family itself. 
Indeed, according to Okin, Rawls simply assumes the 
family to be just (Okin 1989b, 235-237). In Part III of b:_ 
Theory of Justice Rawls traces moral development, acquired by 
children in families. He ties this moral development to its 
culmination in the acquisition, by adults, of a sense of 
justice. In just societies, children proceed through three 
stages of moral development: morality of authority, of 
association, of principles (TJ, 462-479). The family plays an 
essential role in the first two. In the first, the family 
encourages the internalization of "a collection of precepts" 
(TJ, 466) regarding rewards and punishments; these precepts 
result from familial authority based in love and affection. 
This demands that the parents "exemplify the morality which 
they enjoin" (TJ, 466). Indeed, the parents themselves must 
"be worthy objects of (the child's) admiration" (TJ, 465) . In 
the second stage, the family conveys the necessity to see life 
from a variety of points of view, inculcating the need "to 
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honor one's obligations and duties" (TJ, 471). Affection and 
attachments prevalent in the family ingrain in the maturing 
children the desire to reciprocate benefits. Finally, in the 
third stage of development, the adult generalizes from the 
moral precepts acquired in the family, coming to "appreciate 
the ideal of just human cooperation" (TJ, 474). The adult now 
acts from principles of justice as well as affection. 
Given this explicit and detailed picture of the role of 
the family in the production of a society populated by persons 
with an adequate sense of justice, Rawls' silence concerning 
justice within the family appears inconsistent. After all, if 
families model just relations for children, the question of 
just relations within the family becomes significant. Okin 
argues that Rawls' s reluctance to explore justice between 
family members manifests an ambivalence internal to his work 
regarding the private or public nature of the family. 8 On one 
hand, Rawls designates the family as part of the basic 
structure of society, a basic structure susceptible to the 
principles of justice; on the other, he fails to apply justice 
to the family. He details the essential role of families in 
just societies while disregarding the impact of unjust 
families. In Okin's (1987, 47) assessment, Rawls is "effec-
tively trapped by this assumption ... that life within the 
8Kymlicka (1990a, 190) also asserts that Rawls "flip-
f lops on whether the family is or isn't one of the basic 
institutions of society to be governed by principles of 
justice." 
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family and relations between the sexes are not properly to be 
regarded as part of the subject matter of social justice." 
This unwarranted--patriarchal--assumption by Rawls yields an 
"internal paradox" (Okin 1989a, 249), sharply limiting the 
feminist potential of Rawls' thought until this "ambiguity" 
(Okin 1991, 181) is resolved. 9 
The communitarian feminist critique of Rawls indicts him 
not only for his distinction between private and public but 
also for espousing the very principles which yield that 
distinction. Feminists adopting this perspective share an 
opposition to what they perceive to be a narrow conception of 
human nature and experience, a conception inadequate for a 
full articulation of women's differences. Specifically, there 
are three cornrnuni tarian feminist challenges to Rawls' liberal-
ism: a critique of his abstract method; a critique of his 
stress on justice as opposed to empathy; and a critique of his 
notion of obligation as opposed to non-voluntarily constructed 
duties. 10 
Many feminists reject Rawls' abstract method, best 
exemplified by his veil of ignorance which requires the 
elimination of all individual, particular concerns motivating 
parties to the original agreement. For these feminists, 
Rawls' approach considers persons shorn of all actual, 
9For a similar argument see Green (1986). 
10Grimshaw (1986, 203) delineates each of these three 
characteristics of what she calls a "female ethic." Baird 
(1994) also points to this three-prong characterization. 
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historical and social circumstances. They question the very 
possibility, and usefulness, of this sort of abstraction--
Carole Pateman calls parties in the original position "disem-
bodied entities of reason" (1989, 46) --and conclude that under 
the contract situation "sexually differentiated individuals 
have disappeared" (1988, 42) . 11 Seyla Benhabib describes the 
relationship between abstract persons in the original position 
and actual, particular individuals in society as one between 
a "generalized other" and a "concrete other." The former, 
Rawls' "generalized other," mistakenly depicts persons as 
"disembedded and disembodied beings" (Benhabib 1987, 81). 
Abstracting from particular individuals with unique histories 
and positions, abstracting in essence from all that makes us 
human, disallows an understanding of difference. "Under 
conditions of the 'veil of ignorance' the other as different 
from the self, disappears .... Differences are not denied; 
they become irrelevant" (Benhabib 1987, 89). Benhabib 
recommends an alternative view of others--that of the concrete 
other. As concrete others, persons perceive one another as 
unique individuals and try to understand their differences. 
Rawls' distinction between private and public reflects his 
impoverished conception of the self. Rawls' politics, as 
such, ignores sexual differences, differences in needs, 
desires and perspectives. These needs "become 'private', 
11Matsuda (1986, 616) and Minow (1990, 154) arrive at the 
same conclusion. 
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nonformalizable, nonanalyzable and amorphous aspects of our 
conceptions of the good life" (Benhabib 1987, 94). Rawls' 
private-public distinction relegates consideration of concrete 
others to the private realm. Women, as women, disappear from 
politics. 
Iris Young presents a similar critique of Rawls. She 
notes that Rawls employs a "social ontology that gives primacy 
to substance over relations" and "fails to appreciate that 
individual identities and capacities are in many respects 
themselves the products of social processes and relations" 
(1990, 27). That is, Rawls' veil abstracts from all human 
relationships, all the distinctive characteristics which make 
us human. Rather than capture a plurality of selves, the 
veil's monological character excludes discussion among moral 
subjects; behind the veil, any individual looks like, could 
be, any other individual. The veil eliminates any possibility 
of exploring differences, or analyzing relationships. Through 
this veil Rawls attempts to achieve impartiality, but actually 
merely masks--often coercive--relationships. Impartiality is 
necessarily elusive- -and dangerous. "Reducing differences to 
unity means bringing them under a universal category, which 
requires expelling those aspects of the different things that 
do not fit the category" (Young 1990, 102) . 12 
12MacKinnon (1989, 162, 292) makes an even stronger case. 
"Formally, the state is male in that objectivity is its norm. 
Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of itself." 
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She believes this drive toward impartiality results in 
two related problems. First, it allows Rawls to mistakenly 
focus on distributive justice. Because Rawls' method rules 
out any discussion of context, he understands social justice 
as tantamount to a simple distribution of "benefits and 
burdens among society's members" (Young 1990, 16). He elides 
the transformation of societal institutions- -economic and 
familial--necessary to effectively combat oppression. 13 
Second, Rawls' private-public distinction reiterates this 
stress on impartiality, and the reduction of justice to 
distribution. "Like impartial moral reason, this public realm 
attains its generality only by exclusion of particularity, 
desire, feeling and those aspects of life associated with the 
body" (Young 1990, 107) . 
Whereas Benhabib and Young oppose Rawls' universalizing 
intent, other communitarian feminists--maternal feminists 14 --
contrast Rawls' paradigm of justice with an ethic of care, 
evident they argue in women's moral voices. Rawls' "contrac-
tual rationality" (Held 1987, 112) diminishes morality to mere 
13Young (1990, 27) notes that Rawls' inclusion of self-
respect as a primary good appears to transcend mere distri-
bution, but ultimately fails. "While Rawls does not speak of 
self-respect as something itself distributed, he does suggest 
that distributive arrangements provide the background condi-
tions for self respect." 
14Dietz (1987) identifies "maternalist feminism" as one 
feminist challenge to the liberal notion of citizenship. 
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bargaining- -men jostling for limited goods . 15 Contractual 
justice models a relationship between mutually disinterested 
parties seeking to further their own ends through agreement. 
In contrast, women's lives, as mothers, reveals a distinctive 
ethic, a paradigm which integrates women's empathic insights 
as caregivers and nurturers. These feminists do not claim 
that all women are so giving; but, rather, that the possibili-
ties built into the mother-child relationship shed light on a 
different standard of action, an alternative model of ethical 
judgment. This model demands that the actor evaluate the 
needs of the other person, as well as--or before--a consider-
ation of how to maximize his or her own benefits. 
Virginia Held, for example, recognizes that different 
standards of behavior operate in different types of relation-
ships. She contends, however, that: 
relations between mothers and children as paradigm-
atic ... may be an important stage to go through in 
reconstructing a view of human relationships that 
will be adequate from a feminist point of view. 
(1987 t 115) 
Rawls' principles elevate contractual justice, defining it as 
the paramount public voice, and relegating the ethic of care, 
women's voices, to the private realm. Held concludes: 
To continue to build morality on rational princi-
ples opposed to emotions and to include women among 
the rational will leave no one to reflect the 
promptings of the heart. To simply bring women 
15Hirschmann (1992, 259) remarks: "Indeed, in the 
original position justice arises only because people act 
defensively against the possibility that they will be worse 
off when the veil is lifted." 
into the public and male domain of the polis will 
leave no one to speak for the household. (Held 
1993, 48) 16 
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Finally, some feminist communitarians find Rawls' theory 
of obligation problematic. Contract theory which founds 
obligation upon consent fails to comprehend non-voluntarily 
acquired obligations. In particular, the veil of ignorance, 
which removes individuals from their context, cannot account 
for non-voluntary duties. In contrast, the maternal experi-
ence demonstrates that not all obligations are acquired 
through agreement; some duties are simply given. Rawls' 
emphasis on consent neglects the non-voluntary component of 
all obligations, ranging from the political to the maternal. 
To be sure, Rawls reintegrates non-voluntary obligations with 
his notion of natural duty- - the duty to comply with just 
institutions. In this case, one's obligations derive from 
what one would agree to, what anyone would agree to, given 
Rawls' original position. Ultimately, however, this hypothet-
ical construction creates obligation and coercion, without and 
regardless of actual consent. This "problematic construction 
of voluntarism" creates a situation where "voluntarism is 
largely hypothetical" (Hirschmann 1992, 93). As a result, 
16Ruddick ( 19 89, 180) also explores what she calls a 
"maternal thinking" which "articulates an opposed and superior 
conception of conflict resolution rooted in a maternal view of 
relationships .... In this alternate conception, the ideal of 
equality is a mystifying phantom. Mothers are not equal to 
their children .... Differences in strength cannot be wished 
away .... Power relations are shifting and complex." 
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Rawls disguises coercion behind a facade of hypothetical and 
empty consent. 
Rawls ... flounders in the attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting needs for individual choice and commu-
nity and ends up binding people against their will 
through the elaborate construction of a falsely 
voluntaristic structure. (Hirschmann 1992, 94) 
Rawls' voluntarism masks coercion, and in doing so, hides non-
voluntarily acquired duties, most profoundly experienced by 
women in the family, in a liberal private sphere. 17 
In sum, Rawls' private-public distinction troubles both 
his liberal feminist and communitarian feminist critics. They 
perceive a reluctance on Rawls' part, manifest in this 
distinction, to address and rectify injustice in the family. 
Rawls' feminist critics point to a number of indications that 
the family is in fact private for Rawls - - from the more 
superficial (the heads of family constraint) to the more 
profound (his perceived distinction between universal/ 
particular, justice/care and obligation/duty). Contrary to 
these interpretations, I believe that Rawls' private-public 
distinction is both essential to his theory of justice, 
necessary as a preserve of individual integrity in and out of 
17Hirschmann (1992, 116) describes a "systematic sexism 
in modern obligation theory ... which once again turns on the 
central assumptions of the public-private split. For the 
denial of the relevance to political obligation of the 
activities of the private sphere, such as child care, affec-
tive relations and productions and reproduction in all its 
variety, at least implicitly indicates a masculinist onto-
logical and epistemological framework." 
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the family, and potent as a weapon against patriarchy, against 
patterns of domination in the family. 
Rawls' Liberal Response 
Feminist critics of Rawls argue that his promise of 
freedom and equality is empty unless he responds to substan-
tive inequality within the family. They extend their earlier 
critiques of Locke's and Mill's liberalism, contending that 
liberalism's masculine bias, expressed in its private-public 
distinction, masks private, familial coercion with a facade of 
formal equality. In fact, Rawls shares the feminist concern 
for the substantive bases--material and social--of liberty. 
He agrees that "Locke's doctrine improperly subjects the 
social relationships of moral persons to historical and social 
contingencies that are extended to, and eventually undermine, 
their freedom and equality" (PL, 287) . 18 Like Locke, Rawls 
hopes to protect individual liberty by defining the legitimate 
scope of political intervention, by disclosing the fair terms 
of cooperation. 19 More profoundly than Locke, however, Rawls 
18Rawls continues, "The constraints that Locke imposes on 
the as-if historical process are not strong enough to charac-
terize a conception of background justice acceptable to free 
and equal moral persons" (PL, 287). 
19Rawls asks, "When may citizens by their vote properly 
exercise their coercive political power over one another when 
fundamental questions are at stake? Or in light of what 
principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our doing 
so is to be justifiable to others as free and equal?" (PL, 
217) . 
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understands that individual liberty also demands an attention 
to social and economic conditions. 
Rawls' political philosophy uncovers the repercussions of 
understanding persons as "self-authenticating sources of valid 
claims. 1120 This phrase captures the essence of the liberal 
tradition, the theme which echoes from Locke and Mill to 
Rawls: persons as distinct beings- -free and equal. For 
liberals from Locke to Rawls, the distinction between private 
and public blends a belief in the integrity of the individual 
with the need for, and joy in, community. In particular, 
Rawls' distinction between private and public elucidates the 
fair terms of cooperation among persons and associations with 
diverse characters and ends. 
The central concern for feminists involves the location 
of the family in Rawls' political thought. They ask: is the 
family private for Rawls, an expression of rationally pursued 
individual goods and, as such, beyond public intervention? Or 
is it public, thereby subject to reasonable principles of 
justice? At times Rawls treats the family as public, identi-
fying it within the basic structure (see TJ, 7; PL, 258). At 
others, he characterizes the family as private, operating 
according to affectionate, rather than coercive principles 
(see PL, 137). Some feminists point to this two-dimensional 
20Mosher (1991, 289-290) identifies "two fundamental 
intuitions" in Rawls' work: "persons are separate" and "luck 
cannot be a morally defensible basis for distributive out-
comes." These intuitions flow from the notion of "self-
authenticating" persons. 
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nature of the family as an apparent "ambiguity" (Okin 1991, 
181) or "internal paradox" (Okin 1989a, 108) in Rawls' 
thought. Okin (1989b, 231) perceives a "tension within the 
theory." In contrast, I argue that this two-dimensional 
treatment reflects the dual nature of families themselves. 
Family life correctly understood belongs both in the public 
basic structure (a realm subject to the principles of justice) 
and to the non-public sphere of associations. 21 On one hand, 
families operate as one of the most persistent barriers to 
fair equality of opportunity (TJ, 74, 301, 511). On the 
other, free individuals express and form themselves within the 
confines of the family unit (TJ, 462-469). Families are both 
private and public. Rawls' liberal paradigm reflects this 
complexity inherent in family life, and offers a strategy for 
addressing both the private and public aspects of family life, 
for combating patriarchy while preserving the familial choice 
and expression. 
Rawls' distinction between the reasonable and the 
rational, the right and the good, clarifies his understanding 
of public and private. The reasonable connotes those ends 
21At one point, Rawls recognizes the family as distinct 
from both the political and associational. "The political is 
distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways 
that the political is not; it is also distinct from the 
personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in 
ways the political is not" (PL, 137). For my purposes, 
families intersect with both the private and public realm, 
acting both as part of the basic structure and the broader 
associations. This does not deny that family life maintains 
a peculiar, affectionate character. 
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societies pursue as necessary to common life (e.g., coopera-
tion) . The rational designates those goods individuals and 
associations seek as a result of independent choice and free 
will. 22 As persons with both reasonable and rational powers, 
with both a sense of justice and an awareness of distinct and 
sometimes conflicting personal and associational ends, each 
individual acts as both a citizen and a man or woman (PL, 19-
20, 29-35). As citizens, individuals exercise a sense of 
justice which is articulated and clarified by the device of 
representation known as the original position. As free and 
equal persons, each follows independent personal and associat-
ional goals. In this way, the reasonable constrains the 
rational, citizenship cons trains personhood. This is the 
meaning of Rawls' claim that the right is prior to the 
good. 23 As such, individuals pursue their life within fair 
terms of cooperation, realizing their ends within a space 
which allows for equal self-development in others. 24 "In 
22Rawls (PL, 49-50) specifically recognizes the differ-
ence. "The reasonable is an element of the idea of society 
as a system of fair cooperation and that its fair terms be 
reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of reci-
procity .... The rational is, however, a distinct idea from 
the reasonable and applies to a single, unified agent (either 
an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment 
and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its 
own." 
23Mendus (1989, 119) notes that public and private in 
Rawls corresponds with the right and the good. 
24 Rawls explains, "the right and the good are compli -
mentary: no conception of justice can draw entirely upon one 
or the other, but must combine both in a definite way" (PL, 
173) . 
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justice as fairness the priority of right means that the 
principles of political justice impose limits on permissible 
ways of life" (PL, 174) . Justice as fairness draws those 
limits in such a way as to allow the greatest possible freedom 
for self-development and diversity. Rawls (PL, 174) con-
eludes, "A political conception of justice must contain within 
itself sufficient space ... for such ways of life." 
Rawls' basic structure, the non-voluntary social ins ti tu-
tions which shape life possibilities, 25 falls within the 
domain of the reasonable and public; fair terms of cooperation 
demand that these coercive social institutions abide by the 
principles of justice. "The basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice because its effects are so profound and 
present from the start" (TJ, 7). Clearly, by this definition, 
the family belongs in the basic structure. Rawls (PL, 258) 
recognizes this, in his most recent book, noting that the 
major social institutions of the basic structure 
assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the 
division of advantages that arise through social 
cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the 
legally recognized forms of property, and the 
organization of the economy, and the nature of the 
family, all belong in the basic structure. 26 
25 See TJ, 8 for Rawls' comparison between the basic 
structure and other "voluntary cooperative arrangements." 
26 It should be noted that at other points Rawls fails to 
include the family in the basic structure--unless he does so 
with the nebulous term "social ins ti tut ions." Earlier in 
Political Liberalism Rawls writes, "By the basic structure I 
mean a society's main political, social, and economic insti-
tutions" (PL, 11). Okin (1989, 49) reads passages similar to 
this to indicate an ambiguity in Rawls' thought. I argue that 
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This reinforces Rawls' placement of the family in the basic 
structure in A Theory of Justice (TJ, 7). 
While the basic structure expresses our reasonable, 
public selves, particular associations manifest our private, 
or more correctly, non-public selves. 27 In non-public 
spheres, persons realize disparate rational goods. Persons 
express themselves in a variety of associational contexts, 
often shifting membership and alliances, choosing values 
appropriate to their unique ends. Persons work out their 
identities within various associations, learning about 
themselves and confirming their value, trying on different 
roles and goals. 28 Associations encourage self-development 
and affirm self-respect, providing an environment where the 
individual's contributions are recognized and appreciated 
(see, in particular TJ, 441; PL, 41-43). As Roberto Alejandro 
( 1993, 77) argues, "associations socialize individuals into 
the in-out relationship between the family and basic structure 
is actually a product of a complexity internal to the family 
itself. 
27 See PL, 220-221 for Rawls' description of non-public 
reason and power. 
28Rawls explains: "In a democratic society non-public 
power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over 
members, is freely accepted.... Whatever comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral views we hold are also 
freely accepted, politically speaking, for given liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought, we impose any such doctrine 
on ourselves. By this I do not mean, apart from all prior 
loyalties and commitments, attachments and affections. I mean 
that, as free and equal citizens, whether we affirm these 
views is regarded as within our political competence specified 
by basic constitutional rights and liberties" (PL, 221-111). 
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the principles of trust and friendship, strengthen the 
individual's self-esteem, and provide a •secure basis' for the 
worth of members . " Associations vividly teach individuals 
about reciprocity and mutuality, the foundation of a sense of 
justice. In this regard, families are also associations; 29 
within the family, members learn about "moral standards 
appropriate to the individual's role," experience the exercise 
of "certain rights and duties" (TJ, 467) and acquire an 
ability "to view things from a greater multiplicity of 
perspectives" (TJ, 469). 
Rawls' paradigm integrates both the private and public, 
reasonable and rational, coercive and affectionate aspects of 
family life, with the reasonable constraining the rational; 
the public framing the private. As such, the public, reason-
able aspects of the family provides space within which the 
private aspects flourish; the public dimension of the family 
limits and protects the private dimension. 30 More specifi-
cally, when the family enters the circumstances of justice 
(see Tomasi 1991, 523; Kyrnlicka 1989, 113), the principles of 
justice hold; when affection and commonality exist, justice 
steps back. When one partner abuses another (e.g., rape), 
29Kearns ( 19 83, 4 O) asserts that "the family is explicitly 
considered to be a small association." See, in particular, 
TJ, 467. 
3011 Political values normally outweigh whatever other 
values oppose them, at least under the reasonable conditions 
that make a constitutional democracy possible" (PL, 155). See 
also, TJ, 425. 
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justice must prevail. After all, love transcends justice, but 
justice founds love. (See TJ, 464, 129.) 
Families operate according to values which differ from 
political values. 31 Rawls, (PL, 10) then, 
does not deny there being other values that apply, 
say, to the personal, the familial, and the associ-
ational, nor does it say that political values are 
separate from, or discontinuous with, other values. 
But, when the values of the family break down, when affection 
and common interests no longer move its members, the circum-
stances of justice exist and the principles of justice take 
hold. Two features characterize the circumstances of justice 
for Rawls: mutual disinterest and distinct, often conflict-
ing, ends (Tomasi 1991, 523) . 32 Thus, when the family acts 
out of love, affection or mutual interest, the circumstances 
of justice are not present. But when coercion replaces 
affection, when domination exploits compassion, justice 
supplies redress. 
31Rawls elaborates on the distinct purposes of different 
social institutions, "But it is the distinct purposes and 
roles of the parts of the social structure, and how they fit 
together, that explains there being different principles for 
distinct kinds of subjects. Indeed, it seems natural to 
suppose that the distinctive character and autonomy of the 
various elements of society requires that, within some sphere, 
they act from their own principles designed to fit their 
peculiar nature" (PL, 262) . 
32Rawls explains, "the circumstances of justice obtain 
whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward con-
flicting claims to the division of social advantages under 
conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances 
existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice" 
(TJ, 128). 
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Like Mill's standard of harm, Rawls' circumstances of 
justice allows a society to systematically decide which 
aspects of a social institution are public and which are 
private. In this way, both thinkers recognize a multitude of 
spheres of activities, first identified by Locke, which 
possess both private and public dimensions. Rawls enriches 
Mill's standard by incorporating a standard which explicitly 
recognizes coercive or oppressive circumstances which might 
not, in some interpretations, clearly fall into the category 
of harm. 
Actually, Rawls' principles supply a two-prong attack 
against patriarchy. He seeks both to provide background 
conditions conducive to justice in the family and to empower 
the oppressed to combat their subordination and create just 
social institutions. To begin, his principles of justice 
create background conditions which expand choices and opportu-
ni ties outside the family. 33 These principles, illuminated 
through the agreement reached in the original position, embody 
the fair terms of cooperation and apply to the basic structure 
of society. 
A. Each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liber-
ties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme for all, and in the scheme the equal politi-
cal liberties, and only those liberties, are to be 
guaranteed their fair value. 
B. Social and economic equalities are to satisfy 
two conditions: first, they are to be attached to 
330kin (1989a, 93, 175-176) makes exactly this point. 
positions and offices open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they 
are to be the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged members of society. (PL, 5-6) 
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Rawls' distinction between liberty and the worth of 
liberty clarifies this relationship between the two princi-
ples. The first guarantees formal equality (liberty); the 
second provides substantive equality, the resources necessary 
to exercise those liberties (worth of liberty) . 
While the difference principle (the second principle) 
addresses social and economic inequities, natural inequalities 
remain. Trying to equalize natural assets would demand far 
too harsh a breach of personal integrity and destroy human 
diversity. Rawls does not seek to level human excellence, but 
to actualize conditions in which all have the opportunity for 
such excellence. 34 
The aim, however, is not to eliminate contingencies 
from social life, for some contingencies are inevi-
table. Thus even if an equal distribution of 
natural assets seemed more in keeping with the 
equality of free persons, the question of redis-
tributing those assets (were this conceivable) does 
not arise, since it is incompatible with the integ-
rity of the person. (PL, 283) 
In this way, Rawls maintains variety among persons while 
ameliorating the social repercussions of those differences. 
He celebrates the differences among persons while disallowing 
the oppressive social and economic structures which might 
34 This echoes Mill's intent. As Mill sought to protect 
human excellence from cultural mediocrity by sheltering each 
person from oppressive social tyranny, Rawls strives to 
advance the full flowering of individuality by eliminating 
oppressive economic tyranny. 
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exploit those differences. Women don't have to become like 
men, adopt traditionally male characters (the greatest fear of 
some feminists) , 35 to claim equal recognition or equal 
access. 
Rawls' principles of justice furnish space and resources 
for many life choices. Differences as well as similarities 
bring people together. Because "the self is realized in the 
activities of many selves" (TJ, 565), Rawls promotes diversity 
among persons. Indeed it is the differences between men and 
women, between any individuals, which brings them together: 
The range of realized abilities of a single indi-
vidual of the species is not in general materially 
less than the potentialities of others similar to 
it. The striking exception is the difference of 
sex. This is perhaps why sexual affinity is the 
most obvious example of the need of individuals 
both human and animal for each other. (TJ, 525) 
It is the differences between men and women which the differ-
ence principle both protects and mitigates. By alleviating 
the social and economic repercussions of gender, the differ-
ence principle allows free, chosen expressions of sexual 
character. Social and economic oppression no longer enforces 
sex roles. 
Rawls (TJ, 511) argues that "the acknowledgment of the 
difference principle redefines the grounds for social inequal-
ities," empowering the oppressed, expanding options for 
escape. Rawls' principle of fair equality of opportunity 
35Those I have called maternal feminists particularly 
oppose the traditionally-defined male character as a standard 
of behavior. See, among others, Held (1993); Ruddick (1989). 
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demands that substantive access to a variety of social and 
economic positions no longer be tied to one's circumstances in 
the family as either a husband or wife, father or mother. 
This requires a dramatic change in employment practices, from 
adequate (government subsidized?) daycare to flextime and 
parental leave policies (see Okin 1989a, 175-176). To the 
extent that prejudice and oppression inhibit women's life 
chances, societal inequities must be structured so as to favor 
women. To the extent that some persons are disadvantaged, the 
difference principle dictates that any inequalities in society 
or the economy favor those least advantaged persons. To the 
extent that women bear a heavier burden at home, the society 
and the economy distribute benefits as to favor them. 36 
Rawls' concern for the worth of liberty insures that entrance 
into a marriage results from true autonomous choice, and also 
permits a negotiation of the sexual division of labor on equal 
terms. 
Rawls' liberal principles also furnish the tools for a 
transformation within the family. As the reasonable con-
strains the rational, justice supplies a fallback (Waldron 
1988, 647) when affection fails. As such, marital partners 
36Noting the family as a barrier to equal opportunity, 
Rawls asks, "Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by 
itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal oppor-
tunity inclines in this direction. But within the context of 
the theory of justice as a whole, there is much less urgency 
to take this course. The acknowledgment of the difference 
principle redefines the grounds for social inequalities .... " 
(TJ I 511) . 
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understand their choices, their rights and obligations. 
Although one partner may voluntarily withhold a just claim, 
each partner recognizes the options available to the other. 37 
In such an environment, genuine marriages of affection and 
reciprocity flourish, marriages built on coercion and domina-
tion collapse (Tomasi 1991, 525-528). Affection may induce 
one partner to withhold a claim, to take on a task which 
justly might be one's spouses, but unreciprocated affection 
soon dies. Both partners, as equal contracting members, 
recognize the essential give and take to the marriage, now 
that choice truly exists. 
Genuine choice also allows a variety of marital arrange-
ments to surface. Although in A Theory of Justice Rawls more 
narrowly refers to the monogamous family as part of the basic 
structure (TJ, 7), he corrected this limited definition in 
later works (PL, 258). True choice provides space within 
which individuals assume a variety of familial and sexual 
roles. This choice undermines both a sexually prescribed 
division of labor in the home and any heterosexist definition 
of family life. 
Two contractual relationships actually animate the 
family, the marital and parental. In both cases, the 
37Tomasi (1991) points out the distinction between 
possessing a right and exercising a right. Each individual 
may possess many rights which they fail to exercise, which 
they withhold, for a variety of reasons. A person's right to 
vote, participate in government, divorce, etc. does not imply 
that one must exercise all those rights. 
152 
contractual aspect of the relationship lays the groundwork for 
genuine affection between marriage partners or parents and 
children. In the marriage relationship, here understood as 
interactions between adult members (usually two) in the 
family, each partner recognizes the other as a possessor of 
rights. This recognition of the other's rights underlies the 
self-respect upon which genuine love builds. 38 As persons 
cannot be bound to tyrannical governments, marriage partners 
cannot be tied to patriarchal marriages. 
By the principle of fairness it is not possible to 
be bound to unjust institutions or at least to 
institutions which exceed the limits of tolerable 
injustice. (TJ, 112) 
Choice preserves the integrity of the marriage contract. 
In this contract, we assume certain obligations while accept-
ing certain benefits (TJ, 113). Love and affection build on 
the base provided by the marriage contract and the justice 
that contract implies. The problem becomes one of distin-
guishing domination from love, coercion from affection. Rawls 
offers a test for distinguishing justice from oppression, 
affection from exploitation: the veil of ignorance (Hampton 
1993, 240-244). The veil asks each partner to consider if the 
terms of the relationship would be acceptable if he or she 
were acting as a representative for the other person. Would 
the terms of the relationship be acceptable to a representa-
tive free of coercive influences, and lacking foresight into 
38Kyrnlicka (1989, 123-125) notes the compatibility between 
love and rights. 
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which position he/she inhabits? That is, is the relationship 
fair from either position? From this perspective, even the 
exploited will recognize exploitation. Affection would pass 
this test, oppression would not. 39 
Obviously, real choice demands the option of exit. 
Either partner can appeal to the principles of justice when 
coercion replaces affection. This right to exit follows the 
dictates of the contract, the principles of justice. So 
divorce law follows the three principles of justice, first 
establishing equal liberty, second, providing fair equality of 
opportunity, third, enhancing the possibilities of the least 
advantaged. This means that current divorce laws, for 
example, which allow women to disproportionately bear the 
burden of exit, in which a woman's standard of living drops by 
73% while the man's rises by 42%, would not satisfy these 
principles of justice. 40 Divorce law needs to be formulated 
so as to protect and enhance the prospects, the possibilities 
of self-development, of the most disadvantaged. 
39Hampton (1993, 240, 244) describes, "in a successful 
contractarian theory the contract is a (mere) device that, if 
used in the right circumstances, will call to mind and 
organize these concepts in a way that will enable us to apply 
them to diagnose successfully the presence of injustice in a 
relationship." According to Hampton, it asks, "Could all of 
us reasonably accept this if it were proposed as the subject 
of unforced, informed agreement?" 
400kin cites these statistics (1989b, 161). She does not 
directly apply them to Rawls' principles of justice, but does 
firmly believe that those principles would condemn any such 
situation (see, in particular, 1989, 174). 
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Contract theory also illuminates the parental relation-
ship, again providing a foundation for true parental nurtur-
ance and affection. In this respect, it asks the parent to 
determine whether the standards of parental rule would be 
acceptable from the child's perspective. would a representa-
tive, lacking knowledge of one's position as parent or child, 
find the terms of this relationship acceptable? 
concludes, 
We must choose for others as we have reason to 
believe they would choose for themselves if they 
were at the age of reason and deciding rational-
ly .... From the perspective of the original posi-
tion, he must assume that this is what they will 
come to recognize as for their good. (TJ, 209; see 
also, TJ, 248-249, 509) 
Rawls 
This test distinguishes abuse from discipline, exploitation 
from affection. 
This test also allows the latitude necessary for the 
family to fulfill its unique function as the first school of 
moral development, of justice. Within the family children 
should learn reciprocity (Alford 1991, 151), empathy, obliga-
tion and love. In the end, children learn that right subordi-
nates authority (see TJ, 467), that justice limits even 
parents--a valuable lesson to learn if persons are to recog-
nize and condemn oppression wherever it surfaces. Eventually 
the reciprocity experienced in the family extends to include 
individuals outside the family, in broader associations and 
society as a whole. Persons apprehend perspectives beyond 
their own, an ability fundamental to a sense of justice. 
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In the economy, like the family, Rawls provides the tools 
of transformation, while maintaining a sensitivity to culture 
and tradition. His first concern remains with autonomy, as 
demonstrated by his primary ranking of the liberty princi-
ple; 41 once this concern is met considerations of efficiency, 
incentives, and historical circumstances arise. 
The question of private property in the means of 
production or their social ownership and similar 
questions are not settled at the level of the first 
principles of justice, but depend upon the tradi-
tions and social institutions of a country and its 
particular problems and historical circumstances. 
(PL, 338) 
In other words, as long as the economic structure satisfies 
the principles of justice, peculiar circumstances determine 
the complexion of the economy. In all cases, however, the 
liberty principle compels the economy to create "a sufficient 
material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-
respect" (PL, 298). If this basis cannot be generated within 
a capitalist society, if the power relationships integral to 
private ownership of the means of production are too strong, 
than the liberty principle disallows this economic arrange-
ment. 
Rawls believes that these conditions can be met within a 
modified capitalist economy. The primary good of self -
respect, however, plays a central role in adjudicating between 
different economic regimes. Primary goods are those resources 
41 See Gutmann (1989, 339) for a discussion of the 
principles of justice as relates to economic liberties. 
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all individuals would desire to possess whatever their ends. 
As such, they serve as a measure of the efficacy of the 
principles of justice. 
We stipulate that the parties evaluate the avail-
able principles by estimating how well they secure 
the primary goods essential to realize the higher-
order interests of the person for whom each acts as 
a trustee. (PL, 75) 
Primary goods, essential to self-development (Beatty 1983, 
488), are distributed in terms of the principles of justice. 
Furthermore, the resources necessary to self-respect are also 
distributed equitably, unless an inequality advances the 
interests of the worst off. In this light, Rawls' difference 
principle distributes productive assets as well as acquisitive 
assets, at least to the extent that the former contributes (or 
diminishes) self-respect. 42 All of this demonstrates Rawls' 
overriding attention to the formation of an economic sphere in 
which women and men participate free from coercion. 
In sum, Rawls persistently confronts the barriers to 
equal liberty, wherever they surface. His treatment of the 
family demonstrates both his overriding concern for justice 
and his regard for the freedom and integrity inherent to the 
family unit. When Rawls asks, "Is the family to be 
42 See Kymlicka (1989, 111) for an argument that Rawls' 
principles also address productive assets, despite Rawls own 
proclivity to speak more narrowly in terms of income redis-
tribution. See, also, Schwarzenbach (1987, 143) for a 
thoughtful discussion of the relationship between primary 
goods and self development, self respect and allocative 
assets. Schwarzenbach identifies an "acquisitive" and 
"purposeful" conception of the self which lays behind Rawls 
economic conclusions. 
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abolished?" (TJ, 511), he recognizes the family as an oppres-
sive social institution. His answer illustrates an under-
standing of another value to family life which transcends 
patriarchy, an understanding of the family's role as a 
reservoir for affection, intimacy and personal freedom. His 
answer provides the tools for a transformation of family life, 
for an attack on patriarchy, without obliterating the family 
altogether, without crushing the private dimension of family 
relationships. His answer discerns the family as both a 
reasonable and rational entity. As such, the family must be 
both subject to the demands of justice and be allowed to move 
beyond those demands to genuine affection. As we have seen, 
Rawls' delineation of the circumstances of justice, and his 
use of the original position (as applied to the family), 
achieves exactly this end. 
Liberal Feminists and Communitarian Feminists: A Reply 
Feminist criticism of Rawls primarily arises from the 
view that his private-public distinction prohibits an effec-
tive attack on patriarchy. Liberal feminists challenge Rawls' 
perceived reluctance to apply the principles of justice 
directly to the family, attributing this to a remnant of 
patriarchal bias on Rawls' part. They contend that to the 
extent that Rawls implicitly accepts a disturbing assumption 
that the family is inherently private, he fails to engage 
patriarchy at its origin. 
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In contrast, I have argued that Rawls understands the 
family as both private and public, rational and reasonable. 
He illustrates the family as operating both in the basic 
structure and as an association. Integrating both facets of 
modern family life, his liberal paradigm provides an avenue 
which challenges familial patriarchy, while protecting an 
opportunity for genuine, self-originating, community. When 
the circumstances of justice prevail, the family is understood 
as public and the principles of justice apply. When the 
circumstances of association prevail, when a true mutuality of 
ends and desires exist, justice remains in the background. 
Rawls' failure to specifically and explicitly expose the 
repercussions of the principles of justice for the family 
results not from a patriarchal bias, but rather from a choice 
of focus. Rawls hopes to elucidate a small number of concepts 
which, by extension, can be specifically applied to an ever 
greater range of social institutions and practices. Rawls 
assumes the family is just only in order to expose the broader 
societal principles of justice; once these are discerned, one 
can convert them for use in more complex cases - -like the 
family. Rawls assumes the family is just only in order to 
hold it constant, for the moment, in order to explore more 
general questions of justice. In his view, 
A constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a 
series of subjects, starting say with principles of 
political justice for the basic structure of a 
closed and a self-contained democratic society. 
That done ... the constructivist procedure is modi-
fied to fit the subject in question. In due course 
all the main principles are on hand, including 
those needed for the various political duties and 
obligations of individuals and associations. 
(Rawls 1993, 39) 
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With this method, Rawls apprehends both the special nature of 
the family unit and the relevance of justice to that same 
family unit (see Rawls 1993, 40). 
As early as A Theory of Justice Rawls discloses the 
limited scope of his project, confessing that he makes no 
attempt to address virtues, other than justice, in a systemat-
ic way (TJ, 17). In this regard, the family presents a 
particularly complicated picture, blending important private 
virtues with the virtue of justice. As such, Rawls puts the 
question of justice in the family aside for the moment, 
concentrating on constructing a paradigm which at a later 
stage may be appropriately extended to the family. 43 Rawls 
reiterates his intent in Political Liberalism: "I believe 
also, though I do not try to show in these lectures, that the 
alleged difficulties in discussing problems of gender and the 
family can be overcome" (PL, xxix) . 
In Rawls' words, he concentrates on ideal theory in which 
"everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in 
upholding just institutions" (TJ, 8); for our purposes, he 
assumes the family acts justly. By doing so, he: 
presents a conception of a just society that we are 
to achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to 
43Rawls explains, "Of course, in a broader inquiry the 
institution of the family might be questioned and other 
arrangements might indeed prove to be preferable" (TJ, 413). 
be judged in light of this conception and held to 
be unjust to the extent that they depart from it 
without sufficient reason. (TJ, 246; see also TJ, 
391; PL, 285) ~ ~ 
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So, non-ideal theory builds upon ideal theory, pointing to the 
discrepancies revealed by ideal theory, suggesting remedies, 
applying the principles of justice to specific cases. Rawls 
tells the reader that his first concern involves ideal theory, 
non-ideal theory will flow from this. 
Unlike the liberal feminist reading of Rawls, the 
communitarian feminists find Rawls' principles to be inextri-
cably implicated in patriarchy. These feminists challenge 
three fundamental components of Rawls' theory: his perceived 
distinctions between universals and particulars, justice and 
care, and obligation and duty. Far from ignoring particulars, 
however, Rawls' political philosophy presents an opportunity 
for a full consideration of others, their unique circumstances 
and relationships. Both Rawls' A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism begin as a defense of unique and separate 
persons. In the former, he takes utilitarianism to task for 
inadequately protecting individual ends, concluding that 
"utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction 
between persons" (TJ, 27) . Poli ti cal Liberalism pursues this 
agenda; here Rawls accounts for the intractability of plural-
ism, which necessarily results from conceiving of persons as 
distinct, free and equal--as liberal. 
Our individual and associative points of view, 
intellectual affinities, and affective attachments, 
are too diverse, especially in a free society, to 
enable those doctrines to serve as the basis of 
lasting and reasoned political agreement. (PL, 58) 
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Political Liberalism accounts for what Rawls calls burdens of 
judgment. That is, given the reality of the human experience, 
competing claims, distinct persons, difficult choices, lasting 
unanimity remains an elusive--and dangerous--goal. 44 Persons 
inevitably differ in beliefs, perspectives and desires. Rawls 
recognizes "the burdens of justice as limiting what can be 
justified to others" (PL, 81); the burdens of judgment require 
pluralism. 
Diversity necessitates a political framework which 
apprehends the fair terms of cooperation among persons with 
varying life plans. 45 Rather than erase differences, Rawls 
celebrates them, providing space for a variety of persons, 
conceptions of the good and of the good life. Rawls does this 
by discerning the common ground upon which we all stand, by 
delineating the breadth of that common ground and the variety 
it accommodates. This is the aim of his original position 
which models the liberal conception of separate persons 
working out a fair and reasonable agreement for life together. 
In order for the agreement to be fair it must not be biased by 
44 PL, 56-57, details an incomplete list of the sources of 
the burdens of judgement. These range from the conflicting 
nature of evidence to differing personal and institutional 
perspectives. 
45
"Justice as fairness works from the fundamental ideas 
of society as a fair system of cooperation together with the 
conception of the person as free and equal" (PL, 167). See 
also Kukathas and Pettit (1990, 135-139) for their discussion 
of diversity and stability in Rawls' thought. 
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the arbitrary natural and social position of the parties to 
the agreement. No one can be allowed to favor one's own 
interests in this agreement. "Each is forced to choose for 
everyone" (TJ, 140) ; each is forced to consider the benefit of 
every, and any, other party to the agreement. 46 Far from 
ignoring particulars, Rawls' veil of ignorance presents an 
opportunity for a full consideration of others, their unique 
circumstances and relationships. Rather than abstract from 
differences, it encourages parties to consider differences by 
releasing them from enslavement to personal desires and 
circumstances (see Okin 1989a). Allowing insight into the 
multiple dimensions of various familial and economic relation-
ships, Rawls provides the tools for a revolution of those same 
relationships. 
Social unity connotes the balancing of various elements, 
not the reduction of different parts to one abstract whole. 
As such, the original position incorporates a notion of 
persons as rational and reasonable, as possessing two moral 
powers: a rational capacity to pursue instrumental, often 
competing individual and associational ends, and a reasonable 
capacity to frame social structures so as to constitute fair 
cooperation. The original position mirrors these rational and 
reasonable moral powers: the rational aspects of the person 
460kin (1989b, 231-244) forcefully and effectively makes 
this point. As Okin notes, Rawls' use of rational choice 
theory undermines this aspect of the veil of ignorance. Rawls 
pulls back from rational choice theory language in Political 
Liberalism. 
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are reflected in the purposes of the agreement itself. That 
is, the parties in the original position further the particu-
lar interests of the person they represent. The reasonable 
aspects are reflected in the constraints essential to the 
original position, in the restrictions on knowledge of 
personal, natural and social positions which induce parties to 
consider fair terms of agreement and compels them to consider 
justice (see PL, 305). Thus, the original position serves as 
a device of representation, not as a depiction of abstract or 
atomistic persons. 47 It allows "reflective detachment" 
(Macedo 1990, 245) which blends individual ends with social 
responsibilities. 
Considered convictions underlie the original position 
which both expresses our liberal intuitions of freedom and 
equality, and serves as a measure of the coherence of our 
conclusions. 48 We use the original position to expose the 
implications of our liberal intuitions and, just as 
47
"As a device of representation the idea of the original 
position serves as a means of public reflection and self-
clarif ication. It helps us work out what we now think, once 
we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what 
justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens" (PL, 26). See 
also PL, 27-28. Here Rawls contends that although it may 
appearas though "the essential nature of persons is indepen-
dent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including 
their final ends and attachments" actually this is an "illu-
sion," a function of the original position acting as a device 
of representation. 
48 In my reading "considered convictions," in A Theory of 
Justice correspond with "liberal intuitions" in Poli ti cal 
Liberalism. 
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importantly, to test those convictions and the viability of 
the original position and its constraints. Rawls explains: 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the 
conditions of the contractual circumstances, at 
others withdrawing our judgments and conforming 
them to principle, I assume that eventually we 
shall find a description of the initial situation 
that both expresses reasonable conditions and 
yields principles which match our considered judg-
ments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of 
affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium. (TJ, 
20) 
This method demonstrates the sensitivity to context of his 
theory of justice. Rawls does not, nor did he ever, claim to 
elucidate universal principles to be imposed, haphazardly, on 
unique political circumstances; as he stresses in Political 
Liberalism, "We start ... by looking to the public culture 
itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas 
and principles." He concludes by "saying that a political 
conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our 
considered convictions" (PL, 8). 
Whereas some feminists misread in Rawls' thought an 
opposition between the universal and the particular, other 
feminists incorrectly locate a dichotomy between justice and 
care. This perceived opposition actually denotes an integra-
tion of both perspectives. As my analysis of marriage 
demonstrates, rather than denying the possibility of care, 
Rawls' presentation of justice lays the foundation for 
genuine, non-exploitative care. Rather than reducing all 
relationships to their contractual components, Rawls articu-
lates the terms of a fair relationship, the foundation of true 
affection. 
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In this light, justice complements rather than 
opposes care. 49 Rawls states this vividly when he concludes 
that "the sense of justice is continuous with the love of 
mankind" (TJ, 476). 
Finally, the alleged opposition between obligation and 
duty in Rawls also results from a misperception. Feminist 
critics have mistakenly located a dichotomy between voluntary 
and non-voluntary relationships in Rawls' treatment of 
obligation and duty. Rawls' aim, however, is to draw out the 
voluntary components of potentially coercive social struc-
tures. For example, it is because "political power is always 
coercive power backed by the government's use of sanctions" 
(PL, 136) that constructs such as the original position are 
necessary to elucidate the voluntary dimension of that 
relationship, the fair terms of cooperation. Similarly, 
because family duties are given, the same device of represen-
tation defines fair terms of cooperation in that relationship, 
thereby enhancing the voluntary component, choice, in the 
familial sphere. Duties do not oppose obligations; they blend 
together to form a complex matrix of human relationships, to 
some of which justice is pertinent (see TJ, 115-116). 
In sum, the communitarian feminist critique of Rawls 
incorrectly interprets Rawls' intent and conclusions. In 
criticizing Rawls on these bases, they overlook the avenue 
49Hampton (1993) and Kymlicka (1990a, 275) both point this 
out. 
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available in Rawls' thought for identifying domination 
regardless of its acceptance by both the oppressed and 
oppressor. Feminists have long argued that patriarchy is 
pervasive across, and within, cultures. Patriarchy consti-
tutes one of the best examples of a form of oppression for 
which, at times, both the oppressor and oppressed have offered 
support. Witness some women's historical support of foot 
binding or, for that matter, high heels. In such an atmo-
sphere of oppression less articulate or unspoken perspectives 
are of ten lost. Rawls' method provides a strategy for 
articulating a perspective which an actual participant in the 
oppression fails to comprehend. Sometimes justice must reach 
beyond the perspective of the "concrete other" (Benhabib 1987) 
to voice an impartial condemnation of an accepted oppression. 
Rawls' original position does exactly this. 50 He reaches 
50 Some scholars of Rawls' work argue that his later 
writings represent a retreat from this liberating vision (see, 
for example, Kloska 1993). In contrast, Kukathas and Pettit 
(1990) identify the shift in Rawls' writings as one of 
emphasis, from desirability to feasibility. In this interpre-
tation, A Theory of Justice portrays the desirability of the 
terms of cooperation; Political Liberalism demonstrates the 
feasibility of terms of cooperation. Rawls, in his most 
recent article "The Law of Peoples" (1993, 38) grapples with 
the extension of the principles of justice to foreign policy. 
Here he "indicates the role of human rights as part of a 
reasonable law of peoples." Rawls argues this because "In 
the absence of this extension to the law of peoples, a liberal 
conception of political justice would appear to be historicist 
and apply only to societies whose political institutions and 
culture are liberal. In making this case for justice as 
fairness, and for similar, more general liberal conceptions, 
it is essential to show that this is not so" (my emphasis). 
Whatever one's interpretation, however, Rawls never denies the 
possibility of a growing appeal and acceptance of what he 
calls "liberal intuitions." (For a persuasive argument along 
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beyond often oppressive community values to create a picture 
of just relationships, to delineate the fair terms of coopera-
tion. 
In conclusion, Rawls' liberal principles contain the 
potential for critically exposing and denouncing women's 
oppression, regardless of the context. Rawls' principles of 
justice protect individuals, their right for self -development, 
while enhancing the possibility of just, chosen communities 
and relationships. Rawls' principles of justice blend an 
understanding of persons as constituted by historical and 
cultural circumstances with a perception into the "self -
authenticating" dimension of personhood. As such, Rawls 
supports liberal individual liberty with the substantive means 
to exercise that liberty. He provides the tools, the primary 
goods, necessary for the realization of women's liberty. 
these lines, see Schwarzenbach 1991, 549.) 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: LIBERALISM AND FEMINISM: 
ARE THE TWO MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE? 
Four related claims emerge from these chapters. First, 
anti-liberal feminists have generally misread liberal theory. 
By focusing on a particular theorist's contingent claims, 
these feminists overlook the deeper, valuable principles 
animating liberal theory. Second, as a result, they have 
failed to grasp the enormous potential of liberalism for 
women's empowerment. Liberalism presents an ideal which 
applies to women as well as men; despite feminist assertions 
to the contrary, liberalism supports and strengthens women's 
quest for equality. Third, liberalism can fully accommodate 
feminism, indeed providing full theoretical support for many 
of the alternatives feminists provide. Finally, to the extent 
that feminists abandon liberalism, they imperil their own 
project. The essential feature of liberalism is the identifi-
cation of private spheres of activities within which individu-
ality is developed and expressed. Liberalism represents the 
only movement in political philosophy which founds and 
sustains a systematic defense of the individual based in a 
distinction between private and public activities. In 
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rejecting liberalism, some feminism lose the protection it 
offers the individual. 
Feminist, have generally, misread the potential and 
intent of particular liberal thinkers. Locke, for example, 
differentiates between private and public in an attempt to 
protect the individual from the arbitrary use of state power. 
He limits the scope of political power, while basing legiti-
mate political authority on consent. Distinguishing paternal 
power from political power to ensure the adult status of 
liberal citizens, Locke disarms tyrannies which would rob 
persons of the freedom of action compatible with the capacity 
for reason. Feminists who narrowly interpret Locke's distinc-
tion to privilege self-interested reason over compassion, man 
over woman, politics over family, overlook and distort both 
the intent and potential built into this early liberal 
expression. 
In distinguishing political relationships from parental, 
marital, economic, and religious relationships, Locke express-
es a liberal understanding of individuals acting in a variety 
of spheres. Liberalism, as it began with Locke and continued 
with Mill and Rawls, has always been about creating a communi-
ty of communities, uniting complex persons and diverse people 
in a cooperative, stable society. Locke explores the relation 
between political liberty and familial, economic and religious 
ends, differentiating between each in order to secure each. 
Still, he never portrays these spheres as entirely separate, 
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dichotomous, or reified. Rather he provides a framework which 
assimilates the unique character of each sphere with a 
rudimentary understanding of the interdependence and interac-
tion between spheres. More specifically, Locke locates the 
differing purposes of families and politics, while implicitly 
recognizing the role government plays in protecting life, 
liberty and property, even within families. Moreover, he 
explicitly incorporates the role of families in nurturing 
liberal citizens, in supplying the requisite background 
conditions of a liberal political system. 
Mill pursues the liberal project of expanding individual 
choice by protecting the individual from another threat--the 
majority. He identifies a tyranny as great, or greater, than 
political tyranny and distinguishes between private and public 
in an attempt to protect the individual from the stunting, 
pervasive whims of a social tyranny. To this end, he elabo-
rates a standard of harm which distinguishes areas of individ-
ual concern from legitimate community interests, while 
offering a standard of privacy to which both men and women can 
appeal. Feminists who construe this private-public distinc-
tion to celebrate abstract reason over emotion misunderstand 
Mill's project. Alternatively, feminists who deny the 
efficacy of Mill's liberal principles in the battle against 
coercive familial and economic control mistake the extent to 
which this standard protects women from harm, wherever it 
surfaces. 
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Mill's use of the concept of harm to distinguish private 
from public concerns manifests a keener sense of the private 
bases of public power than apparent in Locke's thought. In 
Mill's view private is not distinguished from public simply in 
terms of spheres and their purposes, but also in terms of 
impact on the individual. Harm to another legitimates 
political intervention. By recognizing and addressing harm 
regardless of the sphere within which it occurs, Mill grapples 
with the unique harm done to women in families. 
Particularly troubling to feminist critics of liberalism 
is its perceived inability for dealing with the complexity of 
family life. Feminists fear that the liberal distinction 
between private and public inappropriately romanticizes 
families, sheltering supposedly free expressions of marital 
and parental love from damaging state intervention. Many 
feminists charge that this image of family life fails to 
portray reality accurately. Families also enslave, destroying 
individual integrity and hope. Parents abuse children; 
spouses abuse spouses. 
Mill explicitly and potently meets this feminist chal-
lenge to liberalism. He recognizes the historical reality in 
which families capture and enslave women, in which husbands 
rape and maim, and in which women lack redress. But he does 
this while insisting on the possibility that the family may 
live up to the liberal promise of individual integrity; he 
does this while providing for familial sanctuary from the 
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dictates of political and social coercion. In essence, Mill's 
private-public distinction alleviates the potential harm done 
to women in families, while allowing room for individually 
chosen marital and parental arrangements. Mill's harm 
standard legitimates intervention in the family to bar one 
member from harming another. He views any other reason for 
intervention, such as moral repugnance or righteous distaste, 
as illegitimate, an inappropriate use of political power. 
Rawls understands that individual choice demands not only 
freedom of action but also the material and cultural resources 
imperative to exercise that freedom. He employs an original 
position characterized by a veil of ignorance which reveals 
the fair terms of cooperation among individuals. Rawls' 
method seeks to remove personal bias in political reasoning; 
justice surfaces when each individual accounts for the needs 
of every other individual, when each individual possesses fair 
access to the primary goods necessary to maximize authentic 
individual choice. Feminists misinterpret the consequences of 
Rawls' method when they conclude that it yields an inhuman 
distinction between an impartial and particular perspective, 
between universal and particular concerns. Rather, Rawls' 
method allows an understanding of the particular concerns of 
another by removing the personal prejudices and motives of 
each. 
By redefining private and public to explicitly include a 
concern for the distribution of resources necessary to 
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exercise true choice, Rawls advances the liberal agenda. 
Whereas Mill leaves open an avenue to such a policy, made 
manifest by seriously pursuing the implications of his 
positive notion of liberty, Rawls specifically charts the 
egalitarian consequence of grounding a political philosophy on 
liberty. Unlike Locke and Mill, Rawls consciously buttresses 
liberty with the worth of liberty, formal equality with 
substantive equality. Like Locke and Mill, Rawls begins with 
liberty as a first principle, but unlike them, he extends the 
liberal understanding of that first principle by explicitly 
supporting it with a second which demands fair equality of 
opportunity and fair access to primary goods. 
Thus, Rawls broadens Mill's harm principle, recognizing 
that protection from harm alone will not suffice. Rather, 
genuine liberty demands fair play. His original position, and 
the principles derived from it, express the standards of fair 
play, of just societal conditions conducive to individual 
liberty. The difference principle furnishes the necessary 
background conditions of the first principle, of liberty. 
Specifically, Rawls' liberal principles provide for affirma-
tive action aimed at alleviating the burdens of the least 
advantaged groups--including those burdened as members of an 
oppressed class based on sex. 
Rawls' treatment of the family testifies to the potential 
of the liberal private-public distinction in confronting a 
variety of threats to individual liberty. In recognizing the 
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family both as an essential institution of the basic structure 
and as a private association, he incorporates the two dimen-
sional nature of family life into the liberal paradigm: the 
liberal appreciation of the family as a chosen affectionate 
arrangement and the feminist perception of the family as a 
male dominated tyranny. Rawls comprehends the family as a 
significant barrier to opportunity, and offers a model aimed 
at removing that barrier, without undermining its integrity. 
As an institution of the basic structure, the principles of 
justice pertain to the family. When the circumstances of 
justice exist, that is, when conflicting interests motivate 
family members, the principles of justice dictate equal 
liberty followed by a distribution of resources which favors 
the least advantaged. This scheme strengthens the bargaining 
position, the possibility for genuine liberty of any oppressed 
member in the family. When affection replaces conflict, when 
a commonality of interest eliminates discord, justice provides 
the backdrop within which sincere affection and authentic 
individual choice prevails. Thus, Rawls' private-public 
distinction grapples with patriarchal families while preserv-
ing the liberal appreciation for the sanctity of family life. 
Apparent in the evolution of ideas among the liberal 
thinkers studied here is an increasing understanding and 
integration of the material and relational bases of individual 
autonomy and choice. Liberalism expands to incorporate and 
address each new public and private threat to individual 
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liberty. Each of these three philosophers struggles to strike 
a balance between liberty and equality, between choice (that 
is, individual initiative which generates variety and inequal-
ity) and the equality necessary to actualize that choice. As 
each liberal thinker uncovers the implications and repercus-
sions of a liberal political philosophy centered on individual 
choice, each furthers the liberal project by assimilating the 
dynamics of liberty at work in real social, political situa-
tions. In other words, the evolution among these liberal 
thinkers exposes a heightening sensitivity to the link between 
formal and substantive equality, between liberty and the worth 
of liberty. 
In sum, liberalism, and its private-public distinction, 
begins in a concern for individual choice, evolving to an 
ever-growing awareness of the substantive bases of those 
choices. Women's empowerment requires just such an under-
standing of choice, of women's need for freedom from arbitrary 
patriarchal encroachments on their choice and of women's need 
for appropriate bases from which to exercise genuine choice. 
As such, despite many feminist assertions to the contrary, 
liberalism remains a potent weapon against oppression wherever 
it surfaces. Patriarchy begins in women's diminished choices 
in the family which reverberate throughout other social 
spheres. Liberalism combats patriarchy at its roots and in 
its effects by expanding individual choice in a variety of 
human relationships, including those relationships expressed 
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in the familial and economic spheres. Liberalism can recog-
nize the pervasive character of patriarchy, its impact on all 
spheres of activity, while protecting the unique character and 
purpose of different spheres. Patriarchy taints economic, 
religious, political and familial relationships; liberalism 
can fight the patriarchy in these relationships without 
destroying them. 
The demand by some feminists for an alternative political 
paradigm rests on a mistaken reading of liberalism. Rightly 
understood liberalism can accommodate many feminist versions 
of the appropriate private-public distinction. Indeed, in 
this reading, liberalism incorporates O'Brien's distinction 
between "intimate" and "public" space. This interpretation of 
liberalism also negates Pateman's rejection of its private-
public distinction as overly and artificially separated and 
opposed, while integrating her call for a paradigm which 
distinguishes personal from political life. 
Similarly, feminists who reject liberalism's abstract, 
impartial character fail to apprehend the potential of the 
liberal distinction between private and public. Contrary to 
this feminist reading, liberalism offers full theoretical 
support for a "communicative ethic" which integrates a 
situated analysis into political discussion; only an overly 
narrow reading of liberalism can justify the claim that this 
alternative lies beyond the reach of liberal politics. 
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Communicative ethics displaces the opposition which 
liberals supposedly impose between reason and feelings. 
Desires, particulars and emotions now gain entrance into the 
process of public justification; this situated analysis 
exposes the necessity of a redistributive as well as distribu-
ti ve politics. Correctly understood, however, liberalism 
allows the situated analysis these feminists desire. The 
impartial character of liberal politics some feminists reject 
actually encourages each person to fully appreciate and 
comprehend the particular perspective of another. One must 
step out of oneself to truly know another, especially when 
oppression and prejudice color, and narrow, our sympathy. In 
forcing persons to discount personal bias, Rawls encourages a 
"situated analysis" of the other person's circumstances. 
Liberalism facilitates, rather than negates, a communicative 
ethics and sheds light on the power relationships operating in 
society which require structural transformations over and 
above mere distribution. Once one fully understands another's 
oppression, one not only apprehends the personal impact of 
that oppression but also the structural dynamics behind it, 
the power relations which undermine self-respect and the real 
possibility of individual success. 
The liberal private-public distinction looks very similar 
to the "differentiated continuum" to which many feminists 
appeal. Liberalism draws out the choices available in the 
multitude of relationships persons live, while fully 
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understanding the non-voluntary component of each of those 
relationships. Liberalism blends an appreciation of the 
possibility of choice with a growing cognizance of the threats 
to that choice. As such, liberalism apprehends the dual 
character of human life. On one hand, each person is victim 
to circumstance, to the physical and social particulars of 
one's birth. On the other, each is agent to the future, 
creatively choosing among alternatives, framing unique life 
plans from predetermined environments. In recognizing the 
peculiar constitution of each special sphere, liberalism 
maximizes choice in each while allowing insight into the non-
voluntary components of diverse relationships. It assimilates 
the non-voluntarily acquired aspect of parenting, or mother-
ing, with arrangements to accentuate the voluntary aspect of 
such relationships. Liberalism expands choice; women need not 
become mothers, or wives, because feasible options exist. 
Moreover, if one chooses to mother, liberalism undercuts the 
oppressive outcome of that choice. 
Not only can liberalism accommodate many feminist 
alternatives, it also guards against those alternatives which 
threaten individual liberty, which require inappropriate 
violations of one sphere by another. Elshtain's "compassion-
ate politics" for example, does reach beyond the limits of 
liberalism. Liberals cherish their adult status, seeking 
fairness in 
compassion. 
politics 
While 
rather than dangerous, paternalistic 
appropriate to the personal familial 
179 
sphere, compassion translates poorly to the political sphere 
where persons do not, cannot, know the particular desires and 
ends of every other person. In such circumstances, compassion 
endangers individuality, imposing tyrannically designated ends 
on adults reasonable enough to choose their own ends in 
situations of fair cooperation. 
In general, anti-liberal feminists endanger their own 
agenda by dismissing the liberal paradigm. Rejecting liberal -
ism entails a denial of the one essential feature of liberal-
ism, a distinction between private and public spheres of 
activities. Private life, a realm where the individual may 
retreat from the social and political pressures of modern 
life, constitutes a fundamental component of liberalism and of 
the feminist aim of women's emancipation. Both sexes require 
an arena within which they are left alone, within which the 
individual, and her/his choices, reign. Liberalism constructs 
and protects such an arena. Feminism requires a liberal 
understanding of privacy if it hopes to protect individual 
choice. 
Feminism can use this paradigm in order to expand women's 
choices, women's empowerment, while retaining the liberal 
protection of genuine choice from authoritarian encroachment. 
The liberal thinkers studied here reconciled the reality that 
individuals live in, and often cherish social groups, with an 
acknowledgment of the coercive character of those groups. 
They achieved this by recognizing both the private and public 
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dimensions of various human relationships. Locke began this 
liberal paradigm of private and public spheres by separating 
the political from other private spheres. Mill extended it by 
identifying legitimate and illegitimate reasons for political 
intervention in private lives. Rawls deepened the liberal 
understanding of private and public life by differentiating 
between the right and the good, between the reasonable and the 
rational. These philosophers have shown that individual 
liberty requires fair and explicit terms of cooperation, 
blended with the greatest possible latitude in choice. 
The paradigm which liberalism offers to feminism is not 
one which creates a private-public distinction, but rather 
private-public distinctions. Inherent to liberalism, to each 
of the liberal philosophies studied here, is an identification 
of multiple spheres of life, each with its own character and 
dynamic. Indeed liberalism adopts this view as early as Locke 
and carries it through Rawls' notion of a cornrnuni ty of 
communities. Liberalism protects an individual acting in a 
multitude of relationships, and respects the unique character 
of those various relationships, without falling prey to the 
relativism characteristic of the most recent expression of a 
"spheres of justice" approach espoused by Michael Walzer. 
Locke's natural law, Mill's utilitarianism, and Rawls' 
contract theory save them from the relativism implied by 
basing political ideals in "shared understandings." In each 
case explored here, liberal individuals act within a variety 
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of human relationships without ever being totally defined by 
any one, or group of those relationships. Through an exercise 
of genuine choice, individuals transcend the totality of their 
relationships. 
Women's equality demands both the liberal recognition of 
a variety of spheres operating according to private and public 
dimensions and the liberal insight into individuality which 
transcends community. Women's history exposes the oppressive 
potential of community life, the danger inherent to shared 
understandings. Liberalism locates an individual who is not 
merely defined by that communal oppression, but who may also 
reach beyond those oppressive circumstances to express his or 
her own individuality. Liberalism maximizes the possibility 
for authentic choice, for individuals forming themselves, 
within the context of rich and diverse, sometimes oppressive, 
relationships. 
Many questions remain unanswered, however. The public 
policy implications of these private-public distinctions need 
to be elaborated, struggled over, revised, implemented, and 
struggled over again. Liberalism offers a paradigm within 
which these policy discussions can take place. Although the 
complexity of human life and relationships deny us easy 
answers, standards such as harm and fairness off er us a 
rational, liberal base from which to begin these discussions. 
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